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Abstract 
 
A growing awareness of the devastating impact of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on 
international peace and security inspired multilateral efforts in the 20th century to alleviate 
the threat posed by these weapons. These efforts culminated in the adoption the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty (1968), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (1997). This complex of WMD disarmament regimes, which 
was expanded by the recent adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
2017, provides legal frameworks for reducing, and eventually eliminating, all WMD stockpiles. 
The disarmament literature tends to place a focus on political, technical, scientific and military 
aspects surrounding the implementation of disarmament regimes, while largely neglecting 
their legal architecture and the wider role of international law in the field of disarmament. 
However, developments in recent years, including the ad hoc chemical disarmament of Syria, 
the Marshall Islands lawsuit brought against the nuclear weapons states at the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), and the adoption of the new treaty on nuclear weapons, have accorded 
increased attention to international legal aspects surrounding disarmament. 
In the context of these movements, this thesis intends to make a two-fold contribution. First, 
it addresses gaps in the disarmament literature by offering a comprehensive up-to-date 
analysis of the international law on disarmament, including of recent legal debates. As a 
second contribution, it will provide a novel evaluation of the legal effectiveness of 
disarmament regimes by identifying criteria which are considered crucial for successful 
disarmament and applying them to the respective WMD regimes. Through this dual 
examination of legal and practical aspects surrounding disarmament, this thesis aims to offer 
useful insights and support to both international legal scholars and disarmament practitioners 
in the appropriate interpretation, implementation and strengthening of disarmament 
regimes. 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1. Background and Research Problem 
1.1. Background to the Research 
Over the 19th and 20th centuries, disarmament has emerged as a key area of international 
relations. Given its central role in the maintenance of peace and security, disarmament has 
become a high priority on the agenda of the international community.1 In light of the 
continuing threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the devastating 
humanitarian impact of their use, as well as excessive global military expenditure caused by 
the costly maintenance of vast weapons stockpiles, disarmament remains of relevance.2 
Today, disarmament goals are pursued through a cooperative and rule-based approach in the 
form of multilateral treaty regimes which provide a legal framework for collective 
disarmament efforts.3 Yet, the effectiveness of disarmament regimes can be questioned on a 
number of grounds. Two types of challenges for the effective execution of disarmament 
norms can be distinguished. 
The first set of challenges is related to the legal architecture of the regimes itself, which may 
lead to discrepancies between the standards established by disarmament norms on the one 
hand, and state conduct on the other. For instance, structural weaknesses in the treaty regime 
may result from conflicting interests during treaty negotiations or from the withdrawal of 
participating states.4 As these treaty regimes were adopted several decades ago, they require 
                                                          
1 Ban Ki-Moon, ‘The World is Over-armed and Peace is Under-Funded’, Opinion Piece, 30 August 2012, available 
at http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20120830/ 
2 Hans Blix, Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, ‘From a Cold War to a Cold Peace’, 
Lecture at UCLA, 28 April 2008. 
3 Hans Blix, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Arms, (Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Commission, 2006) 18. 
4 For example, the asymmetry in the NPT regime has led to discrimination between nuclear weapons states and 
non-nuclear weapons states, as different obligations are imposed upon both. Furthermore, the BTWC is often 
dismissed as a ‘failure’ due to the inability of negotiators to attach a verification regime to the treaty, which has 
significantly limited its authority in contrast with the CWC. 
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continuous strengthening and adaptation in order to withstand emerging challenges and to 
prevent the erosion of their disarmament norms.5 
The second set of challenges is related to the external environment in which disarmament 
regimes are operated. This environment is generally marked by a lack of mutual trust among 
participants in disarmament regimes, political tensions and instances of non-compliance. 
Disarmament regimes are exposed to the political will of their parties. This vulnerability may 
manifest itself in their reluctance to ratify disarmament treaties, to reduce weapons 
stockpiles as required, to comply with verification and monitoring procedures or even their 
modernisation of weapons stockpiles contrary to the goals and purposes of disarmament.  
For example, although Syria was not a party to the CWC at the time, its decision to use 
chemical weapons in 2013 sparked debates regarding the legal and diplomatic mechanisms 
available to end this use and to prompt Syria to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpiles. In 
particular, the Syrian case raised questions related to its implications for the health of the 
CWC regime. A second movement, the Marshall Islands’ lawsuit in 2014 against the nine de 
facto nuclear weapons states at the ICJ also moved legal questions surrounding disarmament 
into the centre of attention. Questions related to the legal scope and nature of the obligation 
under Article VI, NPT had been left unanswered since the ICJ’s 1996 Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of Nuclear Weapons. They remain open to date, given that the lawsuits failed to move 
to the merits stage. 
These examples of increased attention given to legal issues must be viewed within the general 
context of renewed attention to disarmament in high politics, and in particular at the UN level. 
Furthermore, recent North Korean missile test launches also led to responses at the UN, 
including UNSC statements condemning such launches and resolutions tightening and 
expanding existing sanctions.6 More generally, nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and 
disarmament gained stronger attention following the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review under US 
                                                          
5 For example, the limited control disarmament treaties have over non-state actors and non-states parties may 
limit its scope, see Chapter 3 on the chemical disarmament of Syria as a third party to the CWC. 
6 UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, (S/PRST/2017/16), 29 August 2017; UNSC res 2375 
(2017), (S/RES/2375), 11 September 2017; UNSC res 2397 (2017), (S/RES/2397), 22 December 2017; UNSC res 
2407 (2018), (S/RES/2407), 31 March 2018. 
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President Trump,7 which was interpreted by some as the announcement of a new nuclear 
arms race.8 Together with, debates on prospects for nuclear disarmament reopened. 
Since 2014, the Humanitarian Initiative and in particular the Humanitarian Pledge, a political 
commitment to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons, attracted the formal 
support of 127 states.9 It reflected the dissatisfaction of non-nuclear weapons states with the 
status quo in nuclear disarmament. Eventually, this dissatisfaction and uncertainties 
surrounding the fate of New START10 paved the way for the adoption of the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.11  
In light of the generally slow pace of progress in disarmament, this momentum generated in 
the wider disarmament movement is a valuable opportunity for reflection on the strengths 
and weaknesses of existing regimes with a view to their strengthening and expansion. 
Although multilateral discussion fora such as the General Assembly and the Conference on 
Disarmament enable states to achieve consensus and produce important outcome 
documents, they do not offer an in-depth analysis of important theoretical and legal issues. 
However, in order to fully take advantage of the current momentum, states must also 
understand and address the legal dimension of disarmament. For this reason, research on the 
role of international law in disarmament is of high temporal relevance. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 United States Office of the Secretary of Defence, ‘Nuclear Posture Review 2018,’ 2 February 2018.  
8 Katrina van den Heuvel, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review Signals a New Arms Race’, The Nation, 13 February 2018, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-nuclear-posture-review-signals-a-new-arms-race/ ; Omar Lamari, ‘An 
Arms Race Toward Global Instability,’ Forbes, 20 February 2018,  https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
stratfor/2018/02/20/an-arms-race-toward-global-instability/   (both accessed 20 March 2018);  
9 ICAN, ‘Humanitarian Pledge’, 9 December 2014, http://www.icanw.org/pledge/ (accessed 8 July 2018); the 
Pledge was adopted by the UNGA as one of four resolutions: UNGA res L.13, ‘Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear 
Disarmament Negotiations’ (A/C.1/70/L.13/Rev.1), 29 October 2015; UNGA res L.37, ‘Humanitarian 
Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, (A/C.1/70/L.37), 21 October 2015; UNGA res L.40, ‘Ethical Imperatives for 
a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World’, (A/C.1/70/L.40), 21 October 2015; UNGA res L.24, ‘Humanitarian Pledge for 
the Prohibition and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons’, (A/RES/71/47), 14 October 2016. 
10 Nikolai Sokov, ‘New START Expires in Three Years – And Nobody Knows What Comes Next’, The National 
Interest 6 February 2018 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/new-start-expires-3-years-nobody-knows-what-
comes-next-24379  (accessed 1 March 2018). 
11 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, UNTC, 7 July 2018: As of June 2018, the treaty has 10 states 
Parties and will enter into force 90 days following its ratification by 50 states.  
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2. Research Problem 
In light of the potential threat the use or possession of WMD poses for international peace 
and security, the mere creation of regimes imposing their elimination is not sufficient. Given 
the implications of arms reductions for national security, the ability of such regimes to 
influence state conduct in a precise and predictable manner is crucial for the sustainable and 
irreversible disarmament of WMD by all states. For this reason, it is important to continuously 
re-evaluate the ability of disarmament regimes to fulfil their purpose. 
Such an evaluation must account for both the legal character of disarmament regimes and 
the non-legal aspects related to the environment in which they are implemented. WMD 
disarmament regimes are constructed around legal treaties which constitute the principal 
source of international law and are governed by the general norms, rules, principles and 
procedures of international law. This legal dimension is often disregarded in the disarmament 
literature.12  
Furthermore, aspects related to the nature of disarmament processes and the wider political 
environment must be considered. Frameworks for assessing regime effectiveness have been 
elaborated in areas including environmental protection13 and in the field of human rights.14 
However, such tools for assessing for the effectiveness of disarmament regimes have not 
been available. 
It can be argued that the absence of both a comprehensive analysis of the international law 
governing disarmament regimes and of means to evaluate their effectiveness, limits the 
understanding of states of the strengths and weaknesses of such regimes. Such an 
understanding is fundamental to their continuous strengthening and adaptation over time. 
Against this background, this thesis seeks to enhance the legal literature on disarmament and 
to apply the concept of effectiveness to the disarmament context.  
                                                          
12 For more detail, see Section 5: ‘Literature Review.’ 
13 Arild Underdal, Oran Young (eds), Regime Consequences – Methodological Challenges and Research 
Strategies, (Springer, 2004) [henceforth: Regime Consequences]; Edward Miles, Steinar Andresen, Elaine Carlin, 
Jon Skjærseth, Arild Underdal, Jørgen Wettestad, Environmental Regime Effectiveness - Confronting Theory with 
Evidence, (MIT Press, 2001); Olav Schram Stokke, Disaggregating International Regimes, (MIT Press, 2012). 
14 Par Engstrom, ‘Effectiveness of International and Regional Human Rights Regimes’ in Robert Denemark (ed), 
The International Studies Encyclopaedia, (Blackwell Publishing, 2010); Todd Landman, ‘Measuring the 
International Human Rights Regime’, Paper prepared for the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, San Francisco, August 30 - September 2001. 
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The evaluation of disarmament regimes undertaken in this thesis will therefore begin with an 
assessment of both their legal architecture and the tools available under international law for 
its interpretation and the identification of standards of behaviour for states. In a second step, 
state behaviour will be assessed against the legal disarmament obligations set out in the 
respective WMD treaties. By following this interdisciplinary approach, this thesis will shed 
light on the role of international law in the politically charged context of disarmament, as well 
as the boundaries of what it can achieve.  
 
3. Objectives and Scope  
The assessment of the effectiveness of disarmament regimes requires the examination of 
several sub-questions. First, the concepts of ‘disarmament’ and ‘regime effectiveness’ will be 
defined for the purpose of demonstrating the relevance and usefulness of assessing regime 
effectiveness in the context of disarmament.  
This research seeks to identify norms, rules and principles of international law applicable to 
disarmament regimes, considering both treaty obligations. In relevant cases, reference will 
also be made to issues related to customary international law. It also aims to describe the 
relationship between disarmament norms and general international law in the context of the 
fragmentation of international law. The extent to which disarmament norms can be 
considered distinct and special will shape the notion of legal ‘effectiveness’ in this research.  
Furthermore, the role and authority of international institutions, in particular of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC), in disarmament affairs will be examined. Finally, given that treaty 
regimes constitute the objects under review, a special focus will be placed on the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which offers basic rules for the interpretation of 
treaty norms, the examination of compliance issues, the applicability of norms, the right of 
states to withdraw from a treaty. 
Following this legal analysis, the central aim of this research is to define key criteria for testing 
the effectiveness of disarmament regimes. Such criteria will be drawn from the international 
relations (IR) literature on regime effectiveness and international law, and then adapted to 
the practical context of disarmament.  
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4. Research Design and Methodology 
This research follows a purely qualitative design. The rationale for excluding quantitative 
techniques is their limited suitability for exploring regime effectiveness.15 Disarmament 
regimes are defined and shaped by historical, geographical and political phenomena which 
are difficult to grasp through the application of statistical techniques. Such phenomena are 
best examined by means of case-oriented, qualitative analysis, as this makes it possible to 
analyse the specific criteria within the context of the regime as a whole.  
 
4.1.  Interdisciplinary Approach 
Disarmament is an area of international affairs in which legal and political structures overlap 
and cannot be isolated from each other. This creates a need for an expanded vision.16 Given 
that both public international law and international relations seek ‘to understand the causes 
and consequences of international cooperation, in general, and international legalisation, in 
particular,’17 an interdisciplinary approach is required. It allows the drawing of conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of regimes in the real world, which is only possible in the presence 
empirical data.18 This approach constitutes one way in which this research contributes to the 
body of knowledge in the field of disarmament, namely by establishing a connection between 
legal and political debates in the literature surrounding disarmament, which generally remain 
separate. 
The primary focus of this research will be placed on issues of public international law, which 
will be examined using a doctrinal approach. IR theory will then complement this analysis, by 
describing and explaining political factors causing certain types of state behaviour, which 
                                                          
15 Jon Hovi, Detlef Sprinz, Arild Underdal, ‘The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: 
Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead’, Vol 3(3), (Global Environmental Politics, 2003) 87: a qualitative 
approach analysis is better suited for the assessment of dynamic processes which are not measurable on the 
basis quantitative standards. 
16 Dean Hardy Dillard, ‘Conflict and Change: The Role of Law’ in 1963 Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law at its Annual Meeting (1921 – 1969), Vol 57, (25 – 27 April, 1963) 50, 67: ‘Once we get rid of 
the over-simplified notion that “law” is exclusively a matter of norms and the correlative notion that the 
international lawyer’s role is simply to refashion and refine the norms, we open up vistas for collaborative effort.’ 
17 Jeffrey Dunoff, Mark Pollack, ‘Introducing Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International 
Relations: The State of the Art’ (IL/IR Symposium, 16 September 2013) available at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/16/introducing-interdisciplinary-perspectives-international-law-international-
relations-state-art/  
18 Lee Epstein, Gary King, ‘Rules of Inference’, Vol 69(1) (UCLR, 2002) 4-6; Wendy Schrama, ‘How to Carry out 
Interdisciplinary Legal Research’ Vol 7(1) (Utrecht Law Review, 2011) 148 
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cannot be grasped through a legal analysis alone. This imbalance between the legal and 
political analysis is justified by the aim of this research, which is to advance an understanding 
of international legal effectiveness, or, the effectiveness of treaty regimes. This is in line with 
the aim of IL/IR scholarship to provide a better understanding of international legal issues, 
rather than to create an even intellectual balance.  
Although the phenomenon under investigation in this thesis is the legal effectiveness of 
disarmament regimes, it is important to recall that the concept of regime effectiveness is a 
non-legal concept which has entered the field of international law.19 It illustrates the fact that 
the achievement of collective goals requires more than the mere existence of law and 
therefore builds a bridge between the formalism of international law and situations of fact.20  
While relevant situations of fact include the technological, scientific and military state of 
affairs, the geo-political environment in which disarmament regimes operate constitutes the 
strongest factual influence on the success of disarmament. Therefore, it is important to 
recognise the ways in which legal disarmament regimes are influenced by the highly political 
environment in which they operate. Indeed, 
‘it is impossible to lay too much stress (…) [on] the extremely close interrelationship 
which links the problem of disarmament with the evolution of the general political 
situation and makes it highly dependent thereon.’21 
Given this interrelationship, international regimes cannot be examined in either a legal or 
political vacuum, making an interdisciplinary perspective on regime effectiveness 
indispensable and valuable. Viewing legal treaties through the lens of IR theories on 
international cooperation offers a unique opportunity to better understand aspects of state 
behaviour such as treaty adherence, compliance and active collective efforts to promote 
regime goals – phenomena which international legal theory cannot explain.  
Moreover, a better understanding of collisions between legal obligations and political 
interests would clarify the limitations of what the law can achieve in a given area. It would 
                                                          
19 Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, ‘A Propos de l’Effectivité en Droit International’ Vol 11 (1), (Revue Belge de 
Droit International, 1975) 41  
20 Ibid: on the doctrinal distinction between ‘structural effectiveness’ and ‘effectiveness in action.’ ; see also Olav 
Stokke, Davor Vidas, Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System  
(Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
21 Yves Collart, Disarmament – A Study Guide and Bibliography on the Efforts of the United Nations, (Springer, 
1958) 6-7. 
15 
 
allow the identification of situations in which states invoke or disregard the law and thereby 
facilitate the reconciliation of policy with legal structures.  
Despite this interrelationship, there is a persisting tendency of international legal scholars and 
IR scholars to restrict research disarmament to their respective fields.22 The emergence of 
regime theory now ‘offers a long-overdue opportunity to re-integrate IL and IR.’23 This thesis 
aims to make a contribution to this reintegration by linking key aspects of legal disarmament 
regimes to concepts of IR theory.  
 
4.2.  Data Collection 
The doctrinal and empirical approaches followed in this thesis required the collection of 
different types of data. The former approach was concerned with disarmament norms within 
their legal structure and therefore required the examination of both primary and secondary 
literary sources. While the text of the treaties which establish the disarmament regimes under 
review constituted the central primary source, secondary literary sources included 
monographs, articles and treaty commentaries, which were used to determine criteria for 
effectiveness. 
Empirical primary data related to the constitution and operation of these regimes were 
gathered through the case study method and in-depth interviews. Case studies were 
conducted both for the purpose of determining, confirming and illustrating the criteria for 
effectiveness in each disarmament regime. They allowed the study of disarmament regimes 
in practice and in particular the behaviour of state actors in a given context. Two case studies 
were selected for every regime, based on the number of criteria for effectiveness present in 
the particular disarmament situation or operation, as well as the degree of distinctiveness 
between the case studies. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew Tulumello, Stepan Wood, ‘International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’ Vol 92 (3) (AJIL, 1998). 
23 Kenneth Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’ Vol 14 (2), 
(Yale Journal of International Law, 1989) 338. 
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5. Literature Review 
The literature which relates to the research question may be subdivided into three categories. 
The first body of scholarship explores issues surrounding disarmament through the lens of 
international law. The second category studies political, scientific, military or other real-life 
aspects of disarmament regimes. The third category draws from IR literature on regime 
effectiveness and remains almost entirely disconnected from the study of disarmament 
regimes. This literature review will demonstrate that, while each of these categories of 
literature provides important insights into the role international law plays in the field of 
disarmament, a significant gap remains at the intersection between them. 
 
5.1. Literature on Disarmament under International Law 
David Fidler, in his article ‘International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the 
Arms Control Approach?’ (2004) asserts that arms control treaties, international law on the 
use of force and international humanitarian law constitute the three bodies of international 
law which regulate WMD.24 By doing so, he fails to consider important concepts of wider 
international law which govern disarmament regimes. However, a large proportion of the 
legal literature on disarmament does appear to focus on questions of international 
humanitarian law and the use of force which govern the use rather than the possession of 
WMD.25  
As Marco Roscini correctly states, ‘[i]f there are entire libraries on issues of jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello, there is still a relatively scant number of publications on the international law 
aspects of disarmament.’26 
                                                          
24 David Fidler, ‘International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the Arms Control Approach?’ Vol 
14 (39), (Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 2004) 41.  
25 Dean Granoff, Jonathan Granoff, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons: Irreconcilable 
Differences’ Vol 67 (6), (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 2011) 53 – 62; Natalino Ronzitti, ‘Modern Means of 
Warfare: The Need to Rely upon International Law, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Law to Achieve a Decent 
Regulation of Weapons’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, (OUP, 2012); 
Jasmine Moussa, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Separation of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello’ in Gro Nystuen, Stuart 
Casey-Maslen, Annie Golden Bersagel (eds), Nuclear Weapons Under International Law (CUP, 2014). 
26 Marco Roscini, ‘International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Daniel H Joyner 
[Oxford University Press, 2009, 304 pp], Vol 59 (ICLQ, 2010) 884. 
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Allan Gotlieb’s Disarmament and International Law: A Study of the Role of Law in the 
Disarmament Process (1965) constitutes an early contribution to the international legal 
literature on disarmament. Similar to the present thesis, he sought ‘to examine the legal 
questions that may arise in the execution of [disarmament], to describe their close connection 
with the key political questions that must be resolved and to suggest what role the lawyer 
can play in the achievement of a totally disarmed world.’27 In his study, Gotlieb discussed 
important legal issues, such as the nature and scope of disarmament obligations and the legal 
effects of breaches of disarmament agreements.28 
Further, a consultation of the Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law 
reveals that the few contributions which address issues of disarmament are dated and 
provide little insight into current questions of international law in disarmament.29  
A common theme which can be observed is the limitation of legal studies on disarmament to 
an examination of WMD treaty regimes, without consideration of the wider international law 
into which they are embedded. For instance, in Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of 
Arms Control and International Law (2002), former disarmament negotiator Graham Thomas 
Jr outlines the negotiating history and structure of key bilateral and multilateral weapons 
treaties, without further exploring their role as sources of international law.  
Similarly, Jozef Goldblat’s book Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements 
(2002), surveys different weapons treaties, both bilateral and multilateral.30This phenomenon 
can also be observed in the form of articles which are published in international legal journals, 
yet fail to explore issues of general international law.31 
                                                          
27 Allan Gotlieb, Disarmament and International Law: A Study of the Role of Law in the Disarmament Process, 
(Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1965) 4 – 5. 
28 Gotlieb, Ibid, 153 – 168.  
29 Louis de Brouckere, ‘Les Travaux de la Société des Nations en Matière de Désarmement’, Vol 25, (Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1928) 365 – 449 ; Oleg Vasilʹevič  Bogdanov, ‘Outlawry of 
War and Disarmament’, Vol 133, (Collected Courses, 1971-II) 15 – 42; Adrian Fisher, ‘Outlawry of War and 
Disarmament’, Ibid, 389 – 412; Eric Stein, ‘Impact of New Weapons Technology on International Law: Selected 
Aspects’, Ibid, 223 – 387; Alfonso Garcia Robles, ‘Mesures de Désarmement dans des Zones Particulières’ Vol 
133, Ibid, 43 – 134; Serge Sur, ‘Verification en Matière de Désarmement’ Vol 273 (Collected Courses, 1998) 9 – 
102. 
30 Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control – The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, 2nd ed (SIPRI, 2002). 
31 See e.g. Angela Woodward, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’ Vol (10) 
(NZYIL, 2012): She briefly discusses developments in the UNGA (p 254 - 256) but does not raise any further 
questions with regard to general international law. 
18 
 
However, a number of more recent publications examine individual aspects of international 
law within the wider context of weapons law. For example, Julie Dahlitz’ collection of essays 
on the Avoidance and Settlement of Arms Control Disputes, Vol 2 (1994) adopts a legal 
approach to exploring the role of treaty interpretation, the verification and monitoring of 
compliance and the UNSC in preventing and settling arms control disputes.32  
In the same vein, James Fry’s book Legal Resolution of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Disputes 
(2013) outlines the history of legal resolution of disputes of similar political sensitivity, 
discusses the role treaty interpretation and challenges of UNSC involvement in disputes and 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ in non-proliferation disputes. Finally, he argues that legal forms of 
dispute resolution offer greater impartiality and consistency and may be interpreted as a 
manifestation of good faith.33 
Guido den Dekker, in The Law of Arms Control – International Supervision and Enforcement 
(2001), explores the role of international law in arms control and focuses on mechanisms for 
the interpretation of arms control obligations and the monitoring and enforcement of 
compliance.34 In his article ‘The Jurisprudence of Non-Proliferation: Taking International Law 
Seriously’ (1992), David Koplow complements his examination of WMD treaties with an 
emphasis on the relevance of customary international law for disarmament.35 
One of the most relevant international legal studies on WMD regimes was undertaken by 
Daniel Joyner in his book International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (2009).36 In addition to an examination of WMD regimes, he discusses important 
international legal issues including the roles of the UNSC and the ICJ in the field of WMD law 
and the interpretation of Article VI, NPT under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.37  
                                                          
32 Julie Dahlitz (ed), Avoidance and Settlement of Arms Control Disputes, Vol 2 (United Nations, 1994). 
33 James Fry, (fn 34). 
34 Guido den Dekker, The Law of Arms Control – International Supervision and Enforcement, (Martinus Nijhoff 
2001). 
35 David Koplow, ‘The Jurisprudence of Non-Proliferation: Taking International Law Seriously’ Vol 2 
(Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 1992); see also Julie Dahlitz, ‘The Role of Customary Law in Arms 
Limitations’ in Julie Dahlitz, Detlev Dicke (eds), The International Law of Arms Control and Disarmament, (United 
Nations, 1991) 157. 
36 Daniel Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (OUP, 2009). 
37 See also, Daniel Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, (OUP, 2011); Daniel Joyner, ‘The 
Legal Meaning and Implications of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’ in Gro Nystuen, Stuart Casey-
Maslen, Annie Golden Bersagel (eds), Nuclear Weapons Under International Law (CUP, 2014) 397 – 417. 
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John Kierulf’s very recent monograph Disarmament Under International Law (2017)38 
complements his overview of WMD regimes with a short overview of the evolution of the law 
on disarmament and addresses issues of treaty interpretation and the enforcement of 
compliance with WMD treaties Finally, Kierulf makes recommendations for the further 
development of the international legal WMD framework which can be summarised as a mere 
reiteration of calls to advance nuclear disarmament. 
The Book Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts and Justice (2013) 
by Müller and Wunderlich addresses the important international legal issue of norm conflicts 
between WMD regimes. It identifies conflicts within the three WMD regimes, as well as with 
norms of general international law, and their consequences for regime operation.39 
Given the scarcity of publications examining disarmament regimes within the wider context 
of general international law, the blog Arms Control Law constitutes a useful platform for 
discussion among legal experts on issues related to WMD and international law.40 Similar 
blogs include EJIL: Talk which covers all areas of international law, but includes publications 
related to weapons and disarmament, and The Trench which covers chemical weapons in 
particular.41 
Finally, reports of the International Law Association’s Committee on Arms Control and 
Disarmament Law (1990 – 2004) offer important insights into the law on disarmament. The 
Committee was created with a view to contributing  
‘to the development of arms control and disarmament law by investigating and 
elucidating the legal background of existing and evolving principles of the law, (…) 
[taking] account of treaty law and customary law [and] problems of treaty 
interpretation.’42 
                                                          
38 John Kierulf, Disarmament Under International Law, (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017). 
39 Harald Müller, Una Becker-Jakob, Tabea Seidler-Diekman, ‘Regime Conflicts and Norm Dynamics: Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Weapons’ in Harald Müller, Camen Wunderlich (eds), Norm Dynamics in Multilateral 
Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts and Justice (The University of Georgia Press, 2013) 51. 
40 Arms Control Law, Blog, https://armscontrollaw.com/about/  (accessed 17 March 2018): ‘This blog is intended 
as a forum for rigorous analysis and serious discussion of legal issues related to arms control (…) [and] an attempt 
to fill a gap in current online blog offerings (…) [which tend to] focused on either technical or politics/policy 
views of the issue area.’ 
41 EJIL: Talk!, Blog, https://www.ejiltalk.org/; The Trench, Blog, http://www.the-trench.org/ (both accessed 17 
March 2018). 
42 International Law Association, Conference Reports of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament Law 
(1990 – 2004), http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees (accessed 12 May 2018). 
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None of the above-mentioned literary sources examine issues of disarmament exclusively, 
but rather view them as part of arms control and non-proliferation efforts. They focus on one 
class of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons.43 
 
5.2. Non-Legal Literature on Disarmament 
The UN itself contributes to the non-legal body of literature on disarmament. The United 
Nations Disarmament Yearbook, an annual publication by the United Nations Office of 
Disarmament Affairs, is an important source of information on developments in the field of 
disarmament, in particular in UN bodies such as the UNGA and the Conference on 
Disarmament.44  
Further UN publications on disarmament include the Disarmament Study Series (UNGA 
studies undertaken by expert groups on aspects of disarmament), UNODA Occasional Papers 
(input from expert panels and seminar sponsored by UNODA), Disarmament: A Basic Guide 
(aimed to generate public understanding of disarmament and support for multilateral action) 
and Fact Sheets on various disarmament issues.45 Yves Collart’s compilation and summary of 
official UN documents complements the UN’s own literature on disarmament. He describes 
UN efforts and political developments, in particular multilateral negotiations, in the field of 
disarmament between 1945 and 1958.46 
The international relations literature generally views disarmament from a security 
perspective.47 For example, Michael O’Hanlon’s book A Skeptic’s Case for Nuclear 
                                                          
43 Nagendra Singh, Edward MacWhinney, Nuclear Weapons and Contemporary International Law, (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1989); Haralambos Athanasopulos, Nuclear Disarmament in International Law, (McFarland 
Publishing, 2000); Various Authors, ‘Part V – International Disarmament Law’, in Gro Nystuen, Stuart Casey-
Maslen, Annie Golden Bersagel (eds), Nuclear Weapons Under International Law (CUP, 2014) 319 – 432: 
Contributions to Part VI (‘International Disarmament Law’) discuss regional, rather than multilateral, approaches 
to nuclear disarmament, and limit their legal analysis to the NPT’s provisions. 
44 UNODA, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1976 (Vol 1) – 2017 (Vol 42), https://www.un.org/ 
disarmament/publications/yearbook/ (accessed 12 May 2018). 
45 see UNODA website, ‘Publications’ https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/ (accessed 12 May 2018). 
46 Yves Collart, (fn 21). 
47 Richard Falk, Richard Barnet (eds), Security in Disarmament, (Princeton University Press, 1965); Ervin Laszlo, 
Donald Keys (eds), Disarmament: The Human Factor, 1st ed (Pergamon Press, 1981); Neil Cooper, ‘Putting 
Disarmament Back in the Frame’ Vol 32 (Review of International Studies, 2006); Sverre Lodgaard,’Nuclear 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation’ in Sverre Lodgard (ed), Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: 
Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World?, (Routledge, 2011) 195: Sverre Lodgaard views nuclear disarmament 
from the perspective of collective security and examines current and ongoing cases of non-proliferation. 
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Disarmament (2010) outlines the principal challenges connecting nuclear disarmament and 
security. As an alternative to both nuclear arms control and the full abolition of nuclear 
weapons, he proposes an approach to nuclear disarmament which allows possessor states to 
reconstitute their programmes following their dismantlement (‘Dismantling, not abolishing, 
nuclear weapons’).48 
Given the dominant scientific and technical dimension of disarmament, literature from these 
fields also  
 
5.3. Studies on the Effectiveness of Disarmament Regimes 
Alexander Kelle’s journal article ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Security Regimes – The 
Chemical Weapons Control Regime’s First Six Years of Operation’ constitutes the only attempt 
to apply the concept of regime effectiveness to a disarmament treaty.49 He demonstrates how 
criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the CWC regime may be derived from its normative 
framework. However, he treats the CWC’s disarmament dimension as one of several aspects 
under investigation and does not address questions of international law. He follows a similar 
approach in his assessment of the ‘BWC control regime.’50 
 
5.4. Gap in the Research 
This review of the past and current legal literature on disarmament reveals several important 
gaps which this thesis seeks to address. Generally, disarmament appears to receive little 
attention from legal scholars, as publications on legal aspects of disarmament are limited, 
narrow and dated. They tend to be limited to a descriptive overview of WMD treaty regimes 
as the principal source of disarmament law, while disregarding the wider international law on 
other sources of law, institutions, legal obligations and mechanisms under the UN Charter. 
                                                          
48 Michael O’Hanlon, A Skeptic’s Case for Nuclear Disarmament, (Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 82. 
49 Alexander Kelle, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Security Regimes – The Chemical Weapons Control Regime’s 
First Six Years of Operation’ Vol 41 (International Politics, 2004). 
50 Alexander Kelle, ‘Strengthening the Effectiveness of the BTW Control Regime – Feasibility and Options’ Vol 
24(2) (Contemporary Security Policy, 2003) 95 – 132. 
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Furthermore, existing legal studies on disarmament generally only cover individual classes of 
weapons and only consider disarmament in relation to arms control and non-proliferation 
efforts, yet rarely as a goal in itself. Moreover, as very few interdisciplinary analyses of 
disarmament regimes have been undertaken to date, the disarmament literature generally 
focuses on either legal or non-legal aspects. Finally, the absence of considerations of regime 
effectiveness from the legal disarmament literature has been observed. 
This thesis makes two crucial and original contributions to the legal literature on disarmament 
in order to remedy these shortcomings. First, it seeks to provide a holistic and up-to-date 
analysis of the international law WMD disarmament regimes. Secondly, the legal 
effectiveness of these regimes will be evaluated on the basis of principles of both 
international law and international relations. Given that disarmament regimes have not yet 
been examined through the lens of regime effectiveness, this perspective will yield new and 
useful insights for disarmament practitioners and scholars. 
 
6. Thesis Outline 
As explained above, a comprehensive evaluation of disarmament regime requires an 
understanding of the general principles underlying the concept of disarmament in general; of 
the norms, rules and principles of international law governing disarmament treaties; and 
finally, of non-legal factors influencing the behaviour of states in their implementation. 51 
Hence, the research question determines both the structure of this thesis as a whole, and of 
the internal structure of its substantive chapters. Chapter 1 will establish the theoretical 
framework for disarmament. It will provide definitions of key concepts underlying this 
research and demonstrate the relevance of regime analysis in the field of disarmament. Then, 
the international law applicable to disarmament treaties will be detailed. In particular, the 
sources of international law establishing disarmament obligations will be identified, 
distinguishing between consent-based disarmament and coerced disarmament. In its final 
section, this chapter will demonstrate how criteria for the effectiveness of disarmament 
                                                          
51 Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness’, in Regime Consequences, 
(fn 13) 40: the nature of the problem under investigation, properties of the regime itself and the behaviour of 
regime members.  
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regimes are derived from the general context of disarmament, international law and IR 
theory. These criteria will then be outlined. 
Chapter 2 highlights the first dimension of the research question by providing an 
understanding of the concept of disarmament. For this purpose, it traces the historical 
evolution of disarmament regimes until today. It offers insights into the origins of 
disarmament efforts, including explanations for early failures to disarm peoples. This 
historical analysis will reveal aspects of successful disarmament and the genesis of 
multilateral, rule-based disarmament as the form of disarmament pursued today. 
Chapter 3 to 5 constitute the core of this thesis, as they contain an effectiveness evaluation 
of the chemical (Chapter 3), nuclear (Chapter 4) and biological (Chapter 5) disarmament 
regimes. Each chapter will begin by providing a more focused historical background to the 
respective treaty regimes and a detailed examination of their legal architecture. As part of 
the effectiveness evaluation of each regime, two case studies will be used to examine the five 
criteria for effectiveness: a) participation, b) compliance, c) institutional effectiveness, d) 
verification and e) enforcement. Conclusions will be drawn for each chapter. 
The conclusion chapter will first reiterate conclusions drawn regarding the effectiveness each 
regime, including the individual criteria examined. Then, the benefits and limitations of the 
approach to assessing regime effectiveness followed in this thesis will be discussed. The 
complexity of the field and the resulting challenges for efforts to strengthen disarmament 
regimes will be underlined. However, this chapter will confirm the significance of 
international law for the study of disarmament regimes and call for the increased 
consideration for international legal issues in the disarmament literature. Finally, broader 
conclusions will be drawn regarding WMD disarmament in general. 
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Chapter 1 – Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework for assessing the effectiveness of 
disarmament regimes. It first seeks to explain the rationale for the selection of WMD 
disarmament regimes as the object of analysis. For this purpose, the concepts of weapons of 
mass destruction, disarmament and international peace and security will be defined. These 
notions will define the context of analysis by embedding the elimination of weapons threats 
into the wider international security environment. The definition of disarmament and its 
relation to neighbouring concepts will highlight key characteristics disarmament processes as 
well as challenges which are inherent to the area of disarmament. 
Secondly, this chapter aims to demonstrate the usefulness and relevance of examining 
disarmament regimes through the lens of regime effectiveness. Regime effectiveness will be 
presented as a useful tool for determining the long-term significance of evolving entities such 
as disarmament regimes. The components of international regimes described by the 
literature on regime theory reveals the two-fold focus of effectiveness analysis on the legal 
norms, rules and principles of regimes on the one hand, and on the practical behavioural 
responses by states to them, on the other.  
This introduces the central objective of this chapter to demonstrate how suitable criteria for 
effectiveness are revealed by key aspects related to disarmament, international law and 
international relations. Criteria for assessing disarmament regimes will be derived on the 
grounds of three types of considerations: aspects related to the nature and objectives of 
disarmament processes, the rules and norms of international law underlying disarmament 
regimes, and theories of international relations explaining the behaviour of regime members 
related to their implementation.52 
                                                          
52 Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness’, in Regime Consequences, 
(fn 13) 40: the nature of the problem under investigation, properties of the regime itself and the behaviour of 
regime members.  
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The procedure for selecting criteria in this chapter will also be followed in the chapters 
evaluating the respective WMD regimes. Following this approach, this chapter will first define 
the conceptual context of disarmament in order to determine the expected outcomes.53 The 
focus of this thesis will be placed on the examination of the ‘internal’ effectiveness of the 
legal architecture of disarmament regimes. Finally, their ‘external’ effectiveness, or their 
ability to produce practical effects in the ‘real world’ will be evaluated. 
 
1. Concepts and Terms 
1.1. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ is commonly understood to include chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons, including their delivery systems, which are conceived to kill 
or cause significant harm to a large number of human beings and their environment.54 It was 
first used in 1937 to describe formations of aircraft used in the aerial bombardment of 
Guernica, Spain.55 Subsequently, its meaning subsequently to encompass non-conventional 
weapons specifically and the term was introduced into diplomatic discourse.56 In 1947, a 
Working Committee of the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments advised 
the Security Council that  
‘weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive 
weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and 
any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in 
                                                          
53 This will be further developed in Chapter 1 on the historical evolution of disarmament. 
54 For an account of the different definitions of ‘mass destruction’ see Seth Carus, ‘Defining “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction”’, Occasional Paper No. 8, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (National Defense 
University Press, 2012) 39 – 49. 
55 ‘Archbishop's Appeal: Individual Will and Action’, Times of London, 28 December 1937, 9: citing the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, ‘Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would 
be with all the new weapons of mass destruction?’ 
56 Declaration on Atomic Energy, issued by US President Truman, UK Prime Minister Atlee and Canadian Prime 
Minister Mackenzie on 15 November 1945, cited in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II, 668, d): On proposals ‘for the elimination from 
national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.’ 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v02/pg_663 (accessed 12 December 2017); Arthur 
Krock, ‘In the Nation: “In Other Words”—Truman, Attlee, King,’ New York Times, 16 November 1945: Krock 
rephrased the original formulation in the declaration as ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in the non-conventional 
sense; Ido Oren, Ty Solomon, ‘WMD: The Career of a Concept’ Vol 35(1) (New Political Science, 2013) 114. 
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destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned 
above.’57 
The use of the term has been inconsistent over time and across different contexts.58 No 
universally binding, comprehensive definition of WMD has been formulated. This can be 
explained by the fact that each category of WMD has been addressed individually by 
international law, given their fundamental historical, scientific and technological differences. 
For the purposes of this thesis, and the term WMD will be understood in its broadest sense 
to include chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as defined by the CWC, BWC and NPT 
respectively, as well as their delivery systems such as ballistic missiles. Consequently, 
conventional weapons which have been subject to disarmament measures will only be 
addressed for the purpose of providing context to WMD disarmament. 
Beyond their capacity to cause mass casualties, their destabilising influence on relationships 
between states and psychological impact on civilians have made of WMD political tools rather 
than military weapons, as their possession is generally aimed at achieving policy outcomes 
rather than military goals.59 In addition to the risks stemming from the continued possession 
of WMD by states, the  
‘acquisition of WMD or related materials by terrorists would represent an additional 
threat to the international system with potentially uncontrollable consequences. 
Armed with weapons or materials of mass destruction terrorists could inflict damage 
that in the past only states with large armies could achieve.’60 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 ‘Letter from the Chairman of the Working Committee of the Commission on Conventional Armaments 
addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on Conventional Armaments and enclosed resolution’, [letter 
dated 9 September 1947], (UN Doc. S/C.3/24), dated 28 July 1948, in Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action, 
(Morrow, 1970) 297: Bush, co-drafter the Declaration on Atomic Energy, on the inclusion of chemical and 
biological weapons in solutions to the nuclear threat: ‘While we were attempting to bring reason to bear on one 
terrible weapon, we might as well include another that could be equally terrible.’ 
58 Ido Oren, Ty Solomon, ‘WMD: The Career of a Concept’ Vol 35(1) (New Political Science, 2013): an account of 
the evolution of the term over time.  
59 For example, nuclear weapons stood at the centre of Cold War tensions, yet were never deployed. 
60 European Union, ‘Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’, EU Council document 10352/03, 10 June 2003.  https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/st_15708 
_2003_init_en.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018). 
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1.2. Disarmament 
1.2.1. Defining Disarmament 
The concept of WMD disarmament is grounded in a quasi-universal understanding that the 
continued existence of such weapons poses an unacceptable threat to humans. It originates 
in part from the prohibition under international humanitarian law of the use of weapons 
which cause indiscriminate and unnecessary suffering. Furthermore, disarmament addresses 
the paradox of arms races which lead states to ‘incessantly [prepare themselves] for war in 
order to not be surprised by war.’61 
Today, the elimination of individual categories of weapons is regarded as the most feasible 
approach to disarmament, as it takes into consideration the distinct technical traits and 
historical challenges of each class of weapons. The CWC establishes an ‘effective prohibition’ 
of chemical weapons and required the declaration of stockpiles and production facilities as 
well as their destruction within ten years of its entry into force. Similarly, the BWC requires 
the destruction, or diversion to peaceful purposes of all biological weapons and related 
materials. In contrast, the NPT merely requires that its States Parties ‘pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating (…) to nuclear disarmament.’  While only the CWC 
and BWC establish effective bans on their respective classes of weapons, all three regimes 
seek the ultimate elimination of an entire class of weapons.  
The absence of a precise definition of disarmament often blurs the lines between 
disarmament measures and related efforts such as arms control and non-proliferation.62 Arms 
control measures may entail an increase rather than reduction of weapons stockpiles as it 
suggests that certain arms contribute to the stabilisation of military relations between states, 
and as a result, to increased security.63 Yet, the apparent support by a state of disarmament 
measures may in fact be embedded in its arms control policy in cases where it decides that a 
certain type of weapon no longer enhances its national security.64 On the other hand, non-
                                                          
61 Arthur Desjardins, ‘Le Désarmement – Etude de Droit International’, Vol 149 (4) (Revue des Deux Mondes, 
1898) 668 : Arthur Desjardins called this ‘armed peace’ (translation by author). 
62 Jeffrey Larsen, Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment, (Lynne Rienner, 2002) 3. 
63 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age, (Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson for IISS, 1961) vii: A further distinction is offered by Hedley Bull. He understood disarmament as the 
reduction or abolition of certain arms, and arms control as international restraint on numbers, types and uses 
of armaments. 
64 Jeffrey Larsen, (fn 63) 3-4.  
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proliferation seeks to prevent the spread of a type of weapon to a non-possessor state. In 
some regimes, non-proliferation measures may support disarmament by providing 
confidence in the non-reversion of destruction processes.65  
Despite this interrelationship, they remain distinct processes with distinct objectives. A clear 
distinction between these concepts is crucial for the evaluation of regime effectiveness given 
that the obligations of states and expected outcomes vary fundamentally in each context. Yet, 
such overlaps with neighbouring concepts have not only led to the misunderstanding and 
misuse of the term.  
 
1.2.2. Key Characteristics of Disarmament 
Disarmament discourse frequently features expressions such as ‘eradication’, ‘a world 
without nuclear weapons’, ‘Nuclear Zero’ or ‘WMD-free zone’. These terms reflect its 
intended outcome of a world without ongoing arms races.66 However, it is important to note 
that disarmament is not only this end state, but also an ongoing process of creating 
‘conditions that will assure a country that others are neither intending to attack it nor capable 
of doing so at least in the immediate future.’67 This process which entails making states feel 
increasingly secure in not having large arsenals of weapons, is a key element in the full 
elimination of all WMD stockpiles. Indeed, former Secretary-General to the UN, Dag 
Hammarskjold, 
‘viewed disarmament as a dynamic process that was continually evolving in response 
to events and interaction among states: “In this field, as we well know, a standstill 
does not exist; if you do not go forward, you do go backward.”’68 
                                                          
65 See for example, Republic of Korea, ‘Proposal for Enhancing the Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness of Other 
Chemical Production Facilities Inspections’, OPCW document RC-2/NAT.7, 8 April 2008: ‘The relative importance 
of an effective industry verification regime and strengthened non-proliferation measures will grow as the 
chemical weapons destruction campaign progresses and the disarmament goal of the Convention is achieved.’ 
66 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd cd. (Alfred A. Knopf, I960) 167: ‘Disarmament is the reduction 
or elimination of certain or all armaments for the purpose of ending armament race.’ 
67 John Simpson, ‘The Future of the NPT’ in Nathan Busch, Daniel Joyner (eds), Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (University of Georgia Press, 2009) 52; Rumki Basu, The United Nations: Structure and Functions of 
an International Organisation, (Sterling Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2004) 343; Benjamin Cohen, Delegate of the United 
States, Statement to the UNGA, January 1952 in Department of State Bulletin, XXVI (21 January 1952), 101 – 
102: he defined disarmament as a ‘process of creating conditions which make it difficult or impossible for nations 
to break or endanger the peace. 
68 Randy Rydell citing Dag Hammarskjöld, Press Conference, New York 19 May 1960. 
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This highlights two fundamental characteristics of disarmament, namely that disarmament 
processes must be sustainable and that the end state must be irreversible. Disarmament 
processes are not self-sustaining, as they are initiated by ‘human beings who are subject to 
competing priorities, limited resources, technological complexity, uncertainty, stress, risk, 
and ambitions’ which constantly counteract elimination efforts.69 They can be reversed at any 
moment, even after all conventionally imposed destruction requirements have been satisfied. 
Therefore, effective disarmament requires momentum and continuous monitoring. 70 
Rather than being linear and one-dimensional, disarmament both draws from and impacts 
the scientific, economic, military, political and legal spheres. On a geographic scale, 
disarmament efforts can be global, regional or local. They can be unilateral, bilateral or 
multilateral. They can be ad hoc, voluntary and conventional, or coerced. However, given that 
‘disarmament presupposes a cooperative approach to international security,’ multilateral 
conventional disarmament regimes have been regarded as the most sustainable strategy and 
will therefore constitute the object of this thesis.71 
Disarmament measures can be of qualitative or quantitative nature. Qualitative disarmament 
aims to end the possession of any meaningful quantities of weapons agents or materials.72 
The continued possession of weapons components is permitted, as long as they cannot be 
reassembled as deployable weapons. Quantitative disarmament, on the other hand, requires 
the reduction of stockpiles by or to a certain number of weapons and accounts for all 
weapons, their components and related materials.73 It disregards research and development 
activities, the destruction of obsolete weapons and the modernisation of existing stockpiles. 
Due to the dual-use nature of WMD, even the quantitative reduction to zero weapons by itself 
cannot ensure that a state is qualitatively disarmed. For this reason, the continued monitoring 
of facilities required for their production is necessary. 
                                                          
69 Jayantha Dhanapala, ‘A Disarming Proposition: Meeting the Challenge of Sustainable Disarmament’ Vol XXIII 
(2) (Harvard International Review, 2001) 50. 
70 Ibid: ‘Just as the military-industrial complex has developed the means to perpetuate itself over generations, 
to adapt its goals and methods to changing circumstances, and to expand its coalition base, so too must the 
"disarmament complex" match these specific organizational capacities.’ 
71 Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, (Routledge, 2011) 2. 
72 Scott Ritter, ‘The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative Disarmament’, (Arms Control Today, 2000) https://www 
.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/iraqjun  (accessed 12 December 2017): ‘The elimination of a meaningful, viable 
capability to produce or employ weapons of mass destruction.’ 
73 Ibid. 
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1.2.3. Challenges to Disarmament 
A number of challenges inherent to the nature of disarmament and the security environment 
in which it takes place must be considered in assessing the effectiveness of disarmament 
regimes. One of the most fundamental challenge is the reconciliation of the renunciation of 
most powerful weapons with national security interests. Disarmament measures can be 
viewed as depriving states of their primary means of protecting national security.74 The 
absence of alternative, equally effective means of achieving security interests can make states 
reluctant to fully commit to disarmament efforts. Furthermore, the concepts of security and 
insecurity are subjective and differ among states, which makes it difficult for a global 
disarmament regime to adequately accommodate the security needs of all participating 
states. 
Secondly, in the security field states are highly sensitive about disclosing their military 
capabilities and activities. This lack of transparency inhibits mutual trust between states and 
creates suspicions regarding the goodwill of political and military adversaries. By adhering to 
a disarmament treaty, states renounce their freedom to decide on the possession and use of 
the weapon. Although voluntary, the conventional renunciation of a certain type of weapon 
limits the sovereignty of the state in this particular area which has implications for compliance 
by states with their disarmament obligations.  
Thirdly, due the dual-use nature of WMD agents, many of the technologies associated with 
non-conventional weapons programmes also have civilian applications. This not only makes 
a distinction between legitimate scientific activities and violations of weapons agreements 
difficult, but also requires states to provide inspectors with insights into their industrial 
activities. This degree of transparency creates a significant obstacle to the willingness of states 
to adhere to such treaties. 
Fourthly, progress in the field of disarmament is heavily dependent on the political leadership 
of large powers. As a result, ‘the current disarmament and broader limitation system is, to a 
significant extent, an asymmetric one (…), one primarily shaped in the interests of a 
                                                          
74 Russ Wellen, ‘Disarmament Activists Need to Keep an Eye on What Defense Would Replace Nuclear Weapons 
With’ Foreign Policy in Focus, 9 April 2015, https://fpif.org/disarmament-activists-need-to-keep-an-eye-on-
what-defense-would-replace-nuclear-weapons-with/ (accessed 14 December 2017): ‘Disarming, no matter how 
thoroughgoing the verification program, inevitably opens a window of national-security vulnerability, if only a 
crack.’ 
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disarmament empire – the USA.’75 This has led to inconsistent reactions to breaches of 
disarmament obligations and accusations of ‘hypocrisy’.76 This has hampered progress and 
dissatisfied smaller and middle powers which, in turn, seek to acquire WMD to protect their 
interests. 
Finally, no disarmament regime is able to provide absolute guarantees. Such political, 
scientific and technological limitations are unique to the field of disarmament and must be 
taken into account in an evaluation of its effectiveness. Yet, these challenges have 
contributed to a delegitimization of disarmament and its dismissal by policy makers as an 
unattainable goal.77 In particular the continued association of disarmament with the idea of 
General and Complete Disarmament has been ‘used to damn disarmament as utopian in 
principle and unachievable in practice.’78As a consequence, Jayantha Dhanapala argues,  
‘disarmament is rarely the focus of serious scholarly analysis these days. Many 
academics and journalists are devoting far more attention to "arms control," "non-
proliferation," "managed proliferation," and, most recently, "counter-proliferation." 
Though disarmament is a respected topic in policy rhetoric, it is all too often 
trivialized in policy implementation.’79 
Indeed, a ‘near invisibility of disarmament’ in academic debates and, in some cases, an 
apparent ‘self-imposed silence’ on disarmament have naturally limited the resources 
allocated to it.80 As a consequence, ‘more far-reaching and emancipatory forms of 
disarmament [have] arrived still-born into the zeitgeist of IR academia and global society 
                                                          
75 Neil Cooper, ‘Putting Disarmament Back in the Frame’ Vol 32 (Review of International Studies, 2006) 354 
76 William Schabas, ‘Why are Chemical Weapons Worse than other Weapons of Mass Destruction?’ The 
Guardian, 25 April 2018: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/25/chemical-weapons-
mass-destruction-syria-nuclear (accessed 25 April 2018): ‘Only a principled approach to disarmament that 
addresses all weapons of terror and mass destruction in a consistent manner can succeed.’ 
77 Neil Cooper, (fn 76) 354; Jayantha Dhanapala, (fn 70) 48; Stuart Croft, Strategies of Arms Control, (Manchester 
University Press, 1996); ‘Morgenthau Connects Disarmament with Solution of Political Conflicts’, The Crimson, 9 
February 2003 https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/2/9/morgenthau-connects-disarmament-with-
solution-of/ : he suggested ‘keeping the amount of armaments within reasonable bounds [rather than their 
elimination, as the] “realistic aim” of the government.’ 
78 Neil Cooper, (fn 76) 356: Reminders of the overarching goal GCD feature in all three WMD treaties. 
79 Jayantha Dhanapala, (fn 70) 48. 
80 Dan Plesch, ‘The South and Disarmament at the UN’ Vol 37 (7) (Third World Quarterly, 2016) 1204: using the 
example of the academic journal Millennium which, over a 39-year period (1979 – 2010), published over 4,000 
articles, yet only 39 in total on the subject of disarmament (i.e. < 1%). The author made similar observations 
regarding other key journals (Review of International Studies, International Studies Quarterly, World Politics); 
Jayantha Dhanapala, (fn 70) 48: ‘It is notoriously underfunded compared to its counterpart – armament – yet it 
is blamed for being weak.’ 
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more generally.’81 Yet, assertions that ‘disarmament efforts have not borne fruit and only 
reflect the least common denominator among negotiating states [leave] out important parts 
of the equation.’82 For example, at least 24 disarmament treaties have been negotiated under 
the auspices of the UN and the growth of disarmament infrastructure sparked by new 
scientific discoveries and technological progress which constantly offer new support to 
elimination and verification processes.83 
In 2018, disarmament remains a ‘top priority’ for key actors, such as UN Secretary-General 
Antonio Guterres.84 An evaluation of the effectiveness of WMD disarmament regimes is 
grounded in the suggestion that disarmament has yet to develop its full potential and that ‘a 
more emancipatory system of disarmament (…) might be both necessary and achievable’ 
through increased attention and prioritisation.85 
 
1.3. Assessing International Regime Effectiveness 
1.3.1. Defining Regimes 
The concept of disarmament is based on the premise that the protection of national security 
through the accumulation of armaments severely threatens international peace and security 
and must therefore be substituted with a cooperative approach to security.86 The negotiation 
by states of multilateral treaty regimes, which impose legally-binding disarmament 
obligations on states, suggests that the existence of disarmament regimes allow them to more 
easily promote and achieve security objectives.  
                                                          
81 Neil Cooper, (fn 76) 354. 
82 Dan Plesch, (fn 81) 1208: UNODA has listed over 25 disarmament treaties which have been adopted since 
1945 (as of January 2016). 
83 Jayantha Dhanapala, (fn 70) 48, 51: ‘The process of building national and international infrastructures for 
disarmament is by no means complete. Networks of nongovernmental organizations are just beginning to grow, 
and many are facing steep learning curves.’ 
84 Antonio Gutierres, ‘Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament’ 26 February 2018   https://www.un.org/sg/ 
en/content/sg/speeches/2018-02-26/remarks-conference-disarmament   (accessed 12 March 2018): 
‘Disarmament and arms control are top priorities for me. And they are central to the system for international 
security agreed in the United Nations Charter. (…) We need further disarmament and arms control measures as 
a sound basis for global peace.’ 
85 Neil Cooper, ‘Putting Disarmament Back in the Frame’ Vol 32 (Review of International Studies, 2006) 354. 
86 UNGA Res 71/67, (A/71/67) 5 December 2016: ‘(…) recognizing that a resort to unilateral actions by Member 
States in resolving their security concerns would jeopardize international peace and security and undermine 
confidence in the international security system.’; Sverre Lodgaard, (fn 48) 2. 
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The term ‘international regime’ was first used in its current sense in the 1970, as an 
international arrangement constructed by states as a ‘collective response’ to ‘collective 
situations.’87 The initiation of the study of international regimes reflected a growing 
separation of the behaviour of international organizations from institutionalised collective 
behaviour.88 While research on international regimes has produced a range of definitions, 
which each focus on different aspects of regimes, the most commonly referred to definition 
was formulated by Stephen Krasner. He describes regimes as frameworks of  
‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice.’89 
This definition is sufficiently broad to serve as a starting point for further perspectives. Robert 
Keohane proposed a more restrictive definition which focuses on the constitutive and 
prescriptive status of regimes. He describes regimes as ‘institutions with explicit rules, agreed 
upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations.’90 
Others focus on the social character of regimes as reflected in Krasner’s definition. For 
instance, Ruggie defines regimes as ‘set[s] of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, 
plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which have been accepted by a 
group of states.’91 This perspective emphasises state practices and highlights the behavioural 
                                                          
87 John Ruggie, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’, Vol 29 (3), (International 
Organisation, 1975) 558, 568 - 569. 
88 Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, Vol 36 (2), 
(International Organization, 1982) 185 – 205, later republished in Stephen Krasner (ed), International Regimes, 
(Cornell University Press, 1982); John Ruggie, (fn 88)  569: Ruggie places regimes on a scale of institutionalisation 
of collective behaviour which reaches from mere cognitive responses (shared intentions and expectations of 
states) to international regimes (mutual expectations which have been consolidated through commitments, 
plans and the organisation of resources) and finally, international organisations (established by treaties, 
governed by international law and possessing a clear material scope and membership). 
89 Stephen Krasner, (fn 89) 2, 127; Alexander Kelle, (fn 50) 225: ‘The principles of an international regime 
represent the shared beliefs of regime participants about the issue area which the regime is set up to regulate.’ 
90 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, 
(Westview Press, 1989), 4; see also Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural 
Resources and the Environment, (Cornell University Press, 1989) 13: Young defines regimes as ‘specialized 
arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only 
some subset of the members of international society.’   
91 John Ruggie, (fn 88) 570. 
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effects of regimes. These two sets of definitions highlight the normative and behavioural 
aspects which are under investigation in regime analysis.92  
 
1.3.2. Regime Effectiveness 
Today there is a quasi-consensus in regime literature on the significance of international 
regimes in the international order. Recent research has shifted from the question whether 
regimes matter, to ‘the ways in which they matter, the extent to which they matter and the 
conditions under which they matter.’93 Given that international regimes create and shape 
expectations, ‘it is important for governments to find out which of the international 
regulatory regimes they have joined actually yield returns on their investments and where 
progress has been minute.’94 
The literature on international regimes has used the term ‘regime effectiveness’ to address 
these questions. The purpose of studying regime effectiveness is to identify conditions for the 
success of regimes with a view to reducing the likelihood of failure and optimising collective 
problem-solving.95 As mentioned above, regimes are dynamic entities which ‘require ongoing 
efforts and periodic adjustments in governing arrangements to ensure that they are properly 
adapted to changing circumstances.’96 For this reason, simply characterising as effective 
regime as ‘successful’ at one moment in time, says little about its long-term significance. 97  
The literature on regime effectiveness has used the term to discuss a number of different 
notions, which shows that ‘the study of effectiveness lacks a common and precisely defined 
                                                          
92 Robert Keohane, Peter Haas, Marc Levy, ‘The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions’ in 
Keohane et al (eds), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, (MIT 
University Press, 1993) 27. 
93 Oran Young, ‘The Consequences of International Regimes: A Framework for Analysis’, in Arild Underdal, Oran 
Young (eds), (fn 13) 3. 
94 Carsten Helm, Detlef Sprinz, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes’ Vol 44 (5), 
(Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2000) 631. 
95 On the question of why some regimes solve problems more easily than others, see Arild Underdal, ‘The 
Concept of Regime “Effectiveness”’, Vol 24 (2), (Cooperation and Conflict, 1992) 227; see also Edward Miles et 
al (eds), (fn 13); Marc Levy, Oran Young, Michael Zürn, ‘The Study of International Regimes’, Vol 1 (3), (European 
Journal of International Relations, 1995). 
96 Oran Young, ‘The Consequences of International Regimes: A Framework for Analysis’, in Arild Underdal, Oran 
Young (eds), (fn 13) 6. 
97 Ibid 41. 
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core.’98 The precise meaning of effectiveness applied in an evaluation depends on the 
theoretic perspective, background and area of expertise of practitioners. Therefore, the term 
‘effective’ must be understood in its traditional sense, namely as being ‘successful in 
producing a result or effect.’99 Regime effectiveness is to be distinguished from regime effects. 
The former implies positive effects, whereas effects in general can be either positive or 
negative. 
Given the absence of a universally-applicable definition of effectiveness, it varies according 
to the characteristics of the particular field under review. However, common approaches 
have been developed to address regime effectiveness. The most frequently applied approach 
was proposed by Underdal in the form of questions which must be addressed in an 
effectiveness assessment:  
‘(i) What precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? (ii) Against which standard 
is the object to be evaluated? (iii) How do we operationally go about comparing the 
object to our standard, in other words, what kind of measurement operations do we 
perform in order to attribute a certain score of effectiveness to a certain [regime]?’100 
The object under investigation is the regime itself, in particular its norms, rules and principles. 
Assessing the effectiveness of a regime therefore implies a determination of the type and 
level of influence the regime has on the behaviour of states.101 Such an exercise entails both 
legal and political considerations. In a first step, the legal nature and significance of rules, 
norms and principles and their capacity to meaningfully guide the exercise of sovereign power 
must be identified.102 Given that the creation and operation of regimes are political processes, 
the types of state behaviour which are directly caused by the regime (i.e. behavioural 
responses) must then be isolated from all state activity. 
                                                          
98 Ibid, 27, 28: Underdal notes that the effectiveness of a regime is to be distinguished from its ‘efficiency’ or 
‘fairness.’ They must also be distinguished from regime ‘strength’ and ‘robustness’ which are important 
considerations for effectiveness but not sufficient conditions thereof. 
99 ‘Effective’, in The Chambers Dictionary, (Chambers, 2006) 478.  
100 Arild Underdal, (fn 96) 228 – 229. 
101 Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness’, in Arild Underdal, Oran 
Young (eds), (fn 13) 33: On this point it must be noted that the unit of analysis may be a single regime or a group 
of regimes. In the former case, the institutional context in which the regime is embedded (i.e. related regimes) 
may be treated as a ceteris paribus condition. In the latter case, more attention will be given to the degree to 
which regimes influence each other. 
102 Laura Dickinson, International Law and Society: Empirical Approaches to Human Rights, (Routledge, 2017). 
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The standard of evaluation, i.e. the type of state behaviour necessary for effective regime 
implementation, is derived from its norms and principles.103 Using the example of the CWC 
regime, Alexander Kelle proposes a method of determining such a standard. He argues that 
regime principles, which are shared beliefs among regime participants (e.g. the chemical 
weapons taboo), indicate the regime goal. This goal is ‘to exclude completely the possibility 
of the use of chemical weapons’ through their verified global elimination.104  
In turn, the norms embodied in the regime create obligations for states which guide them in 
their pursuit of the regime goal. Such norms include the obligation imposed on possessor 
states to destroy them (disarmament norm); the verification of state activities (declaration 
norm, inspection norm) and the commitment by non-possessor states to not acquire chemical 
weapons (non-acquisition norm).105 Finally, the rules and procedures set requirements for the 
effective implementation of the norms.  
In a second step, the behavioural responses of states to the regime will be evaluated.106 The 
state behaviour to be evaluated are a combination of actions, attitudes and policies which 
reflect the internalisation of regime norms and principles.107 The most relevant types of 
behaviour are those which reflect compliance with regime obligations, cooperation with 
other states parties and decision-making which are oriented towards the regime goal.108 The 
attribution of such behaviours to the regime can be difficult as causal links between norms, 
rules and principles and state behaviour are not always evident.109 
                                                          
103 Alexander Kelle, (fn 50) 293: ‘Retaining [Krasner’s] four-part structural definition (…) can be seen as a pre-
requisite to arrive at a qualitative assessment of regime effectiveness.’ 
104 Preamble, CWC, 3 September 1992, UNTS, Vol 1975, 45. 
105 Article 1 (2) CWC, 3 September 1992, UNTS, Vol 1975, 45. 
106 Beth Simmons, ‘International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International 
Monetary Affairs’ Vol 94 (4), (American Political Science Review, 2000) 832: ‘The effect of international law on 
state behaviour should be a central concern of international relations scholarship.’ 
107 Alexander Kelle, (fn 50) 225; see Harald Müller ‘The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by 
Governments. The Case of Security Regimes’, in Volker Rittberger (ed), Regime Theory and International 
Relations, (Clarendon Press, 1993). 
108 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations, (CUP, 1997), 248: ‘The most fundamental and most widely discussed of these 
purposes is the enhancement of the ability of states to cooperate in the issue area.’; see also David Victor, Kal 
Raustiala, Eugene Skolnikoff (eds), The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Commitments: Theory and Practice, (MIT Press, 1998): on types of political behaviour to be considered in the 
legal-political domain; Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
2nd ed, (Addison-Wesley, 1999): on three models of decision-making (Rational Actor-, Organisational Behaviour- 
and Bureaucratic Politics Models); Irving Destler, Presidents Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of 
Organizational Reform (Princeton University Press, 1972) 52. 
109 Beth Simmons, (fn 107) 820. 
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For instance, in cases where the expected outcome is to reduce emissions below a certain 
threshold has been achieved, the regime can be regarded as having positively influenced state 
behaviour. However, in the case of regimes which require sustained, long term efforts, 
improvements relative to the expected outcome will be assessed. Thus, an assessment of the 
effectiveness of disarmament regimes, which are established with the objective of fully 
eliminating a type of weapon, will focus on the achievements of the regime up until the 
moment of evaluation and its prospects for the future.   
One approach to determining the relative improvement brought about by the regime, is the 
so-called ‘Oslo-Potsdam Solution.’ 110 It allows the determination of how much out of what 
can be accomplished has been accomplished. It establishes two reference points, the lower 
and upper boundaries of regime performance, against which state behaviour must be 
assessed. First, against the hypothetical state of affairs in which the regime did not exist (no-
regime counterfactual), and secondly, against the optimum degree of influence the regime 
could have on state behaviour (collective optimum).111 It is useful for evaluating 
improvements which may be substantive, yet fall short of being optimal.112 
The approach to assessing regime effectiveness followed in this thesis borrows its basic 
structure from the Oslo Potsdam Solution as it uses regime rules, norms and principles as the 
standard to derive optimal outcomes in terms of state behaviour. Where relevant, it explores 
instances of extra-regime disarmament such as measures undertaken prior to the existence 
of a particular regime, ad hoc disarmament operations or coerced disarmament, as no-regime 
counterfactuals.  
Within those two reference points, further focal points for analysis must be determined. 
Explaining effectiveness entails the identification of the ‘critical “determinants” of 
effectiveness.’113 The complexity of the environment in which disarmament regimes are 
operated makes it impossible for any model to account for all relevant factors. Therefore, the 
                                                          
110 This notion of ‘relative effectiveness’ was developed by Helm and Sprinz. See Carsten Helm, Detlef Sprinz, (fn 
95) 359 – 369. 
111 Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness’, in Arild Underdal, Oran 
Young (eds), (fn 13) 36; Philip Tetlock, Aaron Belkin (eds), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, 
(Princeton University Press, 1996) 18; Jon Hovi, Detlef Sprinz, Arild Underdal, (fn 15) 92. 
112 Arild Underdal, (fn 96) 230 – 231.  
113 Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness’, in Arild Underdal, Oran 
Young (eds), (fn 13) 40.  
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most relevant factors of regime effectiveness in the field of disarmament will be selected and 
subjected to qualitative analysis.  
Some authors have questioned the validity of scores which are ‘assigned on the basis of [such] 
crude, qualitative assessments rather than systematic, quantitative measurement’114 
However, qualitative analysis may serve as a remedy to the absence of valid and useful 
quantitative criteria, such as stockpile numbers.115 It better reflects the dynamic nature of 
international regimes than quantitative measurement, as it is not simply concerned with the 
status quo of a regime but aims to offer insights into its trajectory. Such an approach is in line 
with the ‘prevailing practice in regime analysis [which] does not aspire to top rating by the 
canons of scientific measurement.’116 
 
2. International Law and Disarmament 
Historically, the WMD threat has been addressed through the rule of law and in particular by 
limiting the use of armed force and promoting peaceful dispute settlement.117 The principle 
of sovereign equality of states under international law has enabled all states to participate in 
the creation of disarmament regimes, regardless of their military or political powers.118 States 
consequently assume a tripe role as the principal creators, subjects and enforcers of the law 
on disarmament. 
The determination of the role which international law plays in the achievement of 
disarmament requires a discussion of international legal concepts which are relevant to the 
study of regime effectiveness. A review of those sources of international law which create 
disarmament obligations for states will provide an outline of the components of the legal 
                                                          
114 Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness’, in Arild Underdal, Oran 
Young (eds), (fn 13) 37; see also Jon Hovi, Detlef Sprinz, Arild Underdal, (fn 15) 77 – 79, 84: regard no-regime 
counterfactuals and collective optimums as arbitrary constructs that do not offer accurate and comprehensive 
results. 
115 Jon Hovi, Detlef Sprinz, Arild Underdal, (fn 15) 87. 
116 Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness’, in Arild Underdal, Oran 
Young (eds),(fn 13) 37. 
117 Thilo Marauhn, ‘Dispute Resolution, Compliance Control and Enforcement of International Arms Control’ in 
Geir Ulfstein (ed), Making Treaties Work: Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control, (CUP, 2007) 244. 
118 Arthur Desjardins, (fn 62) 668: ‘The law is the asylum of the weak: even small States, which would be crushed 
in the blink of an eye if a strong State used force, naturally evoke the image of international justice. What must 
be admired is the strong seeking to limit the rule of force.’ 
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architecture of disarmament regimes. Finally, the role of international institutions in the 
implementation of disarmament regimes will be discussed.  
 
2.1. Sources of Disarmament Law 
Legal obligations regulating the conduct of states in the area of disarmament may arise from 
all sources of international law.119 The law of disarmament principally comprises multilateral 
treaties and is supported by regional and bilateral agreements120 with other sources of law 
including customary international law, UN Security Council resolutions creating ad hoc 
disarmament regimes, and judgments of international courts and tribunals as interpretative 
sources. In addition, exhortative instruments such as UNGA resolutions or Review Process 
Outcome Documents shed interpretative light on the current limits of the law and potential 
directions for its progressive development. Examining this complex architecture raises 
questions including what standards for state conduct these sources of law establish, how they 
are interpreted and applied to particular situations of fact, how they interact with each other, 
and whether there is a distinct ‘disarmament law.’  
 
2.1.1. Multilateral Disarmament Treaties 
Multilateral treaties are tools which enable the transformation of collective social claims into 
binding law.121 Their consent-based approach not only facilitates the maintenance of 
international peace and security in general but also constitute the normative core of 
disarmament regimes and the primary source of disarmament obligations.122 The effective 
implementation of such complex treaty regimes requires states parties to follow common 
                                                          
119 ILC Report, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’, 13 April 2006, (A/CN.4/L.682); Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, (Rinehart, 1952) 
303; Paul Heilbronn, ‘Les Sources du Droit International’ Vol 11 (Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of 
International Law, 1925-I) 1-63; George Finch, ‘Les Sources Modernes du Droit International’ Vol 53, (Collected 
Courses, 1935-III) 531 – 629. 
120 James Crawford, ‘Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law’ Vol 319, (Collected Courses, 
2006) 336: On the terms ‘bilateral’ and ‘multilateral’ treaties. 
121 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of the Law 
of Treaties’, in Perspectives of International Law in the 21st Century, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 300. 
122 Oliver Dörr, ‘Introduction: On the Role of Treaties in the Development of International Law’ in Oliver Dörr, 
Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – A Commentary, (Springer, 2012) 40 
– 43. 
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procedures regarding the participation in a regime, to develop homogenous understandings 
regarding the content and scope of treaty obligations and ensure compliance with them.  
It is therefore indispensable to acknowledge the key role which the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 plays in supporting the implementation of disarmament 
regimes throughout their life cycle.123 It creates legally-binding obligations regarding the 
creation, interpretation and implementation of disarmament treaties.124 The VCLT is a further 
expression of how the rule of law serves 
‘the cause of disarmament by giving commitments in this field the qualities of 
bindingness and permanence that are simply indispensable. The rule of law not only 
provides the framework within which commitments are undertaken, it also provides 
tools to assist in interpreting them, in confirming their full implementation, and in 
responding to violations.’125 
The VCLT provides rules for the determination of the scope of jurisdiction of disarmament 
treaties. The application ratione temporis of a disarmament treaty begins with its entry into 
force.126 Given the principal goal of disarmament to bring about a permanent state of affairs 
in which a certain class of weapons no longer exists, disarmament treaties must remain in 
place even after the eventual elimination of all stockpiles. Hence, disarmament treaties are 
of indefinite duration.127  
The application ratione personae of a disarmament treaty is limited to those states which 
have signed and ratified it and have thereby expressed the intention to be bound by its 
terms.128 Regarding the territorial application of disarmament treaties, Article 29, VCLT 
                                                          
123 All three WMD under examination in this thesis have been adopted after the entry into force of the VCLT, 
which consequently applies to all of them. 
124 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS, 331: governs all treaties concluded since 1969 between states which are also parties to the VCLT. 
125 Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Disarmament and the Rule of Law’, Speech at 
the 2008 American Bar Association Section on International Law Spring Meeting, 31 March 2008, United Nations, 
New York. 
126 See Article 28, VCLT on the principle of non-retroactivity of treaties. Article 18, VCLT provides that, even 
before it enters into force and creates legal obligations, states which ratified it must refrain from actions which 
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.  
127 See Articles 12 – 18, VCLT on the condition of consent; Article XIII, (1), BWC and Article XVI, (1), CWC: ‘This 
Convention shall be of unlimited duration.’; Article X, (2), NPT: initial limitation of the NPT to 25 years; Decision 
3 of the Outcome Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, 
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex: the Conference decided that ‘the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.’ 
128 See Article 2, para g and Articles 11 – 18 VCLT; although treaty rules may crystallise as customary international 
law, this does not extend the application of the treaty itself to third states. 
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provides that a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory, unless a 
different intention appears from it. Given that a state may produce, stockpile or deploy 
weapons on the territory of other states, the territorial scope of application of disarmament 
treaties cannot be limited to its own territory and must therefore be understood as being 
global.129 
Finally, the material scope of application (ratione materiae) is defined by the text of the 
respective disarmament treaties which generally includes to the prohibition of activities (the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and transfer of weapons), the imposition 
of actions (destruction or diversion to peaceful uses of weapons) and definitions of items 
covered (weapons, weapons agents, equipment, means of delivery and production facilities). 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda enshrined in Article 26, VCLT dictates that treaties are 
binding on their parties and must be executed in good faith. It protects the legitimate 
expectation of states parties in the compliance by all other states parties with their treaty 
obligations. The decision of states to conclude legally-binding disarmament instruments 
illustrates the fact that ‘disarmament is clearly not simply a matter of policy, but a legal 
obligation.’130  
The highly technical and scientifically complex terminology of disarmament treaties can lead 
to disagreements regarding the exact standard of behaviour expected of states.131 Such 
disagreements pose for the consistent and uniform implementation of treaty obligations by 
all states parties. Furthermore, the unilateral misinterpretation of treaty obligation may serve 
as a justification by some states for the adoption of weapons policies which run counter to 
                                                          
129 The CWC imposes the destruction of chemical weapons or chemical weapons facilities owned or possessed, 
‘that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control,’ or weapons which ‘it abandoned on the territory 
of another State Party.’ (Article 1, para 2 – 4, CWC). The BWC simply imposes the destruction or diversion to 
peaceful purposes of all biological weapons under its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. Moreover, 
it prohibits the ‘transfer to any recipient whatsoever, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any State 
(…) to manufacture or otherwise acquire’ biological weapons and their means of delivery. Article VI of the NPT 
refers to the ‘cessation of the nuclear arms race’ and to ‘nuclear disarmament’ which can be understood as 
covering all nuclear weapons on the territories of all states. 
130 Sergio Duarte, (fn 126); Articles 11 – 15 VCLT; Oliver Dörr,(fn 123). 
131 Monica Hakimi, ‘The Work of International Law’ Vol 58 (1) (Harvard International Law Journal, 2017) 35: 
Indeterminate legal texts enable conflict because they are open to multiple interpretations; see e.g. ongoing 
debates surrounding the legal nature and scope of Article VI, NPT, the obligation which it proscribes and the 
legality of weapons renewal and stockpile maintenance activities. 
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their disarmament obligations. For these reasons, Articles 31 – 33, VCLT lists elements to be 
taken into consideration by all states in the interpretation of treaty provisions.132  
The aim of interpreting a treaty is to determine its true meaning at a given time. Article 31 
(1), VCLT provides that treaties must be interpreted on the basis of the ordinary meaning of 
their terms and in the light of their object and purpose. Consequently, the provisions of 
disarmament treaties must be understood as contributing to the ultimate elimination of their 
respective class of weapon. In light of fundamental changes in the geopolitical environment 
since the adoption of most WMD treaties, their interpretation requires the consideration of 
current circumstances, subsequent agreements and state practice, as well as new rules of 
international law (Article 31 (3) VCLT).   
The possibility of a state party withdrawing from a treaty is regulated by Article 54, VCLT 
provides that a state party may withdraw from a treaty ‘in conformity with the provisions of 
the treaty.’ All WMD treaties contain a clause which establishes the right of withdrawal and 
conditions for its exercise.133 It has been argued that the option to withdraw from 
disarmament regimes contradicts and undermines their irreversible, sustainable and 
indefinite character and thereby weakens them.  
However, its inclusion may be understood as a means of restricting the invocation of the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (Article 62, VCLT), which allows states to suspend or withdraw 
from a treaty based on a ‘fundamental change of circumstances.’134 Withdrawal clauses 
attach three conditions to a withdrawal: extraordinary events, which are relevant to the 
object of the treaty, and which threaten national security interests. However, the assessment 
of whether these conditions are met is ultimately left to the withdrawing state itself. 
 
2.1.2. Customary International Law 
Provisions of disarmament treaties may crystallise into norms of customary international law 
which constitute an additional source of disarmament obligations and an exception to the 
                                                          
132 It does not impose a specific process of interpretation and the use of the guidelines it proposes is at the 
discretion of states. This is due to the fact that interpretation is not an exact science. 
133 Article XIII (2), BWC; Article XVI (2), CWC; Article X, NPT.  
134 Nicholas Sims, ‘Withdrawal Clauses in Disarmament Treaties: A Questionable Logic?’ Issue No. 42, 
(Disarmament Diplomacy, 1999) http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/42clause.htm (accessed 2 January 
2018). 
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principle in Article 34, VCLT that states are only bound by norms and rules which they have 
consented to. The existence of such customary obligations strengthens a regime’s normative 
structure by filling gaps left in the membership of disarmament treaties and by creating 
legally-binding obligations for third states (hold-out states).  
The International Law Commission (ILC) suggests that the crystallisation of a customary norm 
requires evidence of uniform, general and consistent state practice135 and of the general 
recognition by ‘states of the existence (…) of an obligatory rule [opinio juris].’136 However, 
such evidence of state practice and opinio juris may easily be challenged by states which do 
not wish to be bound by a customary norm. Customary norms cannot be created ad hoc and 
develop slowly over long periods of time. Although no customary disarmament obligations 
have been widely accepted thus far, debates surrounding the customary nature of 
disarmament obligations have gained renewed attention with the chemical disarmament of 
Syria, a non-party to the CWC, and the submission of the Marshall Island’s applications to the 
ICJ in which it claimed the customary status of Article VI, NPT. 
 
2.1.3. The UN Charter and the Law on the Use of Force 
The UN Charter does not impose disarmament obligations, which can be explained by the fact 
that its negotiators of did not intend for it to serve as a legal framework for disarmament.137 
The only two mentions of disarmament in Articles 11 and 47, UN Charter relate to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.138 Rather than calling for disarmament, it 
                                                          
135 ILC, ‘Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law’, Memorandum by the Secretariat, 65th session, 
14 March 2013, (A/CN.4/659): 9 (Observation 2), 10 (Observation 3), 13 (Observation 6). 
136 Ibid: 17 (Observation 9), 18 (Observation 8). 
137 Leland Godrich, Edvard Hambro, Anne Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 
3rd ed, (Columbia University Press, 1969) 212. 
138 Article 11, para 1: ‘The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the 
regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to 
the Security Council or to both.’; Article 47, para 1: ‘There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to 
advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its 
disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.’ 
Article 47, para 1: ‘There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council 
on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, 
and possible disarmament.’ 
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treats it as a means of preventing armed conflicts where possible and restricting the use of 
force when it occurs.139  
In other words, it recognises that the accomplishment of the UN’s central goal to maintain 
peace and to prevent war can in some cases require the use of armed force.140 Conversely, 
disarmament measures targeting those weapons whose degree of destructiveness goes 
beyond what is required for the enforcement of peace and the maintenance of security –  in 
particular unconventional weapons – are in line with the Charter’s goals.141  
Nevertheless, the Charter plays an important role for disarmament, as it charged the General 
Assembly and the Security Council with the task of dealing with disarmament. Indeed, 
‘disarmament [has become] part of the very identity of the United Nations as an 
institution.’142 
 
2.2. The Law on Disarmament within a Fragmented International Legal Order  
2.1.1. The Existence of a ‘Special’ Disarmament Law  
In an expanding and diversifying international normative system, ‘the allocation of authority 
within a complex system of legal prescriptions’ becomes necessary.143 Such a distribution of 
authority is not straightforward in the decentralised international legal system. International 
law has developed mostly horizontally and does not manifest a clear hierarchy of norms.144 
The fragmentation of international law through the emergence of specialised sets of rules 
                                                          
139 See ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions’, 22 January 2015, 8-10: on the 
distinction between jus ad bellum (‘conditions under which States may resort to (…) the use of armed force) and 
jus in bello (‘conduct of parties engaged in armed conflict’). 
140 See Article 2 (4) and Articles 42, 46, 47 UN Charter.  
141 See for example the Preamble of the BWC: ‘desiring (…) also to contribute to the realisation of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’  
142 Randy Rydell, ‘Explaining Hammarskjöld’s “Hardy Perennial” - The Role of the United Nations in Nuclear 
Disarmament’ (UNA-UK, 2013) 5; Inis Claude, The Changing United Nations (Random House, 1964) 7: ‘The 
assertion that disarmament is the key to peace and that its promotion is the foremost task of the world 
organisation has become a central tenet of the orthodox ideology of the United Nations speech-making and 
resolution-drafting.’ 
143 Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ Vol 
17 (3), (EJIL, 2006) 483. 
144 With the exception of obligations erga omnes and norms jus cogens, see Article 53, VCLT and ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (fn 120), 181, paras 361 – 379 (norms jus cogens); 193, paras 380 - 409 (obligations erga omnes). 
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which claim autonomy from general international law has led to normative conflicts which 
can cause legal uncertainty. 
The International Law Commission (ILC) identified four types of conflicts between norms 
which can contribute to the fragmentation of international law, among which the relationship 
between special law and general international law appears to be the most relevant.145 Given 
their role in inducing highly technical state behaviour, the normative content of disarmament 
regimes is very specialised, accounting for the scientific, technical and political processes 
necessary for disarmament.146 Disarmament treaties contain ‘tailor-made’ rules which don’t 
exist under general international law, such as rules on verification, on the legal consequences 
of breaches and procedures of dispute settlement. 
Conflicts between special and general international law are addressed by the doctrine of lex 
specialis derogat lex generali and the doctrine of self-contained regimes. Both serve as a 
means of determining whether the special set of rules overrides general international law in 
a given issue-area. The doctrine of lex specialis is grounded in the idea that special rules are 
better adapted to the subject area and therefore more effective.147 Self-contained regimes 
have been  viewed as the strongest form of lex specialis.148 In general terms, self-contained 
claim the priority of their secondary rules over the secondary rules which exist under general 
international law.149 For instance, regimes which create their own rules and mechanisms for 
managing compliance and dealing with breaches are less likely to resort to formal dispute 
settlement.150 
Disarmament regimes, although equipped with specialised rules, mechanisms and 
institutions, have not gained sufficient normative autonomy to be qualified as a distinct body 
of ‘disarmament law’. They continue to rely on general international law, such as norms of 
                                                          
145 ILC Report on Fragmentation (fn 120) 15 - 16, para 18: special and general law, prior and subsequent law, 
laws at different hierarchical levels, relations of law to its normative environment generally. 
146 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, (fn 122) 600; Friedrich Kratochwill, John Ruggie, (fn 88) 759. 
147 This has been expressed by Hugo Grotius in De Jure Belli ac Pacis. Libri Tres, Book II Section XXIX: ‘Among 
agreements which are equal…that should be given preference which is most specific and approaches most nearly 
to the subject in hand, for special provisions are ordinarily more effective than those that are general.’ 
148 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 55, para. 2 in Official Records of the General 
Assembly, 53rd Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10) 140, para 5; see also S.S. Wimbledon’, PJIJ, Series A, 1923, 
No 1, 23–24; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, 40 Bruno 
Simma, ‘Self-Contained Regimes’, Vol 16 (NYIL, 1985) 111. 
149 ILC Report on Fragmentation (fn 120) 66, paras 124, 128. 
150 Ibid, 73, para 137. 
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international humanitarian law, the VCLT and the UN Charter, in particular for the 
enforcement of compliance by the Security Council. Therefore, general rules will remain 
relevant and applicable to the extent that special rules are unavailable or ineffective. ‘If the 
rules and procedures of special systems fail, a fall-back on general international law, including 
resort to countermeasures, is justified.’151  ‘ 
Hence, they may be conceived as lex specialis only as an expression or elaboration of general 
international law, rather than an exception to it. This implies that in such an absence of a 
normative conflict, the regime’s special rules are applied simultaneously with the general 
rules under international law and do not further its fragmentation.152  
2.2.2. The Hierarchy of Norms 
It is important to place disarmament treaties and other sources of disarmament law within 
the hierarchy of norms in the international legal system. Article 103 of the UN Charter 
provides that obligations under the Charter take priority over obligations under other treaties 
in the case of a conflict. The phrase ‘obligations under the Charter’ not only refers to the text 
of the Charter itself, but also to binding decisions adopted by UN bodies.153 For instance, 
binding obligations may arise from resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII include sanctions, which themselves claim primary over other international obligations.154 
The effect of this precedence is that rather than being invalidated, the lower-priority rule is 
simply rendered inapplicable to the extent that it conflicts with obligations under the 
Charter.155 
3. International Relations Theory 
Addressing the second layer of regime effectiveness entails exploring why states adopt 
certain behaviours in a given issue-area. Such behaviours include the decision of states to 
acquire or give up certain weapons, to create regimes for this purpose, to comply with 
                                                          
151 Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ Vol 
17 (3), (EJIL, 2006) 485. 
152 ILC Report on Fragmentation (fn 120) 49, para 88. 
ILC Report on Fragmentation (fn 120) 168 - 169, para 331. 
154 Article 25, UN Charter: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.’ 
155 Pierre Marie Dupuy, ‘L’Unité de l’Ordre Juridique International - Cours Général de Droit International Public’, 
Vol. 297, (Recueil des Cours, 2002) 243. 
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disarmament obligations, to actively promote disarmament in international fora and to 
coerce other states to disarm. Considerations drawn from IR Theory will not only shed light 
on questions related to state conduct which international law cannot address by itself, but 
also be useful in defining the limits of what the law can achieve in a highly political context.  
3.1. The Implications of Security Perceptions for Disarmament 
Security is a core value of societies, both national and international. Considerations of 
national and international security are the primary factor influencing decisions of states 
related to the possession of weapons and the formation and implementation of regimes 
governing their elimination. States generally justify the adoption of policies which promote 
arms races on the grounds of the protection of national security interests.156  
In contrast, disarmament suggests that the enhancement of international security through 
the elimination of weapons is in principle not incompatible with national interests. In fact, a 
close relationship between disarmament and security has been affirmed and summarised in 
a 1982 report by then-UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar:  
‘The relationship between disarmament and international security lies at the very root 
of the problem of how to find ways by which States can achieve security without 
engaging in an arms race which merely results in greater insecurity for all.’157 
The desire of states to exist in a state of security is a natural consequence of their inherent 
vulnerability vis-à-vis other states who also seek to protect their existence and limited 
resources. Hence, in international relations, security ‘means no more than safety [from 
threats posed by other states]: either objective safety, meaning safety which actually exists, 
or subjective safety, meaning safety which is felt or experienced.’158 This subjective aspect of 
security has important implications for disarmament.  
                                                          
156 Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race, (Manchester 
University Press, 1977) 7: such policies include those legitimising the use or threat of the use of force, aimed at 
military domination, undermining the peaceful settlement of disputes and supporting the weapons industry; 
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Relationship between Disarmament and International Security’ (UN Centre for 
Disarmament, 1982) 2, para 16. 
157 Foreword by the Secretary-General, (fn 157) v. 
158 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 2nd ed. (Macmillan, 1995) 18. 
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For instance, the presence of large stockpiles of the most destructive weapons may increase 
the perceived level of security for some states.159 This unilateral view on security based on 
deterrence stands in contrast with the collective security which disarmament seeks to 
promote. It suggests that the possession of highly destructive weapons creates a balance of 
power between states which prevents them from launching military attacks against each 
other and that, as a result, security is enhanced.160 Other states may consider the presence of 
the same stockpiles as destabilising feel threatened by them. Such diverging perceptions of 
security can create opposing needs and expectations of states which may be difficult to 
reconcile and hamper cooperative disarmament. 
The level of predictability of state behaviour in a given issue area is crucial for the levels of 
security perceived by other actors. Regimes structure state behaviour and thereby render it 
more transparent and predictable. For this reason, disarmament regimes have been 
described as ‘agent[s] of change in the international security environment in [their] own 
right.’161 
 
3.2. Theories of International Regimes 
Early IR scholarship on international regimes reflected a growing distinction between the 
behaviour of international organizations and the institutionalised collective behaviour of 
states.162 Regime theory,163 which grew out of this separation, is rooted in the idea that 
                                                          
159 See e.g. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Harvard University Press, 1980): Schelling argues that 
deterrence of potential attacks, by demonstrating the ability to launch an even more devastating counter-attack, 
is the most viable way of achieving security; Alva Myrdal, (fn 157) 8. 
160 See, e.g. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, (Polity Press, 2004); George Shultz, James Goodby, The War that 
Must Never be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence, (Hoover Institution Press, 2015); Kenneth Waltz, 
‘Nuclear Myths and Political Realities’ Vol 84 (3), (The American Political Science Review, 1990) 731 – 746. 
161 Jean-Pascal Zanders, ‘Challenges to Disarmament Regimes: The Case of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention’ Vol 15 (4) (Global Society, 2001) 361.  
162 Stephen Krasner, (fn 89) 185 – 205, later republished in Stephen Krasner (ed), International Regimes, (Cornell 
University Press, 1982); John Ruggie, (fn 88) 569: Ruggie places regimes on a scale of institutionalisation of 
collective behaviour which reaches from mere cognitive responses (shared intentions and expectations of states) 
to international regimes (mutual expectations which have been consolidated through commitments, plans and 
the organisation of resources) and finally, international organisations (established by treaties, governed by 
international law and possessing a clear material scope and membership). 
163 It has been argued that there is no such thing as ‘regime theory’, but rather, multiple theories of regimes 
within an overarching ‘concept’ or ‘phenomenon’. See M. J. Peterson, ‘International Regimes as Concept’ 
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/21/international-regimes-as-concept/ (accessed 21 March 2018): he considers 
the phrase ‘theory of international regimes’ more appropriate, as it does not suggest the existence of a ‘distinct 
and reasonably unified school of analysts.’ 
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cooperation between states is possible and necessary in a state of anarchy.164 Common 
approaches to regime theory, including realism, neoliberalism and constructivism, have 
offered different explanations for the motivations of states to form and participate in regimes. 
Realism centres on the role of power in the creation and operation of regimes. It suggests 
that anarchy causes states to pursue relative gains, i.e. a better position relative to other 
states in terms of power and security.165 Realists are interested in immediate, rather than 
long-term benefits which regimes may provide. States traditionally following a realist 
approach are therefore unlikely to participate in and comply with a regime which either 
undermines their superiority or unlikely to directly increase it.   
Neoliberalism suggests that states seek to maximise absolute gains. While they ‘concede that 
cooperation is affected by power relationships’, they argue that interests and expectations 
are influenced by norms and international institutions.166 They regard regimes as cooperative 
arrangements which facilitate the exchange of information, knowledge and resources and 
thereby reduce uncertainty.167 In turn, this exchange optimises the achievement of desired 
outcomes for all participants.  
Constructivists regard regimes as social constructs which, rather than by material interests of 
states, are shaped by knowledge, norms, identities and discourse.168 Constructivism treats 
these elements as part of a learning process. In other words, if a new concept or idea enters 
public discourse and influences the collective understanding of states in a given issue area, a 
regime may emerge from such a process. 
Although the role of power relations cannot be neglected in the international order, the 
realist exclusive focus on immediate gains in superiority is not useful for the legal examination 
of disarmament regimes. Moreover, the realist assumption that regimes have ‘minimal 
                                                          
164 Helen Milner, ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique’ Vol 17 (1), (Review 
of International Studies, 1991) 67; Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’ Vol 46 (2), 
(International Organisation, 1992). 
165 Robert Powell, ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory’ Vol 85 (4), (American Political 
Science Review, 1991); Joseph Grieco, ‘The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation’ Vol 87 (3), 
(American Political Science Review, 1993). 
166 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, (fn 109) 23. 
167 Ibid 
168 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (CUP, 1999) 1. 
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influence on state behaviour’ contradicts the assumption of their importance underlying this 
thesis.169 
Neoliberalist and constructivist theories offer the most valuable perspective for the purposes 
of describing the behaviour and motivations of states in the context of disarmament. 
Although they admit that power relationships influence international cooperation, their 
understanding of regimes centres on norms.170 Moreover, they account for other relevant 
factors including the emergence of weapons taboos which lead states to adopt disarmament 
treaties, the influence of public discourse on progress in disarmament, the need for 
transparency and the exchange of information and the dynamic character of disarmament. 
They best reflect the dual normative and behavioural approach to regime effectiveness 
followed in this thesis. 
 
4. Criteria for Assessing Regime Effectiveness 
As mentioned above, approaches to evaluating regime effectiveness vary depending on the 
subject area and the focus of evaluation. Underdal argues that ‘any attempt at explaining 
[effectiveness] must first of all try to identify the critical “determinants” [or criteria] of 
effectiveness.’171 The following section will set out the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness 
of WMD regimes which have been derived from the concept of disarmament, the law on 
disarmament and general international law, and theories on international relations. The 
structure of the substantive chapters on the effectiveness of WMD regimes will follow the 
two-fold assessment of the normative (internal) effectiveness of regimes and their and 
operational (external) effectiveness. 
 
4.1. Internal Effectiveness 
The internal structure of a regime creates a legal roadmap for states in their pursuit of regime 
goals. Therefore, it is important to evaluate ‘internal’ effectiveness, in order to ensure that 
                                                          
169 John Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ Vol 19 (3), (International Security, 1995) 
7.  
170 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, (fn 109) 23. 
171 Arild Underdal, (fn 13) 40.  
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the legal architecture creates clear obligations for states and enables them to cooperate 
effectively. The necessity of identifying internal ‘sources of effectiveness is based on the 
premise that there are good and bad ways of structuring international institutions.’172 In order 
to be internally effective, a regime must display a number of qualities which reflect their 
dynamic nature.  
A first indicator of internal effectiveness is an ideal balance of density, breadth, precision and 
clarity of rules and norms.173 They must be vague enough to cover all relevant activities, yet 
clear enough to leave as little room as possible for misinterpretation. These factors can be 
summarised as regime strength, which implies its ability to constrain the behaviour of 
states.174 Secondly, the adaptability and survivability of a regime is crucial. This implies that 
the essential functions of a regime remain while non-essential features are adapted to 
changes in order to ensure the continued operation of the regime.175 
Finally, regimes must create opportunities for states to cooperate effectively, not only in their 
operation of the regime but as early as during the negotiation of its norms and rules.176 The 
symmetry and reciprocity of obligations enhances the internal stability of a regime’s legal 
structure. Further, a treaty may create review processes, institutions and fora for the 
negotiation of additional protocols and measures, which enhance the cooperation of states 
in the re-evaluation, adjustment and enforcement of the regime.  
As part of an internal effectiveness assessment, the origins of the regime will be explored. 
This includes the evolution of the prohibition of the weapon in question, the negotiating 
history of the treaty, as well as the historical and political circumstances at the time of its 
adoption. Then, the text of the treaty will be assessed against the qualities above. Finally, all 
secondary sources of law, mechanisms and procedures connected to the treaty will be 
identified. 
                                                          
172 Marc Levy, Oran Young, Michael Zürn, (fn 96) 299. 
173 Robert Keohane, ‘The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research 
Programme’ in Volker Rittberger (ed), Regime Theory and International Relations, (Clarendon Press, 1993) 41-
43; Abram Chayes, Antonia Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, Vol 47 (International Organizations, 1993) 188 – 189: clarity 
is essential as ‘ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language’ may lead to unintentional non-compliance. 
174 Arild Underdal, (fn 13) 28 – 29. 
175 Arild Underdal, (fn 13) 30 – 31. 
176 Susan Buck, The Global Commons – An Introduction, (Earthscan Publications, 1998) 27 – 28: The exclusion of 
some states from the negotiation process or the neglect of legitimate interests of a group of states may erode 
the structure over time through decreased support and an increasing risk of breaches.  
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4.2. External Effectiveness 
As pointed out above, the internal effectiveness of a regime merely indicates the potential of 
the regime and says little about the effects which it develops in practice.177 The following 
criteria have been selected to serve as a foundation for the evaluation of state behaviour 
relevant for the operation of disarmament regimes: the participation and cooperation of 
states, levels of compliance with disarmament obligations, the capacity of relevant 
institutions to support states in the operation of the regime, and mechanisms for the 
verification and enforcement of compliance.  
 
4.2.1. Participation and Cooperation 
The membership of a treaty must be adapted to its object. Multilateral disarmament treaties 
are adopted with a view to achieving the global elimination of certain classes of weapons. For 
this reason, they can be understood as aspiring to universality. Strong adherence to regimes 
is considered an important indicator of their effectiveness as it ensures the widespread 
promotion and implementation of the regime’s norms, rules and principles. Treaties which 
have a strong legal architecture, yet struggle to attract a sufficiently large membership, are 
less likely to achieve their regime goals.178  
Participation in a regime generally implies a formal acceptance of and commitment to the 
regime’s objectives. Such international legal commitments are 
‘a bid to make a credible commitment to a particular policy stance. The acceptance 
of treaty obligations raises expectations about behavior that, once made, are 
reputationally costly for governments to violate. An international legal commitment 
is one way that governments seek to raise the reputational costs of reneging, with 
important consequences for state behavior.’179 
A higher number of states which make such a ‘credible commitment’ also raises the pressure 
on hold-out states to join the treaty. However, it must be noted that a treaty’s aspiration to 
                                                          
177 Charles de Visscher, Les Effectivités du Droit International Public, (Pedone, 1967) 18 : The provisions of a 
treaty are effective ‘selon qu’elles se seront révélées capables ou non de déterminer chez les intéresses les 
comportements recherchés.’ 
178 Ibid, 18. 
179 Beth Simmons, (fn 107) 819. 
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universality does not necessarily imply that universality is necessary for a treaty to be 
effective.  For instance, in cases where a state is bound by neither a treaty- nor a customary 
norm, a treaty may still influence its behaviour. Some hold-out states may not formally join 
disarmament treaties for political or other reasons, yet explicitly adhere to them in principle. 
Another important consideration in the composition of the membership of a regime, i.e. 
whether key possessor states participate or remain outside the regime (hold-out states). 
Furthermore, the leadership of states such as the United States has been regarded as 
essential for the adoption of measures to strengthen disarmament regimes. Finally, the 
withdrawal of a state may weaken a regime. A withdrawal can raise levels of suspicion among 
treaty members and leading to non-compliance with treaty provisions which expose them to 
threats emanating from the withdrawn state which is no longer bound by it. 
 
4.2.2. Compliance 
The participation of states in a regime by itself is not sufficient for the advancement of regime 
goals. Viewed at the level of international peace and security, Former High Representative for 
Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte considers state compliance with disarmament obligations 
an absolute requirement. He argues that 
‘[t]he problem of assessing compliance, however, is not easily solved by simply 
counting the number of countries that have joined treaties, nor even by just counting 
the number of violations in a particular year. There may be very few violations, yet 
the use of even a single weapon of mass destruction, especially a nuclear weapon, 
would have unique and catastrophic effects – both direct and indirect, and both 
short-term and long-term. International peace and security therefore clearly requires 
a very high standard of compliance. When it comes to such solemn goals as (…) 
fulfilling disarmament obligations, partial compliance is simply not good enough.’180 
However, at the regime level, not all instances of non-compliance necessarily undermine the 
effectiveness of a regime, as instances of non-compliance can have effects of varying gravity. 
It has therefore been argued that the concept of compliance must not always be understood 
in absolute terms, but rather in terms of ‘acceptable levels of compliance’ which are not to 
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be understood as ‘an invariant standard, but one that changes over time with the capacities 
of the parties and the urgency of the problem.’181 Therefore, the assessment of state 
compliance will consider the nature of the violation and its implication for the wider operation 
of the regime in question. 
Moreover, not all non-compliant behaviour is intentional. The obligation set out by the CWC 
and BWC to destroy chemical and biological weapons is clear. However, both the dual-use 
nature of these weapons and their definition on the basis of the ‘general purpose criterion’ 
requires states to determine standards of behaviour themselves. The absence of clear 
thresholds for what constitutes compliant and non-compliant behaviour can lead to apparent, 
yet unintended violations. 182 
Compliance is an important factor for the maintenance of levels of trust required for the 
effective cooperation of regime members.  
 
4.2.3. Institutional Capacity 
Disarmament regimes rely, to varying extents, on the support of institutions which they 
mandate with tasks regime members cannot fulfil themselves. In this regard, institutions 
attached to WMD treaties, including the OPWC and IAEA, reflect the dominant technical 
dimension of the control and elimination of weapons. Such bodies are charged with carrying 
out important activities including the verification and enforcement of compliance. Their 
capacity to perform these activities is highly dependent on the authority and resources which 
states are willing to grant to them. The rationale for the creation of institutions is that 
‘[f]or such important purposes many nations seem willing to accept an evolving 
definition of their sovereignty provided that the procedures are implemented 
either by an international organisation with a track record of impartiality, or by a 
specialist institution created expressly to verify compliance.’183 
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In addition to verification and enforcement, institutions also act as discussion fora which 
enable states to review a disarmament treaty periodically, and to develop consensus 
necessary for their further development and strengthening of the regime. The UN system 
complements such institutions with its own negotiating bodies including the first Committee 
of the General Assembly on international security and disarmament and the Conference on 
Disarmament. 
 
4.2.4. Verification 
Given the implications of non-compliance for both the strength of the regime and the wider 
security context, the monitoring of state conduct and the verification of declared stockpiles 
constitutes an indispensable element in WMD disarmament.  The inclusion of verification and 
monitoring mechanisms is particular to disarmament treaties and only exists in few other 
areas.184  
This can be explained on the grounds that the willingness of states to forgo weapons is 
dependent on that of all other regime members. Verification plays an important role in 
confidence building, as States require confidence in the permanence and non-reversion of 
disarmament processes. For this reason, monitoring activities must continue beyond the 
moment of complete elimination. 
The dual-use nature of WMD, in particular biological and chemical weapons, creates obstacles 
for verification, given the reluctance of states to provide inspectors with access to scientific 
and industrial sites. Therefore, effective verification mechanisms must be tailored to the 
political and technical context in order to reconcile confidentiality requirements with 
verification requirements.  
 
 
4.2.5. Enforcement 
In cases where verification activities reveal the violation of a state of its treaty obligations, 
enforcement mechanisms attached to the treaty must be capable of bringing the state back 
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into compliance. The purpose of enforcement is both to deter violations by holding states 
accountable for them and to address them in such a manner which limits their impact on the 
general operation of the regime. Studies on compliance and implementation of regimes 
indicated that co-operative diplomatic approaches were more suitable for the enforcement 
of disarmament and regimes than sanctions.185  
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Chapter 2 - The Historical Evolution of Disarmament 
 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to offer a point of departure for the study of the respective regimes in the 
following chapters. For this purpose, it will first demonstrate that the idea of disarmament is 
not novel. The desire to reduce and eliminate certain types of weapons has accompanied the 
development and use of armaments since the ancient and medieval eras, primarily taking the 
form of demilitarisation imposed by victors of conflicts upon vanquished peoples, or by a 
religious authority upon its subjects. While the underlying incentive for these measures was 
a desire for peace, the interests of the disarming entity generally motivated such measures.  
 ‘The Pact of the League of Nations, in particular Article 8, made disarmament one of the 
cornerstones of the League system. Carried away by the wave of hope and faith which the 
development of new forms of organisation of international society brought with it at that 
time, it was widely felt at the beginning of the inter-war period that the maintenance of peace 
and security depended entirely on disarmament and that it would be sufficient for countries 
to agree to a limitation of their respective forces in order finally to remove the threat of war. 
But the efforts made to achieve this, ending with the prolonged failure of the Disarmament 
Conference that began in 1931, led to nothing but the provision of an instructive example for 
future negotiations, which it was then attempted without much success, to carry forward on 
a slightly different basis.’186 
Further, this chapter will explain how the emergence of a Just War theory and an international 
world order in the 17th century shaped the concept of disarmament and led to the conclusion 
of the first disarmament treaties with reciprocal obligations. While considerations for peace 
continued to drive disarmament motivations, the concept of human security began to enter 
the disarmament debate with the development of international humanitarian law in the 19th 
century. Although The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 failed to produce an 
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international disarmament agreement, they played an important role in paving the way for 
disarmament negotiations after the end of the Great War. 
 The importance of inter-war disarmament efforts will be highlighted, as it not only 
illustrates the essential components of disarmament regimes, such as mechanisms for 
verification and enforcement of compliance, but also offers lessons on which subsequent 
disarmament efforts were built. Moreover, it will evaluate the success of restricted 
approaches to disarmament, such as the Washington Treaty, and offer explanations for the 
failure to conclude a general disarmament agreement at the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference.  
 These first experiences in disarmament, in combination with the realisation that arms 
races had contributed to the outbreak of two World Wars, made Cold War talks between East 
and West a suitable forum for the negotiation of multilateral disarmament agreements. The 
general disarmament approach was abandoned for partial measures in order to overcome 
the paralysis in negotiations, which led to the conclusion of several bilateral agreements, in 
particular between the US and the Soviet Union. However, it was only after the end of the 
Cold War that discussions between the two powers became more fruitful and obstacles such 
as verification were overcome. 
 Finally, this chapter will conclude with an outline of the principal challenges which have 
emerged for disarmament since the end of the Cold War, such as the rise of terrorism, 
unilateral tendencies of states in matters of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control 
as well as the question of how to deal with dual-use materials. Furthermore, it will present a 
number of promising aspects, including the voluntary denuclearisation of Ukraine and South 
Africa, the conclusion of the now quasi-universal CWC, the condemnation of NW by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as the recent lawsuit of the Marshall Islands against 
the nine NWS. 
  
 
 
 
59 
 
1. Early Approaches to Disarmament 
 
1.1. Disarmament in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds 
Contrary to modern times, warfare in the ancient world was mostly endemic and fought with 
primitive weapons. Men organised themselves into social groups and relied on the use of 
physical violence as a means of influencing and controlling the behaviour of neighbouring 
groups. As the size of those groups increased, so did the destructiveness of these tools, which 
reflects the importance of armed forces for states in demonstrating independence and 
sovereignty.187  
During this period, violence was common and warfare, the general means of resolving 
conflicts, was of strong social and cultural importance. Moreover, humanitarian values 
appeared only centuries later with the Just War doctrine. In other words, there were few 
incentives to prevent armed conflict.188 Over the centuries, a number of initiatives emerged 
which demonstrate the link between the limitation of armaments on one hand, and the 
achievement and maintenance of peace, religious and humanitarian considerations on the 
other. 
For example, Hindu law which emerged 4000 years ago, prohibits the use of 
disproportionately destructive weapons.189 At the end of the Peloponnesian Wars in ancient 
Greece (404 BC), the victorious Spartans, dictating the terms of peace, rendered Athens 
indefensible by destroying the long walls connecting it with the harbour, as well as parts of 
their fleet. After the second Punic War (Carthaginian War, 218-201 BC), Carthaginians had to 
surrender their elephants and ships to the victorious Romans. During the Age of Confusion in 
China (6 BC), two of the three ruling military powers (Ts’s and Ts’in) formed an alliance against 
the third, Ch’u, and imposed a treaty of disarmament, which ‘became the foundation of a new 
pacific empire.’190 It is important to note that in the ancient world, depriving defeated peoples 
of their full military force constituted an alternative to its obliteration or enslavement.191 
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Furthermore, disarmament has been portrayed as a prerequisite for peace in the Bible. 
According to the Old Testament, in 8-7 BC the prophet Isaiah predicted a state of peace for 
all nations who spread the message of God to the rest of the world.192 In this state of peace, 
nations were to transform their weapons into peaceful instruments: 
‘and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: 
nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.’ Isaiah 2:3-
4 
This conception of disarmament illustrates the interrelation between peace and 
disarmament, which is also reflected in contemporary disarmament efforts. For example, 
contrary to Isiah’s prophecy that peace will result in disarmament, the United Nation’s vision 
is that disarmament will result in peace. Today, this vision drives all United Nations bodies 
mandated with disarmament affairs.193 
Attempts at limiting armaments in both the Ancient and Medieval Worlds were primarily 
undertaken on religious grounds, generally under the authority of God or the Church, which 
can be regarded as an early form of institutionalised disarmament. In 1139, Pope Innocent II 
is said to have convened the Second Lateran Council, an international conference, to discuss 
a ban of a new weapon he considered ‘hateful to God and unfit for Christians’, namely the 
crossbow.194 Canon 29 of the Council reads: ‘We forbid under penalty of anathema that that 
deadly and God-detested art of slingers and archers be in the future exercised against 
Christians and Catholics.’195 This prohibition can be explained by the highly stratified structure 
of medieval societies.196  
The motivation behind arms control at the time was to create norms of behaviour by 
regulating certain types of violence. The Church, which constituted the legitimising authority 
for the ban, was charged with the enforcement of these norms. However, the scope of this 
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prohibition was limited, given that its use against non-Christians, who threatened the 
authority of the Church, was accepted.197 
These early developments reveal that reductions to armed forces imposed by victors or 
religious and political authorities upon vanquished peoples or inferior subjects, constitute the 
oldest form of disarmament. With the creation of nation states after the 15th century, armed 
conflict began to take place on a much larger scale than those among the feudal states of the 
medieval era. Moreover, the emergence of concepts such as national identity and territorial 
sovereignty led to the establishment of standing armies equipped with sophisticated 
weapons.198 Finally, following the unrestricted forms of warfare of the ancient world, 
movements suggesting the limitation of the level of violence in war began to form. 
This idea of a just war, however, had roots in much earlier works such as Marcus Tullius 
Cicero’s De Officiis (On Obligations) from 44 BC, in which he attempted to lay out moral 
ground rules for public behaviour, including that of statesmen. This essay later influenced 
advocates of a Christian theory of Just War. For example, Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) 
believed that the pursuit of peace did not exclude the use of violence against evils.199 This 
implies that, although states have a right to protect themselves through violence (jus ad 
bellum), they must ensure this use of violence is morally justifiable. Three conditions of a Just 
War were established in Thomas Aquinas’ The Just War (1265 – 1274). According to him, a 
Just War is a war waged by a properly instituted authority for a just purpose with the 
achievement of a state of peace being the central motive.200  
Building on these ideas, the concept of a Just War was further developed in a secular context 
by members of the School of Salamanca, a body of Spanish and Portuguese intellectuals, who 
deemed the unnecessary and excessive use of violence in warfare unjust. Furthermore, in 
1625, Dutch jurist and philosopher Hugo Grotius lamented ‘a lack of restraint in relation to 
war201’ and expressed his belief that freely available arms turned good men into ruthless 
barbarians: 
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‘I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all and that when 
arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; 
it is as if in accordance with a general decree, frenzy has openly been let loose for the 
committing of all crimes.’202 
 
1.2. Disarmament under Emerging International Law: Disarmament Treaties 
These humanitarian values emerging from the Just War doctrine in response to the growing 
dimension of warfare laid the foundation for the first reciprocal agreements on the limitation 
of military force. When modern international law began to take shape in the 17th century, 
the European continent was being ravaged by wars of religion and in particular the Thirty 
Years War. It ended in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, a peace agreement which 
contained provisions that suggest de-fortification and de-militarisation.203 The medieval 
belief that the prohibition of certain types of behaviour in warfare could limit violence 
continued to motivate considerations for arms control and of limitations on the scope of 
war.204 
The foundations of modern disarmament were laid in the era between the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) and the outbreak of WWI (1914). The establishment of neutralised (de-
fortified) areas205 and the adoption of ‘unequal treaties’ which imposed limitation of 
armaments on the vanquished states, illustrate the increasing emphasis put on arms control 
in that era. For example, Swiss philosopher de Vattel welcomed a practise of systematic 
disarmament of both parties to a peace treaty.206 
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is often seen as marking the emergence of sovereign states. 
The Westphalian model is based on the principle that each nation state has sovereignty over 
its own territory and domestic affairs, to the exclusion of all external powers. This explains 
why, the concept of disarmament was only gradually accepted. Indeed, it challenged this 
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absolute understanding of sovereignty as established by the Westphalian model, given that 
military force was and still is considered crucial for the exercise of state sovereignty.  
Several agreements containing provisions limiting military forces were proposed or adopted 
in the 18th and 19th centuries, gradually developing the concept and establishing a foundation 
for the comprehensive disarmament efforts of the 20th century. For example, the Treaty of 
Utrecht (1713) prohibited the French from constructing fortifications at Dunkirk in order to 
ensure greater security for Britain.207 In the wake of the American Revolutionary War (1765 – 
1783), economic reasons as well as a change of goals from war to peace, led the US to 
unilaterally reduce its army and naval forces. In 1766, Austria proposed a reciprocal three-
quarter reduction of the standing armies to Prussia, however, without success.208 On 27 
October 1787, France and Britain concluded a naval disarmament agreement in order to 
reduce military preparedness and, thereby, the risk of a naval attack.209 In 1806, Napoleonic 
France attempted to impose disarmament measures on Prussia, which, however, were 
eventually evaded.210 In 1817, Britain and the US adopted the Rush-Bagot Treaty in which 
they agreed to limit armaments on the Great Lakes. 
The Vienna Congress was convened in 1814, in a desire to find solutions for long-term peace 
following the Napoleonic Wars.  A general disarmament project was proposed for the first 
time by Russian Tsar Alexander I. It was the result of his desire to create a Holy Alliance 
guaranteeing long-term peace. However, this proposal was met with strong scepticism by 
Britain and Austria who shared a fear of Russia’s expansion westwards.211 The Austrian 
representative at the Vienna Congress, Count Metternich, did not consider it possible to 
control the armed forces of the powers and to effectively verify disarmament.212 It is 
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important to note that during the pre-WWI era, the obligations of states in the field of arms 
control were formulated in such vague terms, that verifying compliance with them would 
have been too difficult to be considered until this moment. As a consequence, British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Castlereagh proposed alternatively that Russia disarm unilaterally.213 
 
1.3. Disarmament from The Hague Conferences to the Great War 
During the years of peace between the Vienna Congress and the Crimean War, the reduction 
of armaments was addressed independently from the peace movement. Besides suggestions 
on disarmament as a solution to the financial burden of military expenditure,214 increasing 
considerations for humanitarian aspects in armed conflicts in the 19th century played an 
important role in the advancement of disarmament.  
Key events in this area were the 1868 Saint Petersburg Conference and the 1899 Hague 
Conference. The rationale of the resulting Saint Petersburg Declaration was that ‘the progress 
of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of 
war.’215 To this end, the Declaration prohibited certain types of weapons which were deemed 
to cause unnecessary suffering. However, the list of prohibited weapons was not 
systematically updated and completed. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was convened 
on the initiative of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II on 24 August 1898. Although, like Alexander I 
in 1814, he presented himself as a pacifist, his true motivations stemmed from the critical 
state of the Russian economy.216 Consequently, in order to ensure national security while 
limiting the ongoing arms race and military expenditure, he suggested multilateral 
disarmament.  
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A committee of military specialists charged with studying the possibility of arms limitation 
concluded that at the time any collaborative limitation was impossible.217 It was argued that 
‘there was no possible means of guaranteeing that such a self-denying ordinance would be 
observed, except perhaps through an army of international inspectors, and this would lead to 
friction.’218 In other words, the lack of an international executive body charged with enforcing 
compliance and ensuring verification can be seen as the principal obstacle to an agreement 
on disarmament at the First Hague Conference.219 
Instead, three declarations were adopted which prohibited the discharge of projectiles and 
explosives from balloons, the use of projectiles with the sole object to spread asphyxiating 
poisonous gases and the use of dum-dum bullets. In sum, the impact of these conferences on 
the advancement of disarmament was limited. However, non-state actors such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) took advantage of the post-Hague climate 
to influence the views of politicians, aiming at the creation of new human security-based legal 
norms.220 The idea of human suffering constituted the unifying element between the 
humanitarian and the disarmament communities, which secured the latter additional support 
and included the human security concept in the disarmament debate.  
These early agreements were limited to the prohibition of the use of weapons, as they did 
not include a prohibition of the production of these weapons or an obligation to destroy 
existing arms stockpiles. In such an environment, the outbreak of an arms race could not be 
prevented. It was triggered by the growing imperialist desires of the European powers and 
the permanent fear of a potential attack in the early 20th century.  
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States constantly adjusted their military forces in order to maintain a ‘balance of power’. For 
example, In 1905 Britain built the Dreadnought, a heavily-armed battleship more powerful 
than the entire German navy. In doing so it hoped to deter Germany from challenging the 
British fleet. In response, Germany itself built Dreadnoughts, which turned Britain’s initial 
decision to build the battleship into a strategic error and a political disaster.221 This arms race, 
the naval arms race between Britain and Germany in particular, is believed to have been one 
of the principal causes of the Great War, as constantly growing armed forces gave states the 
impression and confidence that there was little risk of defeat. Thus, when the war ended in 
1918, the question of the limitation of armaments was at the heart of the peace talks. 
 
2. Disarmament in the Interwar Period 
The second important period in the evolution of disarmament began in 1919 with the 
adoption of the peace treaties in the wake of the Great War. After the end of the war, former 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Grey wrote:  
“The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear 
caused by them – it was these that made war inevitable. This is the truest reading of 
history, the lesson that the present should be learning from the past.”222 
The principal objectives of states in the immediate post-WWI period, which resulted from this 
sentiment, were to ‘develop the rules of war, (…) create a general world order’, prevent 
another war and create stability.223 The strong common desire to prevent another war, in 
particular, for the first time provided a fruitful environment to negotiate disarmament. As 
mentioned above, the first pursuers of modern disarmament did not consider a durable 
regulation of nations’ armaments and military forces as an achievable goal. It was only after 
the Great War that the idea of disarmament became an essential element in the pursuit of 
security. 
In parallel to these developments a transition from non-legal values to the reliance on the 
rule of law occurred in the international community. Prior to 1919, the concept of honour had 
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been relied upon to ensure adherence to international agreements, as in European pre-WWI 
civilisation ‘avoiding stain of dishonour was (…) a key incentive promoting conformity with 
the rules making up a common code.’224 With the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles in 
1919, the notion of honour as a guarantee for compliance gave way to the rule of law, which 
became the main component of the new world order.225 Moreover, during this period the 
term “international peace and security” emerged in the international discourse. This new 
objective induced the desire to make treaties legally binding. It was enshrined in the Treaty 
of Versailles which put a strong emphasis on the respect of its obligations. 
Six varieties of disarmament can be distinguished between the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919 and the final peacetime League Assembly in 1938: disarmament imposed on the 
vanquished powers of WWI, unilateral force reductions and budget cuts made by the victors, 
naval limitations, narrow disarmament initiatives aimed at securing acceptance of the 
principle of disarmament, a disarmament for security approach and, finally, general and 
complete disarmament.226 Each approach had an impact on international relations in the 
interwar period and can be used to illustrate some of the challenges surrounding 
disarmament which still exist today. 
 
2.1. The Disarmament of Germany under the Treaty of Versailles 
The arms restrictions imposed by the Allies upon Germany in Part V (Articles 159-213) of the 
1919 Treaty of Versailles, the most important of the post-war peace treaties, constitute the 
central element of interwar disarmament efforts.227 The underlying idea was that forced 
disarmament, followed by the voluntary disarmament of the victors would guarantee lasting 
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peace.228 In other words, a general disarmament agreement would complement the imposed 
disarmament of Germany.229  
It is important to note that the treaty was a product of compromises seeking to fulfil as many 
of the national interests of the allied powers as possible and was thus negotiated under great 
pressure. It was marked by tensions between the high moral ideals pursued by the US and 
Britain on one hand, and France’s desire to reach conclusions fast on the other.230 These 
factors added to the difficulties surrounding the execution of the treaty. In reminding Britain 
of the Prussian evasion of the disarmament measures imposed by Napoleon, France predicted 
that Germany would find a way to evade the restrictions and prevent the Treaty from 
becoming a veritable source of security.231 Indeed, from the very beginning Germany rejected 
the imposed measures and soon began reconstructing its military forces.232  
Imposed disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles failed, as he Allies were unable to put a 
stop to these transgressions and enforce disarmament for a number of reasons. A recurring 
problem was the inability of Britain and France to find common grounds over how to react to 
German rearmament. Britain, favouring a reconciliation policy, dismissed German violations 
as militarily insignificant and, consequently chose inaction. France, on the other hand, was 
alarmed by German rearmament and wished to take action to enforce disarmament through 
military action.233 
The conflicting interests of Great Britain and France also hindered constructive discussions on 
the question of verification. Britain argued that the surveillance of German disarmament 
would not only imply a double insult to Germany but would also be ineffective.234 It wished 
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to create a friendly relationship with Germany and considered such measures a violation of 
state sovereignty.235 Yet, the French feared German rearmament and therefore advocated for 
the surveillance of Germany’s military activities. US President Wilson aligned with Britain and 
dismissed the French suggestion to establish an international control of armaments as 
unrealistic, given that ‘no nation would have consented to such external control on their 
armament’.236 
Such international control was for the first time established in Section IV of the Treaty of 
Versailles, which provided for monitoring mechanisms (the Inter-Allied Commissions of 
Control) and Section V (inspection measures). For example, the Inter-allied Military 
Commission of Control (IAMCC) was established under Article 203 with the mandate to 
supervise the execution of the Treaty’s military clauses. Demanding provisions obliged the 
German government to provide the Commissions with detailed information regarding its 
armaments.237 This idea of requiring a sovereign state to disclose highly confidential 
information on military activities to a foreign inspection authority was unprecedented at the 
time. 
Although the duration of this mandate was limited until Germany had fully disarmed, views 
diverged on what constituted ‘complete disarmament’. Again, Britain opted for the cessation 
of the IAMCC, while France demanded continued assurance that Germany executed its 
obligations under the Treaty.238 After years of discussions regarding the completion of 
German disarmament and the fate of the Commission, the Allies finally agreed on its 
withdrawal in January 1927 and on charging the League with the task of surveilling German 
armament activities under Article 213 of the treaty. 
A final element contributing to the failure of disarmament were the vague terms of Article 8 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was established by Part I of the Treaty of 
Versailles. It provided in that ‘the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national 
armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety.’ However, it did not specify 
                                                          
235 Ann Florini, ‘The End of Secrecy’, Vol 111, (Foreign Policy, 1998) 52: ‘in the 1920s, the prevailing attitude held 
that states, even aggressors, had a right to military privacy’; Sami Sare, The League of Nations and the Debate 
on Disarmament (1918-1919), (Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2013) 52. 
236 Sami Sare, (fn 237) 140. 
237 Articles 208, 209 Treaty of Versailles. 
238 HL Deb 01 April 1925 vol 60 cc876-90. 
70 
 
how this lowest point would be assessed. This illustrates that the powers not only failed to 
achieve consensus, but also failed to consider technical questions inherent to such measures. 
 
2.2. Other Forms of Interwar Disarmament 
A second form of interwar disarmament, besides the forced disarmament of Germany and its 
allies, consisted in voluntary and unilateral force reductions and budget cuts made 
independently by the victors of the war. For example, the British Ten-Year Rule, a government 
guideline ‘based on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great 
war during the next ten years’,239 led to cuts in defence spending and a reduction in naval 
strength. In other words, the powers ‘placed their military establishments onto a peacetime 
footing’, primarily motivated by financial necessity.240 Such unilateral measures did not offer 
a stable foundation for disarmament under Article 8, given that they could easily be 
suspended. 
Naval limitations, which constituted the third type of interwar disarmament, were relatively 
successful as they were able to put a halt to the naval arms race. Substantial reductions to 
capital ships and aircraft carriers were achieved among the main maritime powers as a result 
of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922.241 This can be explained by the fact that 
verification at sea was easier than on land and the US, the strongest naval power, offered to 
make the greatest reductions to its fleets.242 Still, disarmament proved difficult even among 
political allies, as tensions developed between the US and Britain who accused each other of 
violating their treaty obligations.243 These tensions between political interests prevented the 
powers from expanding the achievements in naval disarmament to other maritime powers 
and the wider sphere of general disarmament. It can be argued that the conclusion of the 
naval treaties was only made possible by the small number of states involved, who shared a 
common fear of a naval arms race.  
The fourth type of interwar disarmament consisted in diverse initiatives of the League 
undertaken in parallel, which did not aim to achieve numerical reductions in armaments. 
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Rather, as laid down by the Preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, these measures 
aimed ‘to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations.’ In 
other words, they did not target Germany specifically but represented ‘the first steps towards 
the general reduction and limitation of armaments.’244 In this context, the Geneva 
Conference245 was convened in May 1925 which resulted in the adoption of the Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) on 17 June 1925. Although it banned 
chemical warfare, it was not a complete ban, as it did neither prohibit the study, production 
or storage of CW, nor include provisions for verification or enforcement. Moreover, states 
attached important reservations to it, regarding retaliatory use in particular. These 
weaknesses prevented the Protocol from promoting disarmament. 
The link between the reduction of armaments and international security was emphasised by 
the fifth type of disarmament. The idea that states would more easily reduce their armed 
forces in a climate of international security motivated the adoption of a treaty of reciprocal 
security commitments, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923. Based on its relatively vague 
provisions, the parties assured each other assistance in the case of a military aggression, in 
return for which they were to make reductions to their armed forces compatible with security 
requirements. This treaty was rejected. The French criticised the vague security provisions 
and the fact that disarmament was given priority over security. The British, on the other hand, 
were unwilling to accept undefined and potentially unlimited arms reductions. 
The final approach to interwar disarmament was a comprehensive one which ‘would cover 
all nations and all spheres of armaments’.246 Although general disarmament was discussed at 
the 1932-1934 World Disarmament Conference, these discussions produced no tangible 
results. Varying conceptions of general and complete disarmament, motivations and national 
interests of the 59 participating states prevented the achievement of an agreement. Again, 
differing Anglo-French conceptions stood at the centre of the debate. For the French, 
disarmament was the consequence of security while, inversely, for the British disarmament 
created security and stability in Europe. A major complicating factor was added by Germany’s 
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claim of “equality of status” as an officially disarmed power, a strategy employed to cover up 
its illegal rearmament activities. The conference was doomed to failure when Germany left 
the conference.247 
 
2.3. The Failure of General Disarmament and a Renewed Arms Race 
In the early 1930s there was still hope in Britain that agreement could be reached on 
disarmament measures that were reconcilable with British imperial security. However, being 
confronted with the vulnerability of its territories in the Far East after the Japanese invasion 
of the Chinese province of Manchuria in 1931, Britain soon started to rearm.248 The primary 
motivation behind rearmament was to deter Germany from war. However, disarmament did 
not prove effective in deterring war, as fears that rearmament would trigger an arms race 
were confirmed. It merely delayed the moment when Hitler was prepared to risk war and 
increased Britain’s preparedness when the war eventually broke out.249 
When WWII broke out in 1939, all the efforts to create peace, including disarmament, proved 
futile. The ultimate goal of general disarmament had not been achievable in the political 
setting of the interwar era, given that in the environment of suspicion at the time, the powers 
were unwilling to give up their independence in the area of defence and security. This explains 
why consensus was only reached on very limited questions and under the condition that 
national interests were preserved.  
The disarmament of Germany demonstrated that the unwillingness of a state to disarm 
cannot be remedied, especially in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. In other words, 
disarmament can only develop permanent benefits if it is not imposed but undertaken on the 
basis of an agreement. The demilitarisation of Germany and Japan in 1945 proved much more 
successful than that of Germany and its allies in the 1920s, given that in 1945 their moral 
defeat and the overwhelming military power of the victors made it possible to bend the 
defeated powers to the will of the leaders.250 In 1920, cooperation was also undermined by 
the failure of the Allies to persuade Germany that the imposed asymmetry of forces was not 
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intended as a humiliation but rather a means to enhance European security.251 Moreover, 
Anglo-French disagreements in the interwar period illustrate that political will and consensus 
among disarming powers themselves is a sine qua non in disarmament.252  
This lack of a common strategy among the allies of WWI emphasised the role of the League 
as an institutional framework to interwar disarmament. The League, however, lacked its own 
armed forces and depended on its members to enforce disarmament measures. Moreover, 
none of the proposed or concluded disarmament agreements established levels of reductions 
required, which consequently were to be determined by each state individually. 
 
3. Cold War Negotiations: From Comprehensive to Partial Disarmament 
3.1. Renewed Disarmament Efforts 
Disarmament negotiations during the Cold War were shaped by the post-WWII world order. 
Given that arms control was a ‘key feature of Cold War diplomacy’,253 the conflict provided a 
forum for the renewed negotiations on disarmament. This allowed the transformation of the 
vague ideas about disarmament, as developed in the interwar period, into reality. Moreover, 
the creation of the UN and its Charter reflected the determination ‘to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war’,254 a central objective of the UN which made of 
disarmament an important element in the maintenance of international peace and security.  
However, a comparison of the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 and the United 
Nations Charter of 1945 reflects a change in the priority given to disarmament by the two 
organisations. Formulating plans for disarmament was one of the central tasks of the League, 
as it was considered essential to ensure security.255 After 1945, disarmament was no longer 
considered indispensable, given that ‘weapons were treated as the result, not as the cause of 
insecurity.’256 In other words, similarly to the pre-WWI era, they were again considered 
necessary for the maintenance of peace. This shift is reflected in the wording of Article 11 of 
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the UN Charter, which simply notes disarmament as one of the means of promoting 
international peace and security available to the UN General Assembly.257 
In 1959, the UNGA adopted Resolution 1378, which explicitly put general and complete 
disarmament on the UNGA’s agenda.258 Its preamble states that ‘the question of general and 
complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today.’ As a result, the 
Conference on Disarmament was convened in 1965 by the UN to discuss the steps to be taken 
in order to achieve this goal. General principles to guide negotiations on such a general 
disarmament agreement were adopted, such as the sovereign equality of all members of the 
UN, with the resulting objective of providing equal security for all members through 
disarmament259 and the principle of friendly relations among nations.260 
The UNGA held Special Sessions on Disarmament in 1978, 1982 and 1988 to pursue a 
comprehensive disarmament programme, yet producing few outcomes.261 Preparatory talks 
on further Special Sessions were held in UN Working Groups.262 Given the climate of extreme 
suspicion in Cold War negotiations, finding consensus on the elements of a general 
disarmament agreement proved equally, or even more, difficult than in the interwar period. 
Eventually, the powers soon began to opt for partial measures in order to achieve the 
advancement of disarmament. 
  
3.2. Developments in Nuclear Disarmament 
Two conflicting movements emerged at the very beginning of the Cold War. The nuclear arms 
race between the two superpowers began, while attempts at limiting the use of atomic 
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energy to peaceful purposes were undertaken. The development of the nuclear weapon 
(NW), as well as its use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, constituted a turning point in the 
evolution of disarmament which challenged the traditional diplomatic parameters. As a 
consequence, Wilson’s vision that peace would be achieved through the rule of law was 
replaced by a pursuit of peace through fear.  
The importance of the nuclear question was highlighted by the adoption of the UNGA’s first 
resolution on 24 January 1946, which envisaged the establishment of a commission to deal 
with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy. Both Eastern and Western 
leaders acknowledged that the risks NW posed to humanity outweighed their respective 
interests, which motivated their intention to pursue nuclear disarmament.263 On 14 June 
1946, Barnard Baruch presented a U.S. plan which suggested the unprecedented delegation 
of authority to an international organisation.264 The plan was vehemently opposed by the 
Soviet Union which preferred to maintain control over its own nuclear activities and a 
monopoly on atomic secrets.265 
The first Soviet NW test opened debates on nuclear disarmament at the UN, which led to the 
creation of the UN Disarmament Commission by the General Assembly in 1952.266 In this 
context the phrase ‘disarmament under effective international control’ first became part of 
the disarmament debate. However, opposing views on the questions of disarmament and 
verification hindered negotiations between the East and the West. While the US argued that 
effective verification mechanisms had to be implemented before disarmament could take 
place, the Soviets insisted in a “disarmament first”-approach. These irreconcilable visions 
illustrate the political environment in which states were not yet prepared for the idea of 
mutual verification.267 
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Negotiations during the 1950s took place in a context of easing of geo-political tensions made 
possible by thermonuclear parity between the US and the Soviets. A concentration on partial 
measures of disarmament seemed more acceptable to both sides which allowed more 
constructive negotiations.268 The establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency for the cooperation of nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states 
(NNWS) marked an important turning point for the promotion of the peaceful use of atomic 
energy and nuclear arms control. Its extensive safeguards system, which allows intrusive on-
site inspections on the territory of NNWS, provided a strong foundation for the future NPT.269 
The 1959 resolution 1378 of the UNGA established “general and complete disarmament 
under efficient international control” as the objective of all global disarmament efforts. This 
term was adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which was founded in 1961 in a 
context of decolonisation. It constituted a recurring theme in the Final Documents of its 
Summit Conference of Heads of State or Governments, stressing the importance of 
verification.270 Similarly, Principle No. 6 of the 1961 ‘McCloy-Zorin Principles’ for future 
disarmament negotiations demanded that ‘disarmament should be implemented under strict 
and effective international control carried out by an International Disarmament Organisation 
established within the framework of the UN.’ 
After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis reminded the international community of the dangers of 
the ongoing arms race, negotiations at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in 
1961 underscored the fact that achieving an agreement on a single disarmament treaty was 
imperative. When the issue of verification again stood in the way of agreement on a 
comprehensive test ban, a provisional solution targeting nuclear testing was favoured, 
namely, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which relied exclusively on national technical means 
(NTM).271  
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When China began to emerge as a nuclear power, the need for an agreement countering the 
proliferation of NW became all the more pressing. The most important agreements, which 
resulted from the 1960 negotiations, were the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco,272 the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the 
1971 Sea-Bed Treaty. The NPT is today the only multilateral disarmament agreement. 
Although its underlying purpose is to prevent the proliferation of NW, the UN Secretary-
General at the time stressed that the NPT constituted a step towards disarmament.273 In 
practice, its central function was to establish different obligations for NNWS and NWS; non-
proliferation obligations for the former and disarmament obligations for the latter. Today, its 
disarmament dimension has yet to develop its full potential, given that it is unable to prevent 
the acquisition of NW by non-States Parties. Moreover, its unlimited extension has not yet 
led to disarmament measures targeting the full elimination, but only a simple reduction of 
NW stockpiles.  
Consequently, limited reductions continued to be pursued on a bilateral level. For example, 
in 1964, the Soviets signed the first strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT I) with President 
Richard Nixon in 1972 and a second accord (SALT II) with President Jimmy Carter in 1979.274 
Each treaty sought to freeze the Soviet-U.S. competition in strategic weapons which could 
reach the territory of the other. Despite the refinement of methods of international 
verification and the bilateral SALT I and II, the problem of OSI continued to be evaded, which 
prevented the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. By 1978, with no real progress in 
halting the arms race, the UN General Assembly convened its First Special Session Devoted to 
Disarmament (SSOD I) to organise future efforts. For the first time, international consensus 
on a comprehensive disarmament strategy was achieved.275    
In the mid-1980s another sudden realisation of the real dangers of pre-emptive nuclear strike 
by either side induced a policy of openness and a genuine will to end the war. The Soviets 
moved away from a doctrine of mutual assured destruction towards one of mutual 
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security.276 Finally, in 1989 the Soviets eventually agreed to intrusive OSI, which eliminated 
an important roadblock in negotiations and enabled a rapid progress in relations between the 
US and the Soviet Union. This resulted in the conclusion of the 1987 Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).  
 
3.3. Developments in Chemical and Biological Disarmament 
Concerned by the devastating consequences of the potential use of CW and BW, as well as 
the continuing violations of the Geneva Protocol,277 several UN member states proposed 
amendments to the 1925 Geneva Protocol at the UNGA’s 21st session. Hungary submitted a 
draft resolution on CBW, recognising the Protocol’s inadequacy for prohibiting the use of 
biological and chemical weapons.278 In reaction to this, the UNGA assigned the task of seeking 
an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of such weapons to the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC).279  
As discussions on the question continued in the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament (CCD, the successor of ENDC) and the subsequent UNGA sessions, the question 
arose whether to treat CW and BW separately or jointly. In 1971, two separate but identical 
draft conventions were submitted to the CCD, which both focused on biological weapons 
only. However, there was an understanding that an agreement on chemical weapons required 
further discussion. 
At its 26th session in 1971, the UNGA adopted resolution 2826 (XXVI) with the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin 
Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), as an annex, which did not include a verification 
regime. Not only was international verification still deemed unachievable at the time of its 
conclusion, but the convention was also considered only a first step in the search for a 
comprehensive ban. The US argued that ‘information sufficient to produce an unequivocal 
                                                          
276 Berhanykun Andemicael, John Mathiason, Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005) 45. 
277 Ibid, 50. 
278 First Committee, United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the 1454th meeting, 15 November 
1966; Hungarian draft resolution, ‘Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons’, (A/C.1/L.374), 7 November 1966 in 
Documents on Disarmament, 1966, (ACDA, 1966) 694-695. 
279 UNGA res 2162 B (XXI), 5 December 1966. 
79 
 
verdict of guilty on a proliferator would not be obtainable’280 for reasons linked to the 
complex dual-use nature of biological materials. The Soviets on the other hand objected to 
proper verification from the outset.  
After the successful conclusion of the BWC, the UNGA requested the CCD to continue its 
negotiations of a convention on CW and urged all states, pending agreement on the complete 
prohibition, to refrain from any further development, production and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons.281 However, no agreement was achieved for several years thereafter. It was only 
following Iraq’s use of CW against Iran in the 1980s that efforts to conclude a convention 
banning CW were enforced.  
In the Final Declaration of the 1980 Review Conference of the BWC282 and later at the 1987 
Paris Conference, states parties reaffirmed their obligation to achieve an agreement on 
complete, effective and adequately verifiable measures for banning and destroying CW. In 
1991, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), mandated to elaborate a Convention, included 
the use of CW in the scope of the prohibition. In 1992, after 26 years of negotiations, 
consensus was reached, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) was opened for 
signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1996. The CWC is the first comprehensively 
verifiable multilateral treaty banning an entire class of weapons. As of October 2013, having 
190 states parties with only four States outside of its regime, the CWC is quasi-universal.283  
Its verification regime is the most sophisticated and extensive ever established in an arms 
control agreement; a result of several decades of negotiations.  
 
4. Post-Cold War Developments in Disarmament 
With the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the warming up of East-West relations, the new 
geo-political landscape made the conclusion of new agreements possible. Several factors 
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brought about changes in the international environment in the early 1990s. 284 The 
international community came to the realisation that international security not only depends 
on military factors but can also be ensured through other factors such as regional stability, 
economic strength and political cooperation. Applied to the field of arms control and 
disarmament, this implied a movement towards multilateralism.  
Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the establishment of newly 
independent states as new actors in arms control created new proliferation concerns. Finally, 
the rise of international terrorism, in particular after the events of 11 September 2001, called 
for the rethinking of the concept of disarmament. This changing international environment 
paved the way for new opportunities but also challenges for disarmament. 
4.1. Post-Cold War Opportunities for Disarmament  
While during the Cold War, the deterrent effect of NW had been considered essential for the 
maintenance of international security, after the war such a strong deterrent was no longer 
required. Consequently, as NW transformed from a necessary into an unnecessary evil, fresh 
impetus was given to disarmament by a renewed common willingness of states to begin 
removing NW from their arsenals. 
For example, in 1990 the US invested a large amount of its defence budget to support the 
Soviet Union in the dismantlement of its NW.285 Moreover, in 1994 The US, Russia and the UK 
signed the Budapest Memorandum, in which the three nuclear signatory powers agreed to 
respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in return for Ukraine giving up the NW 
it inherited from the Soviet Union and joining the NPT as a NNWS.286 The Memorandum is 
one of the rare examples of successful voluntary nuclear disarmament. 
Similarly, the end of the Cold War made possible South Africa’s unilateral decision to 
dismantle its nuclear arsenal in 1994. While it argued that ‘a nuclear deterrent had become 
not only superfluous but an obstacle to the development of South Africa’s international 
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relations’,287 several alternative explanations for this decision have been advanced.288 
Although this case of denuclearisation is unique and therefore does not offer generalisable 
criteria for disarmament, it shows that voluntary disarmament can be undertaken without 
threatening national security. 
As previously discussed, the most significant disarmament agreement concluded in the post-
Cold War period was the 1997 CWC. Its highly sophisticated and virtually complete 
verification regime could only be adopted when a certain amount of trust was introduced into 
East-West relations. Its success is illustrated by its efforts in the UN-led mission surrounding 
the chemical disarmament of Syria, for which it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 
Furthermore, the indefinite extension of the NPT on May 11, 1995 marked another important 
moment, as it was originally only given a 25-year lifespan.289  
The last significant agreement of the 1990s, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), was 
adopted by the UNGA on 10 September 1996, as a result of the sustained momentum from 
the successes of the CWC and the extension of the NPT. After four decades of bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations, it constituted a follow-up treaty to the 1963 PTBT. The CTBT bans 
nuclear weapon testing in all environments and is equipped with an extensive global 
monitoring system.290 However, the treaty has not yet entered into force as China and the US 
have not ratified it and India, Israel and Pakistan have not signed it. 
In 1996, the highest judicial body in the world, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion the ‘Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, its longest advisory opinion to date.291 The UNGA 
had adopted a resolution requesting this advisory opinion at its forty-ninth session in 1994 
under the agenda item 62 entitled “General and Complete Disarmament”, in which it declared 
its conviction that ‘the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against 
the threat of nuclear war.’292 While in its advisory opinion the Court concluded that in 
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principle NW are illegal, it did not extend this statement to all circumstances.293 Still, it 
affirmed the obligation of every NWS to negotiate in good faith for the reduction of their 
arsenals which offered additional force to the nuclear disarmament regime under the NPT.  
An important opportunity for disarmament was created in 2014 when the Marshall Islands, 
whose population has suffered from the effects of nuclear tests conducted by the US in the 
1950s and 1960s,294 brought unprecedented lawsuits against the nine NWS before the ICJ. It 
accused the five NWS member to the NPT295 of failing to comply with their obligations under 
Article VI of the treaty, which obliges them ‘to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament.’296 The four NWS remaining outside of the NPT regime were accused of 
violating customary international law.297 The US has dismissed the claim,298 while others 
announced that they would not appear before the Court or have not yet accepted the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction. Whether or not the lawsuit will be successful, it will constitute a first public 
reminder that noncompliance with nuclear disarmament obligations will no longer be 
overlooked. 
Further opportunities for future disarmament efforts can be seen in other recent 
developments. The creation of regional Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ), as authorised 
by article VII of the NPT and defined by UNGA resolution 3472 B (1975), have consolidated 
the commitment of NNWS to nuclear non-proliferation and facilitated their collaboration. For 
example, the WMD-free zone in the Middle East which was envisaged by the ‘Resolution on 
the Middle East’ annexed to the Final Document of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, could 
constitute a solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis and remove double standards over Israel’s 
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NW.299 However, the potential of this regional approach remains unexplored, as little 
progress has been made in implementing the 1995 resolution to establish such a zone.  
Additional impetus was given to multilateral disarmament in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, as US and Russian leaders Putin and Bush began to see eye to eye on terrorism and 
ties between East and West improved. After START I expired in December 2009, this common 
ground allowed the adoption of the most recent bilateral US-Russian agreement for the 
reduction of NW in 2010: the new START treaty. It requires its signatories to reduce the 
number of strategic nuclear missile launchers by half. Moreover, it streamlines the 
verification measures from START I, with fewer but more comprehensive inspections and 
includes verification of actual warhead numbers rather than simply counting delivery vehicles. 
Finally, the Obama doctrine re-engaged policy-makers in a discussion about disarmament.300 
Although proposals for general nuclear disarmament had been made over the course of half 
a century, debates surrounding the role of the US nuclear arsenal for national security and 
the nature of the post-Cold War nuclear threat, revived interest in such ideas. However, such 
declarations and proposals for nuclear disarmament are contradicted by practical measures 
adopted by the US. Indeed, although President Obama speaks of a world free of NW and 
disarmament, the measures he suggested fall into the category of arms control.301 For 
example, the acceptance of the new START was only possible in combination with the $85 
billion modernisation of the US NW programme.302 This shows that arms control and non-
proliferation policies do not automatically lead to disarmament. 
4.2. Post-Cold War Challenges for Disarmament 
On the other hand, new obstacles in the way of effective disarmament constantly arise in a 
quickly changing international environment. For example, the dual-use dilemma each WMD 
technology is confronted with creates a conflict between the development of peaceful 
technologies and the prevention of their diversion into WMD. The clear distinction between 
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scientific or military motivations behind activities involving WMD materials is often difficult. 
This interdependence between industry and the military not only increases the risk of 
noncompliance with disarmament obligations but also that of weapons materials falling into 
the hands of non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Such activities fall outside the scope of 
disarmament treaties, as they address state rather than non-state behaviour. This emphasises 
the need to destroy such weapons completely, rather than to rely on simple reductions. 
While some disarmament agreements have reached quasi-universal adherence, others still 
struggle to attract signatories. For example, the political systems of some countries, especially 
those of the Middle East, are based upon religious texts such as the Sharia. The primacy given 
to these texts over international legal instruments often contributes to this lack of universality 
of disarmament treaties. Moreover, after decades of arduous negotiations on multilateral 
disarmament instruments, unilateralist tendencies have developed after the events of 11 
September 2011. For example, the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002 and its 
reluctance to ratify the 1996 CTBT can be interpreted as a new preference for fast, short-term 
solutions which are difficult to reach in a multilateral context. This aspect risks to undermine 
the authority of multilateral disarmament regimes.  
Today, the remnants of the Cold War can be felt in Ukraine, as Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
has reignited tensions between Russia and the Western nuclear powers. The crisis has led to 
the suspension of US-Russian cooperation in mutual inspections of nuclear facilities and 
Russia’s announcement of its absence at the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 indicate an 
interruption of stockpile reductions.303 One additional aspect linked to the Ukraine crisis, 
Russia’s breach of the Budapest memorandum, is of particular concern for nuclear 
disarmament.304 In fact, in this agreement the three nuclear signatory powers, the US, Russia 
and the UK, agreed to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in return for 
Ukraine giving up the NW it inherited from the Soviet Union and joining the NPT as a NNWS. 
The Memorandum had been one of the rare examples of successful voluntary nuclear 
disarmament.  
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It can be argued, however, that if Ukraine had not given up its NW, Russia would not have 
dared to invade Crimea. Such an interpretation of the Memorandum as a mistake, poses a 
threat to the authority of the NPT regime as it is likely to serve as a justification for NWS not 
to give up their NW.305 For example, North Korean is continually strengthening its nuclear 
programme, in particular over fears of an invasion of its territory by the West. Despite the 
absence of reductions taking place in the near future, the alliance between NWS against North 
Korea will likely be reinforced, given that its relationship with long-time ally China has begun 
to deteriorate.306 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the principal developments in the history of 
disarmament. It has addressed the historical events which have shaped the concept and made 
its achievement one of the most critical elements of international peace. Modern 
disarmament was shaped by the promotion of peace and globalisation, thus loosening the 
rigid Westphalian model of state sovereignty. Indeed, as negotiations in the field of 
disarmament advanced, the acceptance of disarmament as a means of ensuring peace and 
security and the willingness of states to be subjected to such instruments grew. 
The events and developments discussed in this chapter illustrate the strong impact which 
geopolitical circumstances, the level of international security at a given time, as well as 
national interests of state actors have in the negotiation and conclusion of disarmament 
agreements. Furthermore, the militarily strategic value of categories of weapons are believed 
to strongly influence cooperation of states in disarmament efforts. Furthermore, it 
emphasised an important lesson drawn from the interwar disarmament experience: the 
understanding that imposed disarmament is rarely successful, in particular in the absence of 
effective verification and enforcement mechanisms and a climate of political suspicion. 
A further conclusion to be drawn from this historical outline is the understanding that a 
general disarmament agreement is difficult or even impossible to achieve. The political and 
technical complexities of each weapons regime, as well as a degree of suspicion commonly 
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displayed by states in areas related to their armed forces, multiply the potential sources of 
disagreement. Consequently, disarmament continues to be pursued in more limited 
framework on the basis of partial disarmament measures. 
Today there is a common understanding that only binding, irreversible and verifiable 
disarmament obligations can lead to successful disarmament.307 The establishment of 
instruments fulfilling these criteria has proven to be a long and complicated process. First, the 
key aspects of verification and enforcement represented a recurring theme in this analysis, 
which highlights not only their indispensable character for disarmament, but also their 
contentious nature. Today, verification and enforcement mechanisms are not equally present 
in all disarmament regimes, as agreement on these elements is more difficult to achieve in 
some regimes than in others. Secondly, the institutional support provided by the League of 
Nations and, subsequently, the United Nations has evolved. While disarmament was a central 
objective of the League, it was reduced to one means available to the UN in promoting peace 
amongst others. Today, the institutional capacity to coordinate, verify and enforce 
disarmament varies between regimes. Some disarmament treaties establish international 
organisations to fulfil such tasks, while others are devoid of institutions and are consequently 
reliant on regular meetings of states parties and support from the UN. 
Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated the limitations of contemporary disarmament 
efforts. The formalisation of common disarmament interests in treaties aims at making the 
behaviour of states more predictable by increasing the political costs of breaches, rather than 
preventing them. However, the CWC represents hope for future disarmament efforts, as its 
genesis shows that political challenges can be overcome.  
Finally, this historical overview has shown that some efforts to create effective international 
disarmament regimes have failed dramatically while others have attracted a wide 
membership, have been equipped with verification and enforcement mechanisms and 
developed a great potential to achieve full disarmament in the future.  
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Chapter 3 - The Effectiveness of Chemical Disarmament 
 
Introduction 
Longstanding efforts to rid the world of its most devastating weapons have, to a large part, 
centred on chemical weapons (CW). This can be explained by their “particularly abhorrent” 
character, which was highlighted by the impact of their deployment in the Great War,308 as 
well as their lack of deterrence value.309 This experience led to reinforced efforts to establish 
a global ban on CW, which culminated in the adoption of the most comprehensive 
disarmament regime to date, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). What sets this 
treaty apart from other disarmament regimes is the fact that it bans an entire category of 
weapons at a high level of participation and under intrusive verification.310 
Despite its success in acquiring a high level of participation and in advancing the destruction 
process,311 flaws in the structure of the CWC regime have risked weakening its capacity to 
respond to emerging challenges, as changes in the geopolitical and scientific environment 
influence not only weapons capabilities, but also motivations of States and non-State actors 
to acquire them.312 Moreover, the shift after 9/11 in US policy from effective multilateralism 
to ‘selective multilateralism’313 in the security field has invited scepticism about the viability 
of international institutions and instruments. Against this background, this chapter intends to 
examine the effectiveness of the chemical disarmament regime, focusing particularly upon 
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the aspects of participation, verification, enforcement and the institutional capacity of the 
chemical disarmament regime. 
A brief reference to the origins of chemical disarmament will serve as a starting-point for the 
assessment of the CWC disarmament regime, given that evaluating the success of a 
cooperative arrangement implies the comparison of the regime against ‘some standard of 
success or accomplishment’.314 For this purpose, the international reaction to the use of CW 
in the Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-1988) will serve as an example for what can and cannot be 
achieved in the absence of a disarmament regime.  
The criteria of effective disarmament regimes, as defined in Chapter 1, will be examined in 
the context of the CWC regime with a view to evaluating their causal effects on its success. 
First, this chapter will determine the importance of the level of participation in the CW regime 
and cooperation between its members on its capacity to bring forward the elimination of all 
CW. Secondly, the institutional capacity of its central organ, the OPCW, to organise, finance 
and coordinate the removal and destruction of CW stockpiles will be evaluated. Thirdly, this 
chapter will assess both the completeness of the textual foundation of the CWC’s verification 
regime as well as the OPCW’s practical capacity to implement verification measures. Finally, 
measures to enforce compliance under the convention will be discussed and contrasted with 
the UN Secretary-General mechanism for the investigation of the alleged use of CW. Based 
on these elements, the chapter will conclude with an assessment of the effectiveness of the 
chemical disarmament regime.  
This chapter not only intends to evaluate the effectiveness of chemical disarmament in 
routine situations, but also under extraordinary circumstances, such as humanitarian crises 
and other pressure situations. The contemporary relevance of this question is highlighted by 
the recent Syrian case, which reminded the international community that although firmly 
established, the CWC, including its mechanisms for ensuring compliance, verification and 
enforcement, is not applicable in all situations. This scenario raises questions regarding the 
complementarity of the CWC regime and ad hoc disarmament operations. 
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1. The Chemical Disarmament Regime 
1.1. The Chemical Weapons Taboo 
In this section, a discussion of the taboo on chemical weapons will serve as a foundation for 
the examination of the ban on chemical weapons which evolved from it. Early evidence of the 
employment of chemical substances as military weapons dates back to the classical, medieval 
and early Modern periods.315 The first forms of bans on chemical weapons appeared in the 
period between 200 BCE to 300 CE and prohibited poison and fire arrows and the poisoning 
of food and water supplies.316  
Given the extensive use of poison bullets by France and the Holy Roman Empire, the two sides 
concluded the Strasbourg Agreement in 1675. Its Article 57 provided that any person who 
was found in possession of such weapons would be punished.317 The ban, rather than 
providing for measures of enforcement, relied on an assumption of moral integrity - that the 
parties to the agreement would assume the task of stopping any violation by their own 
members. 318 
The taboo on chemical weapons evolved in parallel to the further development of chemical 
weapons. Modern forms of chemical warfare were only developed following the Industrial 
Revolution in the 19th century, as industrialised nations sought more efficient and more 
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economical ways of killing enemy troops.319 These circumstances were a source of concern 
for the international community which desired to counter this development at the time.  
As a consequence, serious attempts to establish a norm prohibiting the use of CW were 
undertaken for the first time at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference in Geneva. They resulted 
in the adoption of a ban on ‘projectiles whose purpose is to spread asphyxiating gases’ which 
was later repeated at The Hague Peace Conference in 1907.320  The Hague Convention of 1899 
was the first international agreement to define the prohibited CW by referring to its intended 
purpose, an approach which was later adopted by the CWC.321  
The norm established in Geneva proved futile as the belligerents resorted to chemical warfare 
during the Great War.322 During the first and most deadly attack near the Belgian city of Ieper 
in April 1915, between 150 and 160 tons of chlorine gas were released onto French trenches, 
killing about 1,000 French and Algerian soldiers.323 The Germans introduced the odourless 
and persistent blistering agent, mustard which was first used against British troops, again at 
Ieper, causing 20,000 casualties. Chlorine and mustard are today referred to as ‘first 
generation CW’. Besides resulting in mass casualties, the use of these CW during WWI 
triggered hysteria and so-called ‘gas fright’ among troops, an effect which was exploited for 
the primary goal of demoralising forces.  
After the end of WWI, a sentiment of outrage in the international community intensified 
efforts to reach a ban on the use of CW. The international society of the 1920s felt that, in 
order to preserve international security, there was a strong need for a legal instrument 
abolishing the use of toxic chemicals in war. For example, the ICRC strongly and openly 
condemned the use of CW.324 As a first result of this global commitment, a prohibition of the 
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use of gas in war was included in the Treaty of Versailles.325 Furthermore, the 1922 
Washington Treaty signed between the US, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, 
banning the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare, reaffirmed the prohibition of 
The Hague Conventions and employed a similar terminology to define the prohibited 
agents.326 
In 1925, the League of Nations convened the international Convention for the Supervision of 
the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War in Geneva, to 
initiate discussions on the supervision of the trade in arms of war. Yet, the main objective of 
the conference was not achieved, which, in particular, had implications on efforts to impose 
restrictions on CW. The proposed prohibition of CW export was not only considered as an 
ineffective means for preventing the use of CW, but also to be discriminatory against non-CW 
states who, as a consequence, could not acquire them.327 Alternatively, the US suggested an 
agreement based on the prohibitions laid out in the 1922 Washington Treaty.  
Finally, the ‘Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases 
and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare’ (the Geneva Protocol) was adopted as a side product 
of the conference. With the coming into force of the Protocol, the use of CW was, henceforth, 
‘justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world’. The Geneva Protocol is the 
oldest element of the current CW disarmament regime and, therefore, constitutes a starting 
point in the evolution of modern chemical weapons disarmament.  
While the Protocol effectively stigmatised CW, there is reason to question the effective 
participation in the ban. Indeed, its incompleteness shows that the negotiators were not fully 
committed to prohibiting this class of weapons in all its aspects. For example, they failed to 
include the prohibition of the use of CW against non-member States Parties, of retaliation in 
kind against a chemical attack as well as of the use of CW in internal armed conflicts. 
Moreover, the Protocol lacked provisions for the monitoring, verification and enforcement of 
non-compliance. The failure to regulate these questions created loopholes, which limited its 
legal authority and allowed states to build vast chemical arsenals for deterrence purposes. 
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Moreover, participation in the ban by states only grew tentatively. Some major powers, 
including the US,328 who had initially led the negotiations, at first failed to ratify the Protocol, 
while others further weakened it by making significant reservations to it.  
Although gas was used by Nazi Germany in its concentration camps, it never entered the 
European battlefields of WWII.329 The first logical assumption would be to regard this non-
use as an accomplishment of the legal ban of the Geneva Protocol. While the ban did play a 
role, it was not because it was considered inviolable that the belligerents complied with it by 
refraining from using CW. Rather, it was a cost-benefit calculation involving several factors 
which excluded the use of CW as a good strategy.330 Although the non-use of CW during WWII 
cannot be entirely attributed to the Geneva Protocol, this example shows that a weapons ban 
can be effective even in the most destructive armed conflict, when it is in the interest of all 
parties to comply with it. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, participation in the Geneva Protocol grew. A wave of ratifications 
occurred following political pressure by the UN (the US finally ratified it in 1975), which 
enhanced its legal authority. Yet, several breaches of the Geneva Protocol occurred in Korea, 
Yemen, South-East Asia and Afghanistan. Although, this created a need for a new, more 
comprehensive chemical disarmament agreement, the negotiation of a CW treaty was not a 
priority of the international community during the Cold War. When the World Disarmament 
Conference was convened by the UN in 1965, CW received little attention. This was due to 
the fact that CW had not been employed during WWII and to the pursuit of a general 
disarmament approach, which focused primarily on NW.331 
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1.2. Case Study: The Use of Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War 
The Iraq-Iran war (1980 – 1988) provided the stage for the second large-scale use of CW in 
modern history, following WWI. Considering that the CWC was not to come into force until 
1997, the development, production and stockpiling of CW had not been prohibited under the 
1925 Geneva Protocol. This allowed Iraq to launch an intensive clandestine research 
programme, which was operated mostly under the cover of scientific research.332 
The use of CW in the Iran-Iraq conflict, waged by Saddam Hussein, was primarily defensive in 
nature and gradually increased not only in terms of frequency but also in terms of toxicity. 
Beginning with the use of tear gas in 1982,333 the battlefield provided an ideal testing ground, 
which allowed the Iraqi regime to quickly develop more toxic and lethal agents such as 
mustard, tabun, sarin and VX. Subsequently, CW were used every year until the end of the 
war in 1988, with almost two-thirds of Iraq’s CW stockpile being used in the last 18 months 
of the war.334 
Simultaneous to the conflict with Iran, a civil war broke out between the Iraqi regime and the 
Kurdish population of northern Iraq, which had risen up against Saddam in its fight for a 
Kurdistan, independent from the Arab regime in Baghdad. On 15 March 1988, during the so-
called War of the Cities (February – April 1988), Iranian forces ‘liberated’ and occupied the 
Kurdish city of Halabja. In response, a chemical attack was launched on the city the following 
day, during which between 4,000 and 5,000 civilians died and 10,000 more were injured.335 
This chemical attack was the single most destructive since WWI and ‘the largest-scale 
chemical weapon attack against a civilian population in modern times.’336  
When the Iran-Iraq war broke out in September 1980, the only legal instrument banning the 
use of CW in armed conflict was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which had been signed by both 
Iran and Iraq in 1929 and 1931, respectively. Although it had been in force for over fifty years, 
its provisions were breached by both sides of the conflict. This leads to the assumption that 
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weaknesses in the norm itself caused it to fail as a deterrent against the use of CW and can 
thus be dismissed as being ineffective.  
However, it has been argued that the use of CW alone does not necessarily justify drawing 
conclusions regarding the failure of the norms in the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical 
warfare.337 On the contrary, Iraq did feel constrained by the norms established in the 1925 
Geneva Protocol. It was ‘only after the failure of the international community to demonstrate 
its commitment to the norm (…) that Iraq felt free to flout the chemical weapons taboo.’338 In 
other words, it was the absence of measures taken to enforce the norms of the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol which undermined its authority rather than the other way around. In sum, this 
conflict illustrated the crucial character of enforcement measures in order to ensure 
compliance with a weapons ban. This conflict constituted a turning point in the evolution of 
the CW regime. While the international community’s reaction to the Iraqi use of CW was 
reluctant and slow, the reminder of the abhorrent character of these weapons and the fear 
of their use in the Gulf War eventually led to renewed efforts to negotiate a more 
comprehensive CW regime.339 
The first important addition to the institutional capacity of the UN in responding to the use of 
CW was made only three months into the war. Without referring to the ongoing conflict 
between Iran and Iraq, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 35/144C, noting that the 
1925 Geneva Protocol lacked a mechanism for the investigation of allegations of the use of 
CBW, thus leaving the Secretary-General unable to follow up on allegations. As a remedy for 
this shortcoming, the Assembly requested Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar to carry out 
impartial investigations of the use of CW. This resolution laid the groundwork for the adoption 
of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism (SGM) in 1987, which constituted the first verification 
mechanism of the CW regime. In its resolution 42/37C (1987),340 the UN General Assembly 
sought measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and requested the 
Secretary-General  
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‘to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention 
by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical (…) weapons that may 
constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary 
international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter and to report promptly 
the results of any such investigations to all Member States.’ 
The SGM seeks to objectively and scientifically establish facts in the case of suspected 
violations of the 1925 GP and to produce a report on the findings which is circulated amongst 
all member states. While the SGM became the first instrument for the verification of chemical 
activities, its full potential remained unexploited.  
Since the early stages of the conflict, Iranian officials had led an intensive campaign to raise 
awareness of Iraqi violations of the Geneva Protocol, through formal as well as informal 
requests to the Secretary-General, to investigate the possible use of CW by Iraq against 
Iran.341 However, it soon became clear that these requests were unable to provoke an 
immediate reaction from the UN,342 as the Secretary-General was ‘under strong political 
pressure not to act’ and to use the mechanism.343 The Soviet Union viewed ‘the instrument 
as impinging on the prerogatives of the UNSC to decide when, where and if any investigations 
were to be conducted’.344 Moreover, given that it was in the interest of the US that Iraq would 
win the war, the outcome of such investigations would limit its possibility to turn a blind eye 
to Iraqi transgressions.  
For these reasons, the activation of the SGM required continuous pleas by Iran to the 
Secretary-General. Although Perez de Cuellar eventually took ‘courageous action’345 in 
launching a first investigation in March 1984, he did so not under resolution 37/98D, but on 
the basis of a moral responsibility vested in him as Secretary-General by the UN Charter.346 
On 13 March 1984, a UN team of experts arrived in Teheran, five months after Iran’s first 
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urgent request to investigate the use of CW. The authors of the team’s report made strong 
efforts not to attribute responsibility for the use of CW to either side, by only declaring that 
CW had been used.347 Similarly, in a presidential statement of the UN Security Council, 
members ‘strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons’348 without naming the 
perpetrator. 
This led Iran to accuse the Security Council, including its most powerful members, of 
demonstrating bias towards Iraq, thus limiting its capacity to respond to the allegations of 
chemical warfare.349 Despite its inherently impartial character, it manifested a pattern of 
consistent bias towards Iraq in adopting a ‘pose of studied neglect’.350 Indeed, instead of 
outwardly addressing Iraq’s evident violations, every UNSC resolution addressed ‘both 
parties’ which implied shared responsibility. Concern was expressed that this ‘active 
condoning of what clearly constitute serious violations (…), for the sake of protection of 
immediate geostrategic interest, (…) helps create a culture of impunity.’351 International 
neglect of the CW issue during the Iran-Iraq war risked leading to the erosion of customary 
norms which prohibited the use of CW in warfare and consequently to the loss of credibility 
of international institutions such as the UN:352 
‘If the very institution responsible for protecting and promoting international norms 
allows these to be violated, deliberately and repeatedly, in front of the world’s eyes, 
then the inevitable consequence is that these norms depreciate in value and in the 
end may become as worthless as the paper on which they are written’353 
The UN continued to avoid the issue of attribution of responsibility until 1986, when a UN 
report clearly stated for the first time that ‘on many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical 
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weapons against Iranian forces’.354 This condemnation was consolidated in a UN Security 
Council statement of 21 March 1986, in which its members collectively name Iraq as the 
perpetrator of chemical warfare.355  
By issuing an implicit warning that it would use CW in retaliation,356 Iran succeeded in 
exercising pressure on the Secretary-General and achieved the launching of several UN 
investigations, indicating the use of CW as well as an explicit attribution of responsibility to 
Iraq by the Security Council. Following this success, Iran further requested enforcement 
measures in the form of effective steps taken by the UN to end the use of CW by Iraq.357 On 
25 March 1988, shortly after the Halabja massacre, the Secretary-General decided to send a 
UN team to Iraq and Iran to investigate the alleged events. Despite clear imputation of the 
attack to Iraq,358 the West failed to condemn Iraq for this attack and even continued the sale 
of military equipment to Iraq. It became clear that, given that a diplomatic or military 
intervention of any of the Western states was very unlikely, only an end to the war would be 
able to put an end to Iraq’s use of CW.  
Finally, the UN-sponsored ceasefire represented a solution which allowed the Security Council 
to avoid adopting a strong position.359 It can be argued that the absence of verification and 
enforcement mechanisms at the time provided the international community with the 
opportunity to avoid getting involved without having to justify its absenteeism.  This allowed 
Western countries, in particular, to preserve their commercial and political interests in the 
region.  
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1.3. The Chemical Weapons Convention 
Although the international community failed to react to chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq 
conflict, its psychological impact helped to bring CW back to the negotiating table. The 
international community perceived an urgent need to repair ‘the damage that had been done 
to the 1925 GP’.360 Indeed, being well aware of the atrocities committed by the Iraqi regime 
and of the fact that the repeated calls by the Security Council to comply with the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol had not been sufficient to deter or stop the use of CW, it wished to prevent the 
repetition of such a dilemma. 
In addition, it had been predicted in the early 1990s that CW proliferation would increase, 
especially in developing countries, which led the public to demand protection from such 
attacks. In response, the international community opted for the full elimination of all CW, 
rather than continuing to rely on deterrence by retaliation in kind.361 Finally, the 1991 Gulf 
crisis further heightened the sense of urgency to conclude a CW treaty quickly.  
The inability of the international community to achieve an agreement was partially resolved 
by the warming up of relations between East and West at the end of the Cold War. A new, 
consensus-oriented political environment gave fresh impetus to negotiations of a 
comprehensive CW ban under the joint leadership of the superpowers.  
Already in the early stages of the war, the UNGA had encouraged the speedy conclusion of a 
CWC, urging states ‘to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the 
prohibition of chemical weapons.’362 From February 1984 onwards, the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva served as a forum for multilateral negotiations of disarmament 
and arms control agreements. An Ad Hoc Working Group was charged with the task of 
elaborating the CW ban based on exploratory discussions which had taken place at the CD.  
The first draft proposal submitted by the US in 1984 included intrusive verification 
measures.363 Although it was outright dismissed by the Soviet Union, this draft served as the 
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basis of a rolling text, in which the Working Group incorporated the progress achieved during 
negotiations, thus progressively expanding the draft treaty.  
Despite the high priority given to verification, it presented a problematic source of 
disagreement throughout the negotiations. The lack of verification arrangements in the first 
drafts of a CWC can be explained by the fact that a CW ban whose compliance could not be 
fully verified was dismissed by both sides. Eventually, an important change occurred in the 
thinking of the negotiators, which led to the adoption of a more relative stance on verification.  
In an address to the UNGA in 1989, President Bush Sr. announced that, instead of pursuing 
total verifiability, the US would now seek ‘a level of verification that would give us confidence 
to go forward with the ban’.364 This implied that the standard of a verification regime 
acceptable to both the US and the Soviets was lowered to the question whether it would 
significantly enhance treaty compliance. 
In January 1989, the Paris Conference was convened with the goal of discussing the 
proliferation of CW. The Paris Conference, which had been proposed by the US and French 
Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand, respectively, was a symbolic attempt to right the wrongs 
committed during the Iran-Iraq conflict, in particular, in Halabja. In a desire to counter the 
proliferation of CW, the Conference encouraged its States Parties to conclude at an early 
stage a ‘global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable’ ban on CW.365 Finally, the Paris 
Declaration affirmed that the parties ‘are determined to prevent any recourse to CW by 
completely eliminating them. (…) They recall their serious concern at recent violations as 
established and condemned by the competent organs of the United Nations.’366 
Although the final obstacle in the path of the Convention was removed when the Soviet Union 
accepted intrusive on-site inspections, finding consensus on the verification of non-
production in the chemical industry continued to present a serious challenge for the 
negotiators. The conflicting interests of protecting industrial secrets while preventing the 
misuse of industrial chemical substances were considered an obstacle to the monitoring of 
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compliance with a CW treaty. Eventually, the chemical industry began to accept intrusive 
verification mechanisms, which it considered to be a necessary evil.367  
Finally, in August 1992, the Ad Hoc Committee deemed the document ready for transmission 
to the UNGA.368 On 12 January 1993, the Convention was opened for signature and signed by 
130 countries. The entry into force of the Convention in 1997 represented a breakthrough in 
the international community’s long-standing efforts to comprehensively ban CW. It ‘was the 
final crown in the trinity of global treaties regulating the three classes of WMD.’369 
The CWC comprehensively bans all toxic chemicals except for peaceful purposes, a 
characteristic which prevents it from being overtaken by technological change. In addition, 
with the CWC, not only the use, but also the development, production, stockpiling and 
possession became unlawful. With the establishment of the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the CW regime was finally institutionalised. The text of the 
CWC explicitly notes that it constitutes an element in the wider objective of general and 
complete disarmament under strict international control, as pursued since the 1960s.370 
Moreover, it can still be argued today that the prohibition of CW under the CWC is part of a 
common framework shared with the prohibition of biological weapons under the BTWC and 
BWC, as trends in science, technology and industry suggest.371 
The CWC took a different path from the NPT. While the NPT established different rights and 
obligations for NWS than for NNWS, the CWC took a comprehensive approach, which made 
an important constitutional element out of the equal rights and obligations of its States 
Parties.372 The distribution of rights was an important element of CWC negotiations373 and is 
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today reflected in the structure of the OPCW’s Conference of States Parties. Disarmament 
under the CWC is divided into two steps. First, States Parties are required to declare their CW 
stockpiles and production facilities. In a second step, the OPCW oversees and verifies the 
elimination of CW and facilities under the timeframes established by the CWC. 
 
2. Case Study: The Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria 
The use of CW in Syria caused not only the second crisis of confidence of the CW ban after 
the Iraq-Iran war, but also the first of the CWC. The subsequent chemical disarmament 
mission can, to a certain extent, be regarded as a test of its effectiveness. While the mission 
was able to minimise the ‘leakage of confidence in the achieved global system of 
disarmament’,374 several existing and emerging challenges were revealed in the process. 
 
2.1. Background  
Seeking a means of protection against Israel’s superior non-conventional weapons 
capabilities, Syria first initiated its CW programme in preparation for the Yom Kippur War of 
October 1973. Similarly to that of Iraq, it was established under a scientific cover and through 
the exploitation of ‘the legitimately used infrastructure of international trade’.375 Although 
several official statements, made during the 1980s and 1990s, clearly indicated the possession 
of CW,376 Syria refused to answer questions regarding the state’s military capabilities.377 It 
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openly refused to participate in the CWC regime, arguing that Syria would only disarm 
chemically if Israel signed the NPT and eliminated all of its WMD.378 
When the uprisings of the Syrian population against the authoritarian Assad regime began in 
March 2011 with nation-wide protests, the Syrian government responded with violence. 
Protesters formed armed rebel groups, which eventually caused the situation to escalate into 
a civil war. At the time, the Syrian government possessed a CW arsenal which included sarin, 
VX and sulphur mustard gas. Still, Syria was not a declared possessor state when it began 
using its CW. This shows that today, the taboo against CW is emphasised by ‘the absence of 
countries coming forward as “CW-States”’.379 
The Syrian CW threat was met with caution internationally, as there was a ‘heightened 
international anxiety about the possible use of CW in Syria’.380 In 2012, the detection of the 
movement of CW in Syria381 prompted President Obama to draw a ‘red line’ regarding the 
possible use of CW.382 Still, the question of how to enforce the ban, in which Syria did not 
participate, sparked international debate.383  
After the first lethal chemical attacks took place in March 2013, the Syrian regime openly 
blamed the opposition and requested the UN to conduct an investigation of the Aleppo 
incident, thus activating the SGM. In a strategic move, it intended to obtain UN protection 
against any aggressions against Syria.384 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon announced such 
an investigation in collaboration with the OPCW and the WHO.385 This decision was further 
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strengthened by French and British requests for an investigation based on evidence obtained 
by their respective national intelligence agencies.386  
After months of disagreement between the UN and Syria on the modalities of the 
investigation, a UN team was eventually deployed on 17 August 2013 in Syria, with the task 
of investigating whether CW had been used. Its mission was abruptly interrupted by the 
chemical attack on the opposition-held Damascus suburb, Ghouta, on 21 August 2013. This 
incident, during which between 300 and 1,300 people died, was the largest chemical attack 
during the Civil War.  
A solution was urgently needed to end the use of CW by the Assad regime. The US and France 
threatened to carry out airstrikes against the Assad regime.387 Such a military intervention 
would not only have been inconvenient for both the parties concerned, but was also widely 
seen as a contravention to international law.388 Given that Syria was not party to the CWC at 
the time, its mechanisms to enforce compliance with its provisions were unavailable. This 
implied not only that Syria’s production and stockpiling of CW could not be verified under the 
CWC, but also that an OPCW investigation could not be launched in response to the use of 
CW.  
This dilemma caused by threats of the use of force and the inapplicability of the CWC put the 
international community under pressure to explore a diplomatic path, while at the same time 
forcing Syria to cooperate in order to avoid such an intervention. Negotiations between the 
US and Russia were launched and eventually led to the adoption of the US-Russian framework 
agreement on 15 September 2013,389 which favoured the chemical disarmament of Syria as a 
way of ending the use of CW in the conflict and served as a starting point to the UN-OPCW 
joint mission. On the basis of this agreement, UNSC resolution 2118 later established the UN-
OPCW joint mission. 
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2.2.  The Chemical Disarmament Mission (UN-OPCW) 
The UN-OPCW disarmament mission in Syria can be regarded as a milestone in the history of 
chemical disarmament, as it was unprecedented in many aspects. Never before had such a 
large number of members of the international community come together outside of the CWC 
regime, to collaborate in the verifiable elimination of a state’s entire class of WMD. The 
mission worked on a very tight, accelerated schedule compared to the deadlines generally set 
under the CWC. Moreover, the OPCW, never before having conducted inspections in a war 
zone, had to work without any guidelines in this respect. It is also important to note that the 
accession of a host state to a major disarmament treaty was an important step which had 
never been achieved before as part of a disarmament operation. 
Furthermore, not only significant financial, but also practical contributions from States had 
facilitated this ambitious undertaking. Although states acceding to the CWC are obliged to 
finance he destruction of their own CW,390 Syria claimed to be unable to pay for neither the 
destruction nor the verification activities. For this reason, the mission was financed through 
donations collected through separate UN and OPCW Trust Funds, as well a third one set up 
for the destruction of destruction of chemical weapons in Syria.391 In accordance with the UN-
OPCW Relationship Agreement of 2000,392 the UN was charged with ensuring the security of 
the team in Syria and providing logistical support, while the OPCW was charged with the 
destruction of Syrian CW, as well as its verification.393 
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of Chemical Weapons, adopted at the UNGA’s fifty-fifth session, 18 June 2001 (UN Doc A/55/988). 
393 UN-OPCW Relationship Agreement: ‘(…) Bearing in mind that, in accordance with the Charter, the UN is the 
principal organization dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
acts as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of the goals set out in the Charter.’   
‘Considering that the OPCW shares the purposes and principles of the Charter, and that its activities performed 
pursuant to the provisions of the Convention contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter.’ 
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Although international outrage led to the launching of the disarmament mission, its mandate 
was very narrow, as it was limited to stockpiles which had been declared by Syria.394  Several 
factors explain this narrow mandate. Firstly, given the urgency to stop the use of CW, 
verification was limited to activities related to Syria’s chemical disarmament. These included 
the assurance that CW had been used in Syria on the one hand and the regime’s compliance 
with its disarmament obligations on the other. This approach allowed the acceleration of the 
disarmament process and, in particular, the deployment of investigators on the ground, the 
collection of evidence and the removal and destruction processes of the CW.  
It can be argued that opting for an accelerated disarmament process was an ill-advised 
decision, given that this was not conducive to thorough verification. It might have been more 
advantageous to await Syria’s accession to the CWC and apply its sophisticated verification 
mechanisms with its traditional time frames. In other words, the limitations of the UN-OPCW 
joint mission highlighted the advantages of the CWC procedure for the investigation of alleged 
CW use. 
The hesitant stance adopted by Russia and China regarding the use of CW in Syria and the 
subsequent approval of only a limited disarmament agreement can also be explained by the 
overstepping by the West of the intervention mandate in Libya.395 While in its resolution 
1973, the UNSC gave its green light for the Libya intervention on purely humanitarian 
grounds, namely the Responsibility to Protect,396 the protection of civilians soon moved out 
of the focus of the intervention which began to aim at regime change. Consequently, Russia 
and China made sure that the UN-OPCW’s mandate was sufficiently narrow to prevent a 
repetition of these developments in Syria. The impact of strong political relations such as that 
of Syria with Russia and China on the authority of the CW ban, illustrate the importance of 
enforcement by an international body.  
On 23 June 2013, Russia issued a draft statement welcoming the removal of the final shipment 
of CW from Syrian territory as well as Syria’s supposedly constructive cooperation throughout 
                                                          
394 Under Article III, CWC 
395 Louis Charbonneau, ‘Russia U.N. Veto on Syria aimed at Crushing West's Crusade’ (Reuters, 8 February 2012); 
Michael Ignatieff, ‘Libya, Syria and R2P’ Vol 34 (8) (Policy Options, 2013) 91. 
396 Stuart Gottlieb, ‘Syria and the Demise of the Responsibility to Protect‘ (National Interest, 5 November 2013) 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/syria-the-demise-the-responsibility-protect-9360 accessed on 5 
October 2014. 
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the disarmament mission. This statement was blocked by the US and other members of the 
OPCW’s Executive Council for a number of reasons. In fact, the limited scope of the deal with 
Syria allowed the regime to obstruct the disarmament mission on several occasions,397 which 
created additional challenges.  
First, in consequence of the limitation of the OPCW’s disarmament mandate to declared CW 
stockpiles only,398 the OPCW was forced to verify the correctness and completeness of the 
Syrian declaration. 399 This outstanding clarification proved more difficult and complex than 
the verification of declared CW stockpiles and prevented the organisation to announce full 
disarmament, due to the risk that the regime might use hidden CW and blame the opposition 
for the use.400 
Furthermore, the use of chlorine against a village in April 2014 forced the OPCW to launch an 
independent investigation of the alleged use of chlorine.401 Finally, continuing efforts to 
prevent the reconstruction of a CW programme after the destruction of all CW and 
destruction sites is required to ensure Syria’s capacity to fulfil all its obligations under the 
CWC and UNSC resolution 2118 (2013). This will, require long-term monitoring and 
verification activities.  
Uncertainties surrounding the outcome of the civil war make it difficult to implement such 
measures in advance. It can be predicted that if Assad remains in power, he will cooperate 
over the short-term while retaining the technical know-how, scientific personnel and dual-
use equipment which would enable him to reconstitute his CW capability over the long-term. 
If his regime falls, the OPCW will have to monitor and verify CW activities in a country without 
a stable or effective government; a situation for which the CWC provides no guidelines.  
 
                                                          
397 Security Council Report, ‘July 2014, Monthly Forecast: Syria’ 
398 Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the 
Security Council Stakeout Following Consultations on Syria, 5 November 2013 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/217196.htm accessed 22 September 2014 
399 Jean-Pascal Zanders, ‘Gradually Making Sense of Syria’s CW Declarations’ The Trench, 11 August 2014. 
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400 Dina Esfandiary, ‘Syria and the Removal of Chemical Weapons’, (IISS, 25 June 2014). 
401 OPCW Office of the Director General, ‘Summary Report of the Work of the Fact-Finding Mission in Syria 
Covering the Period from 3 to 31 May’ 16 June 2014: The use of chlorine, as such not a substance prohibited 
under the CWC, is contrary to the Convention if used to cause temporary or permanent harm. 
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3. The Effectiveness of the Chemical Disarmament Regime 
Iraq’s violation of the Geneva Protocol and its defiance of UNSCOM in the 1990s illustrated a 
‘continual need to maintain, institutionalise and enforce non-proliferation and disarmament 
regimes, if these legal instruments are to retain their effectiveness’.402 These strongly inter-
linked efforts are indispensable for the collective effort of pursuing chemical disarmament. In 
fact, they represent “a three-legged stool, where one or two legs are not enough on which to 
stand; each leg is dependent on the others”403 
Since the entry into force of the CWC, the architecture of the CW disarmament regime can be 
considered complete, in the sense that it covers all three of these aspects of chemical 
disarmament. The following analysis aims to assess to what extent those key elements are 
present in the CWC regime today and whether their interaction is strong enough to ensure 
the overall effectiveness of the chemical disarmament regime. 
 
3.1. Participation and Cooperation 
The CWC regime is a product of global cooperation. The foundations of such cooperation 
among States Parties are laid down in Article IX of the CWC.404 In the 16 years since its 
creation, the OPCW has been able to induce a significant level of participation, which is 
illustrated by the fact that its number of States Parties has doubled in this period.405 As of 14 
October 2013, the CWC’s status of participation has risen to 190 States Parties, which 
‘represent about 98% of the global population and landmass, as well as 98% of the worldwide 
chemical industry.’406 Today, only six states still remain outside the CWC regime.407 
                                                          
402 Jonathan Tucker, ‘Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Convention’ in Michael Barletta, Amy Sands (eds), 
Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk, (CNS, Occasional Paper No.3, 1999) 15. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Article IX, para 1 CWC : ‘States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among themselves, or through 
the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of 
the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object 
and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Convention.’ 
405 29 April 1997 : 95 States Parties, 14 October 2013 : 190 States Parties. 
406 Note by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention 
as at 14 October 2013 (S/1131/2013), http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/ 
407 Technical Secretariat OPCW, ‘Status of the CWC as of 14 October 2013’(S/1131/2013): Angola, North Korea, 
Egypt, Israel, Myanmar and South Sudan. 
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While participation is generally measured by the number of regime members, a state’s refusal 
to ratify the CWC alone does not imply its refusal to cooperate in the pursuit of the goals of 
the treaty. In other words, state practice in the area of CW manifests a strong will on the part 
of the international community, including non-signatory states, to uphold the ban on CW. For 
example, the two most critical cases of non-ratification, namely Israel and North Korea, claim 
to adhere to the principles of the CWC. Both ‘have asserted that they will never use CW or 
are strongly committed to their elimination’.408 On the other hand, the two largest possessor 
states, namely the US and Russia are behind schedule in eliminating their CW stockpiles.  
In its annual compliance report of January 2013, the US State Department assessed that the 
Russian CWC declaration is incomplete and underlined that being unable to meet any 
deadlines established by the OPCW, Russia’s destruction activities would continue until 2015. 
The US itself, while having achieved the destruction of some 89.75 percent of the declared 
CW inventory by the 29 April 2012 deadline,409 is expected to miss the final deadline for full 
destruction by an estimated 11 years.410  
Although multiple factors account for these delays,411 it can be argued that despite the near-
universal status of the CWC, the lack of prioritisation on the part of US and Russia of their 
obligations under the convention significantly limits the effectiveness of the chemical 
disarmament regime. At the least, they constitute poor examples for the CWC membership 
and risk to undermine the credibility of the chemical disarmament regime. 
In contrast, during debates in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Israel 
condemned the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq War and chemical attacks against the civilian 
population.412 Furthermore, it expressed its desire to achieve a Middle East zone free from 
                                                          
408 ‘Rule 74. Chemical Weapons’ in Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, (Cambridge University Press & ICRC, 2005) 259. 
409 Ahmet Üzümcü, OPCW Director-General, Address at the 15th Chemical Weapons Demilitarization 
Conference, Glasgow, United Kingdom (May 22, 2012): noting a September 2023 projected completion date. 
410 Ibid. 
411 David Koplow, ‘Train Wreck: The US Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention’, (JNSLP, 2012) 340, 342: 
old and hazardous chemicals, 9/11 imposed unforeseen disruptions on CW demilitarisation, US bureaucratic 
apparatus that provided inconsistent oversight, poor coordination and unclear goals, unrealistic budget and risk 
profiles. 
412 Israel, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, (UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.16, 22 
October 1987) 22 
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CW413 and repeatedly called for the elimination of CW.414 Israel justified its non-ratification of 
the CWC by pointing to other Arab countries in the region, which had also failed to do so. At 
the same time, it assured that it was ‘strongly committed to the fundamental goal of the 
Convention, that is, the total elimination of the scourge of chemical weapons from the face 
of the earth’.415 
North Korea, which is believed to be the third largest CW possessor, adopted a similar stance 
in assuring that it was opposed ‘in principle’ to the use of CW.416 It asserted that  
‘the government of the Republic in the future, too, as in the past, will not test, 
produce, store and introduce from outside nuclear and chemical weapons and will 
never permit the passage of foreign . . . chemical weapons through our territory and 
territorial waters and air.’417 
These examples show that opposition to the CWC regime in the form of non-participation by 
a very small number of states does not necessarily undermine its effectiveness. Often 
financial or technical obstacles, rather than a lack of will prevent states from complying with 
their treaty obligations. Indeed, the examination of the progress in the signature and 
ratification of the CWC reveals two further problems, which have prevented full participation 
and cooperation in chemical disarmament.  
The CWC is rooted in the principle of non-discrimination, which implies an equal commitment 
of all States Parties to its prohibitions and obligations. The active involvement of developing 
economies is based on the premise that durable security requires not only global participation 
in the regime, but also a basic capacity to implement the Convention through national 
legislation and the budgetary contribution to verification and elimination activities. 
Assistance is crucial for giving developing countries the financial and technical capacity to fully 
participate in the regime and to comply with their treaty obligations. 
                                                          
413 Israel, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, (UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.19, 28 
October 1991) 23 
414 Israel, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, (UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.8, 20 
October 1995) 5 
415 Israel, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the CWC, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997. 
416 North Korea, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, (UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.7, 
19 October 1995) 16. 
417 Gordon Burck, Charles Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, (Greenwood 
Press, 1991) 397. 
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Secondly, over the past ten years, the majority of non-States Parties were Middle Eastern 
states. In light of political and military tension in the region, a concern about the possible 
exploitation of highly intrusive inspections for espionage on military facilities led these states 
to oppose the ratification of the CWC. Opponents also argue that the economic costs of 
remaining outside the CWC regime are over-estimated and that sanctions are unlikely to be 
imposed.418  
Finally, strong cooperative links between the OPCW and the chemical industry have been 
crucial to the advancement of the CW regime. The participation of the global chemical 
industry already began during the negotiations of the CWC. This link has since been able to 
ensure the industry’s ongoing cooperation with the CWC’s industrial verification regime. 
Finally, the Syrian disarmament mission constitutes a significant step forward, not only for 
the region, but also for international participation and cooperation. The extraordinary 
collective effort launched in reaction to the use of CW in Syria illustrated the cooperative 
nature of chemical disarmament. The partnership of the OPCW with the UN in dealing with 
logistical and security challenges was essential to the success of the mission. It was a reminder 
that there are pathways for institutional cooperation in chemical disarmament. 
More importantly, Syria’s accession to the CWC as its 190th State Party constitutes a major 
breakthrough in the pursuit of not only universality but also a WMD-free zone in the Middle 
East. The accession of a host state to a major disarmament treaty was an important step 
which had never been achieved before as part of a disarmament mission. Given that in the 
four years prior to Syria’s accession no new states had acceded to the CWC,419 it is possible 
that Syria’s accession as well as the attention generated by the OPCW’s Nobel Peace Prize, 
could serve as an impetus for the remaining non-States Parties to join the CWC regime.  
 
2.3.2. Institutional Capacity for Chemical Disarmament  
To what extent are multilateral institutions equipped with the necessary resources and 
instruments for the achievement of effective disarmament? All the 190 CWC States Parties 
are automatically members of the OPCW, the organisation which has been given the most 
                                                          
418 Gerald Steinberg, ‘Israeli Policy on the CWC’, (OPCW Synthesis, November 2000) 29-31. 
419 between 26 April 2009 and 14 October 2013 
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specific and comprehensive mandate in chemical disarmament.420 The infrastructure of the 
OPCW centres on its three organs with a body of over 450 employees. Its principal organ, the 
Conference of the States Parties, oversees the implementation of the convention and consists 
of all members of the OPCW. The Executive Council, the political organ of the OPCW, is 
charged with monitoring of operation and consists of 41 members. Finally, the Technical 
Secretariat organises and carries out all activities which are related to verification.  
It is important to note that the OPCW performs these tasks on a small annual budget of 
around 70 million euros which is derived from proportional contributions of States Parties.421 
In 2005, the organisation adopted a ‘result-based budgeting’ approach, adapting the budget 
to the definition of core objectives which are set out based on the OPCW’s Medium Term 
Plan.422 This approach presents a risk for the equality of States Parties, as dominant States 
Parties which pay a large contribution are able to exercise undue influence on the scope and 
scale of the budget.423 
One of the OPCW’s main achievements is that less than twenty years after the entry into force 
of the CWC it has achieved near-universal membership.424 While every treaty pursues 
universality with the goal of strengthening its regime, the effectiveness of the CWC regime 
cannot be automatically inferred from the overwhelming number of ratifications. As 
mentioned above, the largest CW possessor states, namely the US and Russia have not yet 
been able to fully eliminate their own CW stockpiles. As a result, the tremendous legacy of 
chemicals from the Cold War era continues to pose a threat to international security. On the 
other hand, non-signatory states have expressed their commitment to the elimination of CW. 
This indicates that the link between universality and effectiveness is not straightforward.  
                                                          
420 Article VIII A, 1), CWC gives the OPCW a mandate ‘to achieve the object and purpose of [the] Convention, to 
ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, 
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For a long time, the OPCW has worked behind the scenes and maintained a low profile. It did 
not become a household name until its involvement in Syria and has done little to develop 
relations with other bodies. For instance, the OPCW’s involvement in the Moscow theatre 
hostage crisis (2002), the launching of a global partnership for chemical, biological and nuclear 
disarmament at the G8 summit in Russia (2002), the verification of the presence of WMD in 
Iraq (2003) and the US-UK initiative to convert Libya from a ‘rogue state’ to a CWC state party 
(2004) remained largely insubstantial. Although it was technically equipped for such events, 
its practical inertia limits its role in the initiation of multilateral processes.425 Consequently, 
its ability to react to events as they unfold and to become technically and diplomatically 
involved requires further strengthening.  
Furthermore, the lack of transparency inherent to the OPCW is often subject to criticism. The 
CWC’s Confidentiality Annex constitutes a solution to the dilemma which negotiators faced 
in finding the right balance between effective control and the protection of confidential 
information in the military, commercial and industrial fields. The negotiators of the CWC were 
concerned about confidentiality because the cooperation of States Parties, and that of their 
chemical industries, depended on the protection of commercial information. 
It has also been argued that transparency ‘is crucial to the effectiveness of international 
regimes’426 as it is necessary to build confidence among regime members. If a multilateral 
disarmament process were to be entirely secret, it would be impossible for the vast majority 
of states, that do not possess sophisticated global information-gathering capabilities, to have 
confidence in their treaty partners’ compliance. Still, in situations where verification would 
be harmed without confidentiality, it can be argued that the latter takes precedence over 
transparency.  
The assessment of the OPCW’s capacity to perform chemical disarmament must be based on 
its achievements in fulfilling this task both during times of peace as well as under 
extraordinary circumstances. The Syrian disarmament mission stretched the OPCW to new 
limits as it demanded flexibility and innovation on the part of its member states as well as 
that of the UN. For example, inspection personnel who had not been trained to operate in a 
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war zone, was forced to wear bulletproof vests for the first time. For this reason the UN 
security support was crucial to the success of the mission. 
The flexibility of the OPCW, however, is limited by its rigid and archaic structure which 
requires ‘100% solutions’. Although it has the technical capacity to effectively disarm and 
verify, it is often constricted by its own rules. In other words, its procedures demand 
absoluteness, which prevent it from reaching its full potential in situations which are not 
regulated under the CWC. For example, in the case of the Sellström mission, both the UN and 
the OPCW had tissue and soil samples, which could not be joined and technically compared, 
due to strict confidentiality and chain of custody requirements. In an interview with the BBC, 
an OPCW official admitted that the treatment of evidence was ‘a political question, not a 
technical one’427 
Considering that Syria was not Party to the CWC at the time of the attacks, the convention’s 
mechanism for the investigation of the alleged use of CW was not available. In such cases, 
investigations concerning the alleged use of CW by non-States Parties are regulated under 
Part XI, para 27 of the CWC Verification Annex,428 which rely on the SGM. It was on the basis 
of this provision combined with the UN-OPCW Relationship Agreement (2000)429 that the UN-
OPCW joint mission was established.  
Under this special arrangement, the UN and OPCW recognise the need to work jointly to 
achieve mutual objectives and agree to cooperate closely within their respective mandates.430 
While avoiding any duplication of activities, the Relationship Agreement aims to strengthen 
institutional capacity for chemical disarmament by combining their resources. In such cases, 
the OPCW acts as a subcontractor to support the SGM by making experienced inspectors and 
inspection equipment available, providing relevant information and advice, as well as access 
to its network of designated laboratories. 
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On the other hand, the limitations of the UN-OPCW joint mission highlighted the benefits of 
the CWC procedure for the investigation of the alleged use of CW in contrast with 
investigations under the Secretary-General Mechanism. The guidelines and procedures of the 
SGM provide that, if requested, any UN member state must grant access to its territory to 
investigation teams.431 However, acceptance and adherence to the guidelines and procedures 
rests at the discretion of the Secretary-General and of the affected member state. This 
weakness in the SGM caused the initial delay in the deployment of the investigation team to 
Syria. An additional obstacle can be seen in the fact that any obligation imposed on a state 
requires a Security Council resolution which can be vetoed by its five permanent members.432 
In contrast, the CWC’s mechanism for the investigation of the alleged use of CW is much more 
reliable. In the case of an investigation of alleged CW use by a CWC State Party, Part XI of the 
Verification Annex provides that, once a request is received by the OPCW Director-General, a 
team of inspectors must be sent immediately and must be granted access to any area affected 
by the alleged use of CW. In other words, a state party on whose territory CW use is suspected 
to have taken place, must comply with all its obligations under the CWC. Two possible 
remedies exist to this problem. Either the CWC reaches universality, which would also make 
its IAU mechanism universally applicable to all states. Alternatively, the SGM could be 
updated. 
Finally, it can be argued that the International Criminal Court (ICC) could play a role in both 
verification and enforcement of the CW ban. Indeed, in a joint request of 14 January 2013, 
the governments of 57 countries had emphasised the importance of accountability for the 
achievement of peace in Syria and urged the UNSC to take action by referring the Syrian 
situation to the ICC.433 Yet, Syria not being a signatory of the Rome Statute, only either a UNSC 
referral of the situation or a referral by the Syrian government itself could have given 
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jurisdiction to the ICC.434 Such a requested referral was vetoed by both Russia435 and China436 
on 22 May 2014. Both dismissed a judicial solution in favour of a political one, a position which 
reflected their protectionist motivations. Justifications for the veto related to fears of regime 
change were based on the Libyan experience. 
It can be argued that even if the referral to the ICC had been successful, the ICC’s role for 
chemical disarmament per se would have been limited. Individuals can be prosecuted for the 
use of CW in Syria only as part of a charge of crimes against humanity or as part of the war 
crime of intentionally directing attacks against civilians. In other words, proving the use of CW 
would not be necessary to sustain either charge.437 Moreover, an ICC investigation would only 
cover the use of CW and not the non-compliance under the CWC.  
In contrast with the immediate investigation procedures under the SGM, the dimension of 
time is entirely different in the context of the court. Due to lengthy investigation processes, 
it may take a year or longer to build a case, which implies that key pieces of evidence risk 
disappearance in the meantime.438 
In conclusion, assuming that even if the forensic standards held up to those of the CWC 
regime, the ICC would not constitute a reliable complement to this regime. Alternatively, 
‘post-conflict, the international community could pressure a fledging Syrian government to 
ratify the Rome Statute, enabling the ICC to investigate the situation unencumbered.’439 
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3.4. Verification of Compliance 
From a legal point of view, regime effectiveness can be measured by the extent to which 
regime members comply with their contractual obligations.440 The Iraq-Iran conflict showed 
the importance of addressing compliance in a meaningful way, in order to maintain the 
confidence of States Parties in a treaty regime.441 Before the entry into force of the CWC, 
compliance was determined unilaterally by individual states or by a small group of states. 
Today, the CWC charges the OPCW with this task, for which it puts a comprehensive 
verification regime at its disposal. To date, the CWC remains the only treaty which bans an 
entire class of weapons under intrusive international verification.  
Verification is a multi-faceted undertaking. In an overall sense, the process of verification 
encompasses information gathering, information analysis, the identification of instances of 
non-compliance, the evaluation of their significance and as well as the determination of an 
appropriate response with the goal of bringing the state in question back into compliance.442 
Having represented the most contentious issue during negotiations, today the CWC’s 
verification regime is often regarded as its cornerstone and as a model for future 
disarmament agreements. Since the entry into force of the CWC, the OPCW has verified the 
destruction of 85% of the world’s declared CW. This central role of verification is reflected in 
the substantial share of the OPCW’s annual budget which is allocated to verification 
activities.443  
Verification under the CWC comprises mandatory declarations by its States Parties about 
their industrial and military activities, which provide the basis for up to four annual routine 
inspections. The Convention’s Verification Annex covers verification procedures for each 
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category of chemicals and their precursors444 as well as each of the areas covered by the 
prohibition, namely stockpiles, production facilities and the destruction process.  
In addition to mechanisms for routine inspection, the CWC allows its States Parties to request 
challenge inspections.445 This mechanism can be used by any member to call for investigation 
of another member on the basis of well-founded concerns over compliance. If applied, the 
Director-General of the OPCW appoints a challenge inspection team which is immediately 
dispatched. This instrument can be considered a failure, as political obstacles have prevented 
it from being used to this day. 
Today, there is a wide consensus that a ban on CW cannot be effective in the absence of 
intrusive verification.446 The question whether the widespread use of CW by Iraq during the 
1980s could have been prevented had such a comprehensive ban been in force can only be 
answered in speculative terms. However, it can be argued that the existence of authoritative 
verification and enforcement mechanisms would have significantly limited the liberty of the 
international community to turn a blind eye to the flagrant violation of the ban on the use of 
CW established in 1925. 
The standard which must be applied in the assessment of the effectiveness of a verification 
regime is its capacity to enable a quick and effective response to violations of a ban. In other 
words, a verification regime  
 ‘seeks to detect non-compliance early enough to enable States parties to deal 
with the situation by bringing the violator back into compliance, counter the 
security threat presented by the violation and thereby deny the violator the 
benefits of non-compliance.’447 
The quick and decisive reaction of the international community in assessing and stopping the 
use of CW in Syria, despite the high security risk for inspectors, is indicative of the potential 
and importance of verification measures for effective disarmament. Furthermore, the 
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unprecedented involvement of the international community in the detection and elimination 
of CW in Syria, will likely act as a deterrent for other states, which are tempted to use CW in 
the future. On the other hand, the Syrian disarmament mission highlighted some of the 
limitations of the CWC’s verification regime. 
Verification was a complex and difficult task in the hostile climate of the Syrian civil war, 
where military movements were fast and unpredictable, in particular under the given 
timeframe which was accelerated in contrast to procedures envisaged by the CWC. Although 
this acceleration can be attributed to a lack of trust in the Syrian regime and the resulting 
need to remove CW as quickly as possible, it can be argued that this ad hoc approach 
minimised the CWC’s impact in the mission. Hence, it is not justified to criticise the CWC 
verification regime per se for the shortcomings of the Syria mission. A preferable solution 
might have been to wait for Syria to accede to the CWC in order to make its verification 
procedures available.  
Verification efforts in reaction to the use of CW in Syria have illustrated the complex and 
controversial relationship between national intelligence agencies and international 
verification organisations, such as the OPCW. Elements of national intelligence were put 
forward by governments prior to and throughout the disarmament mission, confirming the 
use of CW and, in large part, the regime’s responsibility.  
The degree of openness and willingness with which national governments put forward the 
information which their intelligence agencies had acquired, indicates a change in the 
international community’s attitude towards covert intelligence gathering. It can be argued 
that the verification mandate of the UN-OPCW joint mission was so narrow that national 
intelligence was needed to shed light on areas which the verification regime of the SGM could 
not cover. Based on the argument that a successful verification regime draws on all available 
information, is it justified to assume that information and data gathering practices are being 
gradually integrated into the CW verification regime, thus enhancing its effectiveness? 
Covert intelligence gathering lacks not only the cooperative spirit inherent to regimes, but 
also a legal foundation, given that the CWC itself does not provide a legal foundation for a 
role of national intelligence agencies in multilateral verification activities. Moreover, since the 
US and British intelligence failure prior to the 2003 Iraq war, there is a heightened suspicion 
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of Western intelligence,448 which calls for healthy scepticism towards this type of information. 
There were clear indications in the debates of the psychological effect of the intelligence 
failure leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.449 This invasion was justified based on 
information which was deemed ‘extensive, detailed and authoritative’, yet later turned out 
to be ‘limited, sporadic and patchy’.450 Consequently, it was argued that there was a risk that 
the supposedly clear evidence of the Assad regime’s culpability could prove to be unfounded.  
Furthermore, the final assessment of compliance must be performed by an authoritative 
body.451 In conclusion, intelligence information is a valuable but unreliable element of 
verification as states make the decision to share intelligence on a case-by-case basis 
depending on their national interests. 
First, the inability to verify the precise circumstances of the chemical attacks and the resulting 
lack of certainty regarding the non-compliant party was not regarded as an obstacle to the 
legality of a military intervention, as verification was mostly bypassed in US, British and French 
parliamentary debates. Supporters of military action went directly from reaffirming the ban 
on CW to seeking a remedy against its violation, simply skipping the question of verification. 
While there was consensus on the attribution of responsibility as a necessary preliminary step 
to any military action, this was done on purely speculative grounds, instead of by means of 
established verification mechanisms. 
In conclusion, today the necessary verification architecture is in place, but in the Syrian case 
it was not applicable. The CWC’s verification regime was ‘designed against a more static and 
deterministic concept of CW production dependent on synthetic routes involving scheduled 
chemicals.’452 In other words, the rigid nature of the CWC’s verification provisions may not be 
able to reliably cover current and future approaches to CW production, which highlights a 
need for 80% solutions and compromise. It is crucial to prevent the CWC verification regime 
from becoming ‘frozen in time’.  
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3.5. Enforcement of Chemical Disarmament 
Upon detection of contraventions to the CWC by means of verification, the difficult question 
of how to handle non-compliance must be addressed. During the negotiations surrounding 
the question of enforcement, concerns emerged regarding the conflict between the 
prerogatives of the UNSC under Chapter VII on one hand, and the OPCW’s competence on 
the other. While negotiators took caution in preserving the UNSC’s rights, the failure of the 
latter to effectively respond to violations of the CW ban during the Iran-Iraq conflict, made it 
clear that the CWC required its own mechanisms to address non-compliance.453 Yet, there 
was an understanding that enforcement mechanisms available to both organisations had to 
be complementary,454 which led to the reliance on enforcement under the UN Charter. 
Today, Article XII, paragraph 1 of the CWC is the cornerstone of a system of measures 
designed to remedy violations. It confers exclusive competence to the Conference in the 
determination of the measures to be taken, based on information obtained by the Technical 
Secretariat. The sole purpose of such measures is to bring the behaviour of the State Party in 
question into harmony with its obligations under the Convention. Solely punitive measures 
are excluded from the scope of Article XII.455 Indeed, ‘the provisions of Article XII demonstrate 
that there is a point at which the internal treaty compliance mechanism is essentially 
exhausted and it is left to the States Parties to take action in concert, or to ‘fall back’ on the 
UN.’456 
The CWC is widely criticised for its failure to explicitly and adequately address the question of 
enforcement. The primary complaints concern its inability to enforce its provisions regarding 
countries that have not yet ratified the treaty, to impose its provisions with respect to 
terrorist groups, and finally, the fact that the OPCW cannot itself authorise military force. 
While all international treaties are based, to some extent, on comity, it can be argued that 
the absence of enforcement mechanisms significantly reduces the effectiveness of the CWC 
regime. In other words,  
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‘although arms control treaties rely on the self-interest of the parties and the pressure 
of world public opinion to restrain would-be violators, moral restrains by themselves 
may not be sufficient. Without a credible threat of economic or even military sanctions 
in response to a persistent pattern of violations, the CWC will never play a truly 
effective role in containing and reversing the spread of CW.’457 
A number of solutions are available, which are based on non-conventional enforcement 
mechanisms under general international law. While reciprocity in the form of retaliatory use 
of CW or abandonment of disarmament obligations is not permitted under the CWC, 
collective measures as well as “name and shame” are available mechanisms, which can be 
applied in order to restore the respect of obligations under the CWC.  
This absence of a mandate for the enforcement of the CWC implies that collective measures 
in the form of the use of force cannot be decided by the OPCW itself. Its role is limited to 
recommendations made to the other State Parties or consultations with the UNSC if it deems 
military action to be necessary. These recommendations are not legally binding, may not 
infringe upon the prerogatives of the UNSC. The Conference has yet to make use of this 
mechanism.  
Considering that Syria was a non-State Party at the time when measures were sought to end 
the use of CW by the Assad regime, the OPCW had no legal basis for making such 
recommendations to the UN.458 Neither did the UNSC adopt measures independently from 
the OPCW. For this reason, collective measures suggested and adopted in the Syrian case took 
the form of ad hoc enforcement mechanisms.  
While the US and France threatened airstrikes for this purpose,459 such a purely punitive 
military intervention would not only have been inconvenient for both parties concerned but 
would also have fallen outside the scope of Article XII and contravened a number of 
international principles and norms.460 The question of whether the resolution would 
authorise the use of force in the event of non-compliance represented the most contentious 
issue during negotiations of resolution 2118 (2013) between the US and Russia. In paragraph 
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21 of the resolution, the Council ‘decides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution 
(…), to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.’461 This formulation 
does not imply that non-compliance automatically triggers a right to the legal use of military 
force against Syria. Instead, it should be read as effectively imposing a legally binding462 
disarmament regime on Syria.’463  
Eventually, the threat of force, in combination with the Russian rejection of an automatically 
militarily enforceable UNSC resolution, exercised pressure on both Syria and the international 
community to explore collective measures in the form of a diplomatic solution. This solution 
was eventually adopted in the form of the US-Russian Framework Agreement, which included 
an ad hoc chemical disarmament regime as a way of ending the use of CW in the conflict. It 
can be argued that it is unjustified to criticise the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the CWC 
given that ad hoc enforcement measures are available on a case-to-case basis and, therefore, 
likely to provide solutions which are more adapted to specific situations.  
The second type of enforcement mechanism relates to the publication of a state’s cheating 
with the aim of both forcing him to bring his actions back into compliance and deterring 
potential cheaters. Name and shame, implies public statements regarding a state’s offensive 
behaviour. It is most effective for the enforcement of compliance, when such statements are 
made by authoritative international organisations such as the UN or the OPCW. Still, 
statements made by individual members of the international community are not to be 
underestimated, as they can compel international organisations to address the issue. On the 
other hand, as the Iraqi and Syrian examples show, the OPCW and UN are reluctant to make 
official statements regarding the culpability of a state, given that often action in the form of 
sanctions or judicial measures are expected of them.  
For example, in the Syrian case, responsibility for the attacks was attributed through channels 
external to the CWC regime.464 Neither the UN inspector team’s mandate under the SGM nor 
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that of the UN-OPCW mission aimed at establishing attribution. The results of verification 
efforts had to remain objective, given that collected evidence might not have been sufficiently 
clear to determine which party to the conflict had used CW. When leading UN and OPCW staff 
was repeatedly asked about who was responsible for the chemical attacks in Syria, they all 
argued that “attribution would require more efforts and resources”465 and that the evidence 
indicating Syria’s responsibility for the chemical attacks, would not stand in court.466 
The absence of any provisions on attribution in both the Geneva Protocol and the CWC can 
be interpreted as indicating the separation of disarmament and the attribution of 
responsibility. Attribution is not necessary to achieve disarmament. On the contrary, it even 
risks undermining disarmament efforts given that the cooperation of the host state is crucial 
for the elimination of CW. A further explanation for the absence of provisions on attribution 
could be the fact that the possibility to attribute varies from case to case. 
In light of the difficulties surrounding the publication of violations in the form of attribution, 
accountability must also be excluded as a reliable enforcement mechanism. Calls for 
accountability would not only have to be addressed outside of the CWC regime, but would 
also have to imply a commitment to end the Assad regime. However, given the slow 
procedures of the ICC and the need for the host state’s cooperation in disarmament activities 
the parallel activation of a judicial process risks undermining the principal goal of ensuring 
effective disarmament. In Syria, only if Assad were to be overthrown, would Syrian officials 
responsible for the chemical attacks be likely to face prosecution and imprisonment.  
Finally, the effectiveness of the CW disarmament regime further implies that it is capable not 
only of dealing with today’s threats but also with those emerging in a constantly changing 
international security environment. It has become clear that in light of the CWC’s quasi-
universal status, a shift is taking place from the use of CW by sovereign states for whom the 
CWC is binding, to the ‘irregular use of chemicals in scruffy, low intensity war (waged by non-
state actors) that was never expected by the CWC.’467  
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The enforcement of disarmament vis-à-vis non-state actors remains an important issue to be 
resolved. A remedy to this lacuna can be seen in Article VII of the CWC (national 
implementation measures), given that effective national implementation is necessary to 
prevent non-state actors from gaining access to the CW stockpiles of states. Its paragraph 1, 
a) provides that States Parties are responsible for prohibiting national and legal persons on 
its territory from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under the CWC. On one 
hand, this provision can be interpreted as creating an environment of enforceability vis-à-vis 
non-state actors. On the other, States Parties have lagged behind in this area, despite the 
adoption of an action plan by the OPCW to encourage States Parties to effectively implement 
the Convention.  
In the same line, UNSC resolution 1540 (2004) aims to remedy this weakness by calling on all 
states to take enforce national measures regarding the elimination and non-proliferation of 
WMD, including CW. It recognises the tremendous damage which non-state actors can 
potentially cause with only small, militarily insignificant quantities of chemical agent and, 
therefore, emphasises the necessity to block the access of non-state actors to CW stockpiles 
through the adoption of effective measures on a national level.468   
In conclusion, there is an increased urgency for enforceability of chemical disarmament 
norms. For this purpose universality is essential, given that assurances of enforceability will 
be difficult as long as some states refuse to join the CWC. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the effectiveness of the chemical disarmament regime. A first 
conclusion regarding the impact of this treaty was drawn by means of contrasting the 
paralysis of the international community prior to the establishment of the CWC regime during 
the Iran-Iraq war, to the strong moral outrage of the international community which 
facilitated ad hoc disarmament measures in response to the use of CW in Syria. 
The effectiveness of the CWC regime was evaluated on the basis of the four key components 
which make up its architecture, namely compliance, verification, enforcement as well as the 
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capacity of the OPCW and the UN to perform chemical disarmament. The findings of this 
chapter can be divided into two aspects: the strengths and weaknesses inherent to the 
structure of the treaty itself on one hand, and its practical application on the other.  
Regarding the structure of the regime, it can be concluded that it provides a solid foundation 
for chemical disarmament. The level of participation is satisfactory overall and multilateral 
institutions such as the OPCW and the UN are equipped with the necessary infrastructure and 
instruments for chemical disarmament. Moreover, a sophisticated verification regime is 
attached to the CWC and mechanisms for the enforcement of the CWC are available. 
Despite this conclusion, it was argued in this chapter that the structure of the CW regime is 
not sufficiently flexible to ensure the full exploitation of its potential. For example, the 
mandate of the OPCW does not allow for the shared treatment of samples with the UN, nor 
does it provide guidelines for dealing with emerging challenges such as non-state actors. 
Furthermore, this chapter highlighted the grey areas caused by the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms inherent to the CWC regime. In this respect, the reliance on the UNSC for 
enforcement exposes the regime to the bias and veto of the P5, thus allowing close relations 
to a P5 member to protect violators from sanctions. 
On the other hand, practical obstacles limit the scope of the regime and, consequently, its 
applicability. For example, the Syrian case has highlighted the limited scope of the CWC 
regarding non-state parties. Furthermore, a lack of political will constitutes a recurring 
problem for the effective application of the CW regime. For instance, political implications 
have caused the failure of challenge inspections and risk undermining any measure taken by 
the UNSC.  
To remedy these shortcomings, ad hoc disarmament regimes may serve as a complement to 
the CWC disarmament regime. This has been illustrated using the example of the UN-OPCW 
joint disarmament mission in Syria. While it can be argued that the existence of such ad hoc 
regimes undermines the authority of the CWC regime, both must be regarded as 
complementary. In order to serve as an effective complement, such ad hoc regimes must be 
based on a wider mandate than that of the UN-OPCW mission, which only provided quick, 
short-term solutions and deprived chemical disarmament of the long term effects the CWC 
regime offers. Moreover, these findings highlight the importance of the time factor in 
disarmament operations, as the crisis situation in Syria has allowed the intensification of 
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efforts in terms of participation of states in the operation, the quick implementation of 
verification measures and the cooperation between the UN and OPCW in the mission. 
In conclusion, this chapter assesses the overall effectiveness of the CWC regime for the 
advancement of chemical disarmament. It is argued that while the entry into force of the CWC 
has significantly decreased the risk of chemical warfare, the complete and permanent 
elimination of CW requires universal adherence to the CWC regime.  
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Chapter 4 - The Effectiveness of Nuclear Disarmament 
 
Introduction 
As elaborated above, the chemical disarmament regime is rooted in a comprehensive, 
verifiable and quasi-universal treaty imposing precise obligations. In contrast, the legal 
structure underlying the elimination of nuclear weapons remains to date much less 
developed. Pending the negotiation and adoption of a comprehensive nuclear disarmament 
treaty, a limited regime currently governs the behaviour of states leading up to the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. 
First, this regime will be positioned within its historical context for the purpose of highlighting 
the key legal, political and scientific factors which gave impetus to the disarmament 
movement, in particular leading up to the adoption of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). The NPT was long regarded as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament regime. 
Therefore, the analysis of the internal effectiveness of the nuclear disarmament regime will 
begin with an examination of the NPT. In its Article VI it establishes an obligation to negotiate 
in good faith on legal measures leading to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.469 Although its precise legal nature and scope remains controversial, 
this provision was conceived as a first step in nuclear disarmament, envisaging the verified 
elimination of nuclear weapons to take place in a second step under such a regime. 
For almost five decades following the adoption of the NPT, multilateral negotiations involving 
the nuclear weapons states have yet to be initiated. While bilateral and unilateral reductions 
have allowed the containment of the nuclear threat during and since the end of the Cold War, 
they have stagnated as a consequence of the deterioration of US-Russian relations and no 
longer constitute reliable substitutes for nuclear disarmament.470  On the contrary, nuclear 
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weapons states have recently engaged in the renewal, modernisation and expansion of their 
nuclear weapons programmes, which can be seen as further undermining the disarmament 
agenda. 
The legality of such measures was the object of the 2014 lawsuit of the Marshall Islands at 
the ICJ against the nine de facto nuclear weapons states for their failure to comply with Article 
VI, NPT. Among the issues raised in the Marshall Islands’ memorial were the qualification of 
the obligation in Article VI as an obligation of result or conduct, its customary nature, as well 
as the compatibility of the good faith obligation contained in the Article with the renewal and 
modernisation of nuclear weapons programmes. As the cases eventually did not reach the 
merits stage, these questions remain open.  
Unilateral and bilateral measures are regarded as indispensable in the preparation of a 
multilateral disarmament regime.471 For this reason, the effectiveness of such nuclear 
disarmament measures in practice will be examined using two case studies. First, an analysis 
of the unprecedented unilateral denuclearisation of South Africa at the end of the Cold War 
will offer insights into the role of the NPT, as well as other international norms in ad hoc 
nuclear disarmament processes. Secondly, nuclear reductions under the US-Russian bilateral 
framework will on the one hand highlight a number of factors which have influenced their 
effectiveness and on the other demonstrate their appropriateness as a foundation for a 
multilateral disarmament regime. 
A crucial shift towards a multilateral approach occurred in 2017 with the adoption of the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which aims to universally banning nuclear 
weapons. Upon its entry into force, a wide range of activities linked to the development, 
possession and deployment of nuclear weapons will be banned, for the first time making 
nuclear disarmament a legally binding commitment for all States Parties. Despite its strong 
potential as ‘a means to exert greater normative pressure on all states to pursue nuclear 
abolition goals,’ the strong initial opposition to the treaty on the part of the nuclear possessor 
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states raises the question whether this ban approach can eventually gain the full support of 
key nuclear states.  
In particular, the fresh impetus in the nuclear disarmament debate during the Obama 
administration has faded under US President Trump who adopted a clear stance in opposition 
of multilateralism in nuclear matters. The announced withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the 
unilateral US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal) in 
May 2018 illustrate this clear lack of US leadership in nuclear disarmament. A brief discussion 
of the current geopolitical landscape, in light of which key efforts such as the JCPOA and the 
TPNW must be evaluated, will provide an outlook on how the political and legal spheres in 
nuclear disarmament are likely to evolve. 
Finally, this chapter will proceed to the assessment of the external effectiveness of the 
nuclear disarmament regime in practice. The factors examined will include its ability to 
achieve the levels of state participation and cooperation necessary for effective disarmament, 
as well as levels of compliance with the obligation to negotiate in good faith on nuclear 
disarmament measures. Furthermore, given the lack of an institutional framework providing 
mechanisms for the verification and enforcement of obligations, the role of the NPT review 
process and the UN disarmament machinery in providing these elements will be evaluated. 
 
1. Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament 
1.1. Overview 
Concerns about the devastating potential of nuclear weapons and the desire to prevent their 
military use, have been expressed since the very early days of their existence, including by 
the creators of the atomic bomb themselves.472 Prior to the attacks with first-generation 
fission bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, US scientists and policy-makers considered secrecy 
over the discovery of nuclear weapons to be an appropriate means for curbing the nuclear 
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danger and preventing an arms race.473 However, given the increasing public awareness of 
their destructiveness resulting from these first nuclear attacks, new measures became 
necessary.474 
Initial attempts at nuclear disarmament were undertaken under President Truman in the 
immediate aftermath of WWII. Yet, following the arms race of the 1930s, disarmament was 
no longer regarded as a reliable means for achieving peace and security. This led to only 
hesitant attempts during this period to limit a weapon which could be potentially influential 
in a future conflict.475 Finally, the central role of the nuclear question was highlighted by the 
adoption of the first resolution of the UNGA on 24 January 1946. This resolution envisaged 
the establishment of a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of 
atomic energy and in particular the ‘elimination from national armaments of atomic 
weapons.’476  
The United States Atomic Energy Commission, in its first report to the UNSC on 30 December 
1946, asserted that an ‘effective system for the control of atomic energy must be 
international, and must be established by an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention, 
which in turn must be administered and operated by an international organ or agency within 
the United Nations.’477 However, in a climate of suspicion and heightened hostility between 
the superpowers, the Soviet Union rejected this on the grounds that scientific knowledge and 
technical expertise would allow the US to rebuild NW at any time. This position illustrated the 
interrelation between non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as the necessity to pursue 
both simultaneously, in order to assure disarming states against the nuclear re-armament by 
others.478 
By the mid-1950s, the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament negotiations led to the 
abandonment of a comprehensive approach for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the 
pursuit of partial measures. The notion of arms control pursued under the Eisenhower 
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administration reflected the idea that comprehensive nuclear disarmament was not 
achievable and that the ‘management’ of nuclear competition constituted a more suitable 
strategy for avoiding nuclear war.479 Consequently, the reduction of nuclear weapons was 
viewed as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. 
Following the development of nuclear weapons by China, France and the UK, consensus grew 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s on the need to counter such realist motivations to acquire 
nuclear weapons with normative restraints in the form of a verifiable international 
agreement.480 Both Eastern and Western nuclear powers warned each other that the 
passiveness of leaders in addressing the nuclear arms race would lead to a gradual loss of 
control over the matter.481  
This prediction proved true when on 14 October 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis, which 
upset the nuclear equilibrium between the US and the Soviet Union, for the first time leading 
the world to the brink of nuclear war. Several practical and psychological effects resulting 
from this shock generated additional impetus for non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. 
The crisis demonstrated that once the strategic nuclear balance was lost, it would be difficult 
to prevent a full-scale nuclear war.  
This realisation highlighted a mutual interest in crisis management, as well as the need for a 
common approach to nuclear arms control based on non-power-related measures.482 This 
demonstrated that diplomatic compromise was possible, even in a context of extreme 
political and military tension.483 US historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., in a memorandum to 
President Kennedy shortly after the end of the Crisis, described it as ‘a beginning of fresh 
initiatives for peace, including a new attack on nuclear testing [and] disarmament (…).’ 
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Indeed, this experience provided fresh impetus for the negotiation of the NPT, which began 
in 1965 in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), a UN negotiating body which 
considered treaty proposals by the US and Soviet Union.484 It was charged with negotiating a 
treaty on nuclear non-proliferation, which was regarded as crucial in keeping the road to 
nuclear disarmament open.485 Aware of the dangers of continued expansion and 
diversification by NWS of their nuclear capability, the non-nuclear armed states sought 
security assurances not in guarantees of non-use, but in nuclear reductions and a promise of 
eventual disarmament.486 Hence, they insisted in a two-sided bargain, at the minimum 
imposing an obligation on nuclear armed states not to increase their arsenals.487 
When the NPT was adopted in 1968, its Article VI established an obligation to negotiate 
towards nuclear disarmament for the NWS as a counterpart to the non-proliferation 
obligations imposed on NNWS.488 The strong interest in pursuing disarmament repeatedly 
expressed by the NWS during and after the conclusion of negotiations had generated 
sufficient levels of confidence in the urgent pursuit of concrete disarmament measures, which 
now seemed achievable.489  
By 1978 no disarmament negotiations had been initiated and no real progress was achieved 
in halting this arms race. The UNGA convened its First Special Session Devoted to 
Disarmament (SSOD I) in 1978 with a view to organising future disarmament measures.490 For 
the first time, international consensus on a comprehensive disarmament strategy was 
achieved. With respect to nuclear disarmament, the Final Document elaborated a 
‘Declaration of Principles’ which accorded priority to nuclear disarmament negotiations.491 
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Secondly, the ‘Programme of Action’ emphasised the importance of ‘taking into account 
[both] the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of existing arsenals’492 In this 
respect, it urged the negotiation of mechanisms to verify a) the cessation of the qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons systems, b) the cessation of the production of nuclear 
weapons and fissionable material and c) a comprehensive programme including time-frames 
for the reduction and elimination of stockpiles.493  
Additionally, it recommended further bilateral US-Soviet talks on the reduction of and 
qualitative limitation on strategic nuclear arms.494 A further initiative to create a common 
strategy for the elimination of nuclear weapons was undertaken At the Reykjavik Summit in 
1986. US President Reagan and Gorbachev, then-leader of the Soviet Communist Party, 
presented very diverging proposals and were unable to reach an agreement.495 Moreover, 
the success of India, Israel and Pakistan in acquiring nuclear weapons fundamentally changed 
the attitude of the formerly exclusive nuclear club, in particular given that these new de facto 
NWS remained outside of the NPT regime.496  
Following the end of the Cold War and the thawing of East-West relations, the diminishing 
deterrence value of nuclear weapons and a growing potential for dialogue generated hope 
for the facilitation of disarmament negotiations.497 Initial successes included the indefinite 
extension of the NPT in 1995, as well as the dismantlement of the Iraqi nuclear programme 
between 1991 and 1997.498 Furthermore, the abandonment by Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
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Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum in return for security assurances by the nuclear 
powers,499 demonstrated the practical feasibility of eliminating NW from national militaries.  
The following sections illustrate two important examples of practical approaches to nuclear 
disarmament. First, in Section 1.2., the nuclear disarmament of South Africa in 1991 will be 
discussed, as an example of unilateral denuclearisation. Secondly, in Section 1.3., the US-
Russian approach to the reduction and elimination of nuclear stockpiles will illustrate the 
potential and challenges of a bilateral approach to nuclear disarmament.  
 
1.2. Case Study: South African Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament 
South Africa remains the only NWS to have voluntarily and unilaterally abandoned its NW 
programme to date. This case of unilateral nuclear disarmament merits closer attention, as it 
offers unique insights into early disarmament efforts, as well as an opportunity to evaluate 
the influence of the NPT regime in this case. 
South Africa started its peaceful nuclear research programme in 1961, under the Atomic 
Energy Board. Possessing abundant uranium reserves, it built a uranium enrichment plant, 
the Y-Plant, for the purpose of developing its uranium enrichment technology.500 Despite the 
peaceful nature of this research, the sensitivity surrounding the enrichment process required 
this process to remain secret.501 In 1971, the South African Ministry of Mines approved an 
investigation into the applicability of nuclear explosives for mining and construction purposes, 
which concluded affirmatively. This led to the development of the first nuclear explosives for 
peaceful application and the construction of underground testing sites.  
Several internal and external factors leading to the international political isolation of South 
Africa, prompted the transition from peaceful nuclear ambitions to the pursuit of a nuclear 
deterrent. For instance, during the 1970s, the international community, in particular the US, 
began to react more strongly to South Africa’s racially-influenced internal politics, restricting 
sales of conventional armaments to South Africa. Moreover, Soviet expansionist motivations 
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in South Africa and the presence of Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 made the government 
fearful of an invasion.  
Despite the continued secrecy of the South African nuclear programme, growing suspicions 
in this respect led the international community to apply pressure on South Africa through 
nuclear isolation, in order to halt the development of its nuclear capability.502 In addition to 
the refusal by the US to export pre-paid fuel elements to South Africa in 1976, the US Congress 
additionally adopted the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act two years later, prohibiting the 
transfer of nuclear materials and technology to states not party to the NPT. Furthermore, the 
IAEA denied South Africa seats in both its Board of Governors and General Conference and 
the NWS unilaterally imposed restrictions on nuclear trade with South Africa.  
This combination of conventional weakness, an increasing external military threat and 
growing political isolation led South Africa in 1977 to pursue a nuclear deterrent as the only 
means of preserving national security, in defiance of nuclear sanctions. The production of HEU 
was achieved at the Y-Plant by 1978.503  The government approved a three-phase plan, 
starting with continued ambiguity over its nuclear capability, followed by a phase combining 
deterrence with diplomacy, consisting in disclosure to selected states such as the US to solicit 
military support in the face of a threat to South African territory. Finally, in the case of denial 
of such support, the government would publicly disclose its nuclear programme accompanied 
by an underground nuclear detonation. In other words, no offensive tactical capability was 
envisaged and the nuclear deterrent was limited to only seven warheads. 
In the 1980s South Africa’s accession to the NPT was contemplated and discussed with the 
US, the UK and the Soviet Union. However, the government at the time concluded that 
substantial political reform was necessary in order to make accession beneficial to South 
Africa. However, several events significantly improved South Africa’s external and internal 
security situation, including Namibian independence, the withdrawal of Cuban forces from 
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Angola, the foreseeable dissolution of the Soviet Union and a beginning process of 
democratisation in South Africa, initiated by the new President de Klerk in 1989. 
These developments were critical to the decision of de Klerk to reverse South Africa’s nuclear 
programme. Shortly after being elected, he requested an expert committee to evaluate the 
costs and benefits of maintaining a nuclear deterrent.504 This committee recommended the 
abandonment of the nuclear deterrent but advised the government to maintain secrecy over 
it until after South Africa’s accession to the NPT. Following this report, de Klerk mandated a 
working group with the establishment of a timetable for disarmament with a view to joining 
the NPT at the earliest possible date. 
The production of HEU was stopped immediately and South Africa’s nuclear programme was 
fully dismantled without any incidents by June 1991. Following its accession to the NPT in July 
and the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in September, an IAEA inspection 
team began to verify the completeness of South Africa’s declared inventory of nuclear 
materials in November 1991. Despite the government’s policy of transparency and openness 
this process took almost two years, given the necessity to verify South Africa’s nuclear 
activities over the previous two decades. In March 1993, President de Klerk revealed South 
Africa’s past nuclear programme to the public in an announcement. Special IAEA verification 
ended with the confirmation of the completeness of South Africa’s declaration by the General 
Conference of the IAEA in September 1993 and was followed by usual safeguards 
verification.505 
A number of observations can be made regarding the factors and motivations which drove 
South Africa’s successful denuclearisation. Different explanations for the decision to reverse 
its nuclear programme have been advanced. A first explanation is based on the realist 
argument that the threat justifying the development of a nuclear deterrent faded with the 
sudden improvement of South Africa’s security environment in the late 1980s.506 According 
to this explanation, the continuation of a nuclear programme was not only illogical, but also 
constituted an obstacle to South Africa’s acceptance within the international community.  
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However, it has been argued that the absence of appropriate delivery systems severely 
restricting the range of South Africa’s NW, as well as its conventional superiority to its direct 
neighbours, indicates that the removal of external threats does not explain the decision to 
disarm.507 The crucial role of threat removal has been further questioned by the drawing of 
parallels to the reluctant denuclearisation of the former Soviet republics Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, which only transferred their NW to Russia under severe pressure from the US 
and Russia despite the disappearance of the security threats related to the Cold War. 
Alternatively, a second explanation is linked to South Africa’s three-phase deterrence 
strategy, which suggests that it only acquired NW for the purpose of coercing Western powers 
into defending it against the Soviet Union and to gain international acceptance, and intended 
to abandon its NW after the end of the Cold War.508 Given that its deterrence strategy never 
moved beyond phase one and accession to the NPT was more likely to lead to international 
acceptance than the continuation of a nuclear deterrent, it decided to denuclearise. This 
argument has also been questioned on the basis that, given the secrecy of the nuclear 
programme at the time, it might have been sufficient to end the apartheid regime to achieve 
the lifting of sanctions and the achievement of international acceptance.  
A final explanation links South Africa’s decision to internal political factors. As the final 
apartheid government under de Klerk had already initiated a democratisation process and 
wanted to ensure continued domestic security, it wished to minimise the future internal 
political uncertainty implied by a future ANC government.509 The benefits stemming from 
reducing political uncertainty outweighed the sovereignty costs implied. Considering this, it 
has been argued that the apartheid regime pursued the dismantlement of its NW and the 
accession to the NPT with the aim of preventing its employment of NW and the reproduction 
of a nuclear capability by a future ANC government by binding it to the NPT. 
While it is difficult to isolate one key justification for South Africa’s decision, a number of 
important factors can be identified, that are useful to consider in future disarmament efforts. 
For example, South Africa’s imminent democratisation made its government open to nuclear 
disarmament, thus suggesting that regime change facilitates such a decision. Indeed, 
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democratic regimes have been considered more likely to forgo NW, suggesting that it is useful 
to concentrate efforts to incite disarmament measures on leaders of governments in 
transition. Furthermore, such a decision can be strengthened by offering assistance to states 
in transition through security assurances and thereby reducing the sovereignty costs implied 
by the abandonment of a nuclear deterrent.  
Furthermore, given that South Africa continued to pursue a nuclear deterrent despite 
international pressure, this case demonstrates that the beneficial effects of profound 
domestic political change in reversing proliferation, outweigh economic or military pressure. 
In fact, international isolation resulting from such pressure reinforced South Africa’s nuclear 
ambitions.510 It can also be argued that pressure emanating from superpowers outside of the 
region of the state that is to be disarmed, is only effective to a certain extent.511 In other 
words, external pressure cannot compensate for ongoing real or perceived regional security 
threats.  
The voluntary nature of South Africa’s decision to denuclearise also played a central role in 
the success of the disarmament process. This demonstrates that while imposed ad hoc 
disarmament as undertaken in Iraq is likely to fail, a unilateral decision to disarm, based on 
higher perceived security benefits in relation to sovereignty costs can lead to sustainable 
nuclear disarmament. 
However, it must be noted that the secrecy of South Africa’s nuclear programme allowed it 
to proceed on its own terms without the pressure of having to report to an international body 
such as the IAEA. Finally, the limited scope and level of technical sophistication of South 
Africa’s nuclear programme facilitated its dismantlement, allowing it to complete this process 
without international institutional support.512 
Despite its success, the South African decision to disarm is unique to its particular situation at 
the time and has not been reproduced since. Consequently, it does not constitute a 
generalisable model of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, its usefulness for clarifying the 
dynamics of the disarmament process itself is limited, as it was already completed at the time 
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of its disclosure. A similar decision by one of the current NWS to give up its NWS status would 
generate pressure for other NWS to follow suit.513 
 
1.3. US-Russian Bilateral Disarmament Framework 
These diverging positions on the necessity to establish a legally-binding multilateral nuclear 
disarmament treaty contradict the idea underlying Article VI NPT which consisted in the 
elaboration of such an instrument as a prerequisite for the practical elimination of NW. 
Although the understanding persists among the majority of NPT States Parties that ‘the final 
phase of the nuclear disarmament process (…) should be pursued within an agreed legal 
framework’,514 States Parties have failed to enter this final phase through the negotiation and 
conclusion of a nuclear disarmament instrument.  
In the absence of a multilateral disarmament framework during the Cold War, disarmament 
measures were promoted through bilateral arms control measures and pursued as an 
auxiliary objective to non-proliferation. The US and the Soviet Union addressed the need for 
the reduction of their vast strategic nuclear forces on a bilateral level starting with the 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) in 1969. As prospects for multilateral negotiations 
under the NPT faded with time, this bilateral disarmament framework was further developed, 
extended and renewed.  
In total, the US and the Soviet Union/ Russia have adopted a total of eight treaties imposing 
limitations on the use of NW and reducing the number of warheads. Today, US-Soviet and US-
Russian disarmament measures account for the vast majority of NW reductions to date. The 
US nuclear arsenal has been continuously reduced since its peak at 31,225 warheads in 1967 
to a total inventory of approximately 7,000 warheads in 2016.515 While the Soviet/Russian 
arsenal was reduced from 45,000 warheads at its peak in 1988 to 7,300 warheads in 2016.516 
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Given the development over several decades of legal provisions and technical aspects 
including verification and enforcement mechanisms within this bilateral framework, it can be 
argued that ‘the road ahead for [a future multilateral disarmament] treaty will be influenced 
greatly by the road behind’.517 In other words, it is to be expected that this bilateral 
foundation will be used as a template for a multilateral nuclear disarmament regime. For this 
reason, it is useful to examine the development of this framework and its principal 
characteristics. 
Bilateral negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union began to intensify shortly after 
the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, scared leaders attempted to counter the ongoing arms race 
with a prohibition on nuclear testing. However, as the issue of verification stood in the way 
of agreement on a comprehensive test ban, a provisional solution was favoured: the 1963 
Partial Test Ban Treaty. It did not provide for verification by on-site inspection which therefore 
relied exclusively on NTM.518 
The search for internationally verifiable measures continued while verification of US-Soviet 
arms control relied on NTM, given that OSI had been a constant obstacle in bilateral 
negotiations. The objective of the negotiations was to determine verification methods that 
were sufficiently effective without being unacceptably intrusive.519 The result of this progress 
was ‘the emergence of a multitude of verification mechanisms varying in intrusiveness as one 
moved from the bilateral to the multilateral spheres.’520 
The first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) started in 1969. They produced the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 1973, from which the US withdrew in 2002. Its follow-on 
SALT II, limiting ICBM and SLBM, was signed in 1979 but was abandoned when the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan. 
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was signed in December 1987 and 
entered into force in 1988, imposing the verifiable elimination of all ground-launched ballistic 
and cruise missiles.521 Its unprecedented intrusive verification system laid the ground work 
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for verification of the subsequent START. In 1989, intrusive OSI were eventually agreed upon 
by both sides. This was a breakthrough which enabled a rapid progress in relations between 
the US and the Soviet Union. Measures of mutual OSI were added to the verification 
techniques available for both sides.  
The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed in 1991. START I was the first 
treaty to impose deep cuts in strategic NW stockpiles, by limiting the number of deployed 
strategic NW to 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles and proscribed the destruction 
of excess delivery vehicles. An intrusive verification system, based on OSI, data exchange 
(telemetry) and NTM (satellite imagery) was implemented to verify reductions ensured the 
predictability and stability of the strategic balance and provided a framework for further 
reductions. While reduction activities soon exceeded imposed limits, verification and 
transparency provisions maintained in place until the end of the treaty. START I was 
considered too complicated and expensive to continue and efforts were undertaken to 
replace it with a new treaty. START II was signed but abandoned as Russia withdrew from it 
in response to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. 
In 2010, the START process was revived. New START was signed between the US and Russia 
in 2010 and entered into force in February 2011. Although it fails to address missile defence, 
it limited US-Russian arsenals to 1,550 warheads and 700 strategic delivery systems. These 
treaty limits will take effect seven years after its entry into force and will be in effect for ten 
years. Its verification regime was further developed from that of START I.522   
Today, this bilateral framework is under strain, as the deterioration of US-Russian relations 
resulting from the Ukraine crisis has made a constructive dialogue difficult. As a consequence, 
the bilateral sphere no longer appears to be a reliable forum for nuclear disarmament. 
Bilateral reductions must therefore be replaced with effective negotiations on a multilateral 
disarmament agreement, using key elements from bilateral framework such as verification 
measures.  
Moreover, the construction of an effective bilateral framework for NW reductions can be 
attributed to similarities in the composition of US-Russian nuclear forces making their 
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arsenals a class of their own. Consequently, the alignment of warhead numbers across NWS 
must be pursued part of efforts to establish a multilateral disarmament regime.523 For this 
reason, bilateral reductions must remain in place. As the largest NW possessor states, the US 
and Russia remain key actors in NW activities, influencing not only the nuclear policies of 
other NWS but the dynamics of nuclear disarmament in general. Given their power to slow 
down, accelerate or block the disarmament process, they possess a particular responsibility 
for leadership in multilateral nuclear disarmament.524  
 
2. The Legal Nuclear Disarmament Regime 
2.1. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – Article VI 
The NPT is often referred to as the ‘cornerstone’ of the nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament regime and remains the only multilateral instrument establishing legally-
binding obligations related to nuclear disarmament to date.525 The NPT’s quasi-universality 
reflects the long-standing global consensus on the need to regulate, and eventually eliminate, 
NW. Yet, it is the only weapons-related treaty dividing its membership into two classes, on 
the one hand imposing a detailed and comprehensive non-proliferation regime on NNWS, 
while establishing Article VI as a relatively vague stand-alone obligation for NWS on the 
other.526 
Over 45 years since its adoption, the exemption of NWS from the legal prohibition of NW 
possession persists, despite reaffirmations that the NPT only constituted a first step towards 
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disarmament and was not intended to be a license for the indefinite possession of NW.527 
Against this background, the scope and compulsoriness of the legal obligation embodied in 
Article VI will be determined, in order to define the standard of duty against which the 
performance of States Parties will be measured. In other words, this section will assess the 
internal effectiveness of the nuclear disarmament provision. Article VI reads as follows: 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”528 
Article VI requires States Parties to achieve the three goals listed, namely the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date, nuclear disarmament and a treaty on GCD, through good 
faith negotiations. However, controversy endures regarding the exact content of the 
obligation ‘to pursue negotiations on effective measures (…) relating to nuclear 
disarmament’. Indeed, interpretations of this obligation put forward by NWS and NNWS vary, 
reaching from an attempt to extrapolate the maximum value from it by requiring effective 
nuclear disarmament, to an interpretation watering down the text to the point where 
obligations become reduced to mere ‘goals.’529  
The VCLT provisions on the interpretation of the legal obligation in Article VI underlie this 
analysis.530 For instance, the drafting history of Article VI and the circumstances of the NPT’s 
conclusion offer important insights into the different interests put forward during the 
elaboration of the text. Moreover, ‘subsequent agreements’ between states such as NPT 
RevCon Final Outcome Documents will reflect a consensus on the interpretation of the text.531  
                                                          
527 Statement by Jayantha Dhanapala, the President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, 
(NPT/CONF.1995/PV.19), 13 May 1995: ‘permanence of the treaty does not represent a permanence of 
unbalanced obligations, nor does it represent the permanence of nuclear apartheid between nuclear haves and 
have nots.’; UN  Secretary-General  U  Thant,  Official  Records  of the  UNGA,  Twenty-First  Session,  supplement 
1A/201/Add.1. 
528 Randy Rydell, ‘Turning the Page on Pax Atomica’, Arms Control Today, October 2015, 33. 
529 Daniel Joyner, (fn 38) 70. 
530 NPT was concluded prior to the entry into force of the VCLT. However, the rules on treaty interpretation 
(Article 31, 32 VCLT) are considered customary international law and are thus applicable to the NPT 
531 A supplementary means of interpretation in the sense of Article 32 VCLT; Article 31 (3) (a) VCLT: ‘There shall 
be taken into account, together with the context, any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’;  Daniel Joyner, (fn 38) 411; Burrus Carnahan, 
‘Treaty Review Conferences’, Vol 81 (AJIL, 1987) 226 – 229: document whose substance reflects ‘an agreement 
as to the interpretation of a provision’ 
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The ICJ adopted a finalistic approach in its 1996 advisory opinion, concluding that Article VI 
required states to effectively reach an agreement on disarmament.532 This view is affirmed by 
the Final Outcome Documents of both the 2000 and 2010 RevCons, which speak in favour of 
a positive obligation to achieve, not simply pursue, nuclear disarmament.533 Furthermore, the 
1965 UNGA resolution 2028 (XX) appears to reflect the intention of drafters to create a treaty 
on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament leading towards GCD.534  
Inversely, NWS tend to dilute the obligatory character of disarmament negotiations, in some 
cases reducing the obligation under Article VI to a ‘good faith effort in pursuit of disarmament 
negotiations.’535  In addition to this exclusion of actual negotiations from the scope of the 
obligation, NWS marginalise the disarmament pillar of the NPT by placing excessive emphasis 
on non-proliferation issues.536 This practice is in line with the absence of references to nuclear 
disarmament in the early drafts of the NPT proposed by both the US and the Soviet Union.537 
A third, intermediate, construal of Article VI challenges the two-fold obligation suggested by 
the ICJ, while upholding the view that Article VI calls for the pursuit of good faith 
negotiations.538 Indeed, it can be argued that during negotiations, the US and the Soviet Union 
only accepted to undertake negotiations but not to achieve a disarmament agreement.539 
Moreover, the phrase ‘to pursue negotiations in good faith’ was originally proposed by 
                                                          
532 Para of advisory opinion which speaks of the obligation to reach an agreement “and bring to a conclusion” 
533 Daniel Joyner, (fn 38) 412-413. 
534 UNGA resolution 2028 (XX) 19 November 1965, see third principle of negotiations of an NPT listed ‘the treaty 
should be a step towards the achievement of GCD and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament’ 
535 Christopher Ford, ‘Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons’ Vol 14 (3) (Nonproliferation Review, 2007) 403, 411: argued that the language drafters chose 
in Article VI, ‘leaves open the possibility that such negotiations may not take place, let alone succeed.’ 
536 Statement by US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, ‘The NPT: 
A Crisis of Non-Compliance’, 3rd Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 
New York, 27 April 2004: ‘We cannot divert attention from the violations [of non-proliferation obligations] we 
face by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist’; Statement by John Duncan, UK Ambassador for 
Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, 2008 NPT PrepCom, 28 April 2008. 
537 Mohammed Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959 – 1979, Vol II 
(Oceana Publications, 1980) 566; Daniel Joyner, (fn 38) 17. 
538 Daniel Joyner, (fn 38) 97: the ICJ opinion might “stretch the meaning of the terms of Article VI”; Lord McNair, 
The Law of Treaties, (Clarendon Press, 1961) 2ed, 27, 29: an ‘obligation assumed by two or more parties to 
negotiate in the future with a view to the conclusion of a treaty’; see also PCIJ, Railway Traffic between Lithuania 
and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 15 October 1931, No. 42 para 29 
539 Mohammed Shaker, (fn 582) 567. 
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Mexico, which later reaffirmed that Article VI did not impose the achievement of an 
outcome.540 Others argue that this would be beyond the power of any individual state.541 
A comparison of Article VI with Article III (4), NPT, which explicitly mentions the obligation of 
NNWS to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and with Article 33, UN Charter, 
which requires states to seek solutions through negotiations, consolidates such an 
interpretation.542 Furthermore, taking into account the context, object and purpose of the 
treaty, it can be argued that Article VI has an aspirational character.543  
The good faith requirement included in Article VI and widely accepted in international law, 
adds a nuance to its interpretation.544 In short, the good faith standard requires a degree of 
openness to concessions on the part of both parties, sustainability in the negotiation process, 
as well as a manifestation of a vision of the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.545 Hence, 
it can be argued the mere process of initiating and conducting negotiations absent the 
intention of reaching an agreement do not fulfil compliance requirements under Article VI.546   
Several further elements require clarification. Firstly, the absence of a timeline for results, 
lamented by NNWS, raises questions regarding the temporal requirements for negotiations 
                                                          
540 See Article 31 (1) VCLT;, Statement delivered by the Delegation of Mexico, Geneva, 2015 Session of the 
Conference on Disarmament, Switzerland, August 17, 2015: 
http://mision.sre.gob.mx/oi/images/stories/pdf/disarmament_17ago.pdf ‘Negotiating is not the same as 
reaching an agreement, and an agreement is not the same as an outcome. We believe that the CD can start 
negotiations, without reaching an agreement immediately. Reaching an agreement is a privilege of a 
negotiation. It is not the negotiation itself.’  
541 Marco Roscini, ‘The Cases against the Nuclear Weapon States’ Vol 19 (10) (ASIL Insights, 2015) 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/10/cases-against-nuclear-weapons-states. 
542 Daniel Joyner, (fn 38) 407. 
543 Article 31 (1) and (2) VCLT; the Preamble of the NPT requires ‘effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament’, Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP, 2008) 186-187: preamble as a source of the object 
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545 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany 
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Award of 16 November 1957, 24 ILR 101, 128 (‘the obligation to negotiate in good faith may be violated by an 
‘unjustified breaking off of the discussions, abnormal delays, disregard of the agreed procedures, systematic 
refusals to take into consideration adverse proposals or interests.’); Government of Kuwait v. American 
Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), Award of 24 March 1982, 66 ILR 519, 578: (‘sustained upkeep of the 
negotiations over a period appropriate to the circumstances, awareness of the interests of the other party, and 
a persevering quest for an acceptable compromise.’); PCIJ, Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, 
Advisory Opinion, 15 October 1931, No. 42 para 29: negotiations must be pursued ‘as far as possible.’; ICJ, 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, para 142; Anthony 
D’Amato, ‘Good Faith’ in Rudolf Bernhardt, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law (eds), Encyclodedia of Public International Law (North-Holland, 1992) 599 – 601. 
546 Daniel Joyner, (fn 38) 407. 
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under Article VI.547 A general reading of the terms of the provision suggest that the sole time 
element included, namely ‘at an early date’, only applies to the cessation of the arms race, 
implying that the nuclear disarmament and GCD goals are less urgent. What could be qualified 
as an ‘abnormal delay’ in the sense of the Lake Lanoux Arbitration, also remains unclear. This 
ambiguity allows NWS to speak of the ‘ultimate elimination of NW’ and postpone negotiations 
indefinitely. 
Second, contrary to the obligation to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith…on treaty on GCD 
under strict and effective international control’, the obligation to negotiate measures on 
nuclear disarmament lacks a clear reference to a treaty, suggesting that the negotiation 
towards a treaty is not necessary. For instance, the Thirteen Practical Steps adopted at the 
2000 RevCon, listed the adoption of the CTBT, FMCT and START II as necessary measures for 
the implementation of Article VI.548 Adopted by consensus, they reflect a ‘subsequent 
agreement’ on the interpretation of Article VI and in particular the term ‘effective 
measures’.549 Consequently, measures to implement the 13 Steps constitute acts of 
compliance with Article VI.550 
 
2.2. The Marshall Islands Lawsuits 
While the NNWS have repeatedly criticised the inaction of the NWS in starting a multilateral 
negotiating process, no effective attempts to enforce this obligation had ever been 
undertaken prior to 2014.551 However, on 24 April of that year, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (RMI), a small Pacific island state, brought nine separate but related lawsuits against 
all NWS at the ICJ, for breach of their legal obligation under Article VI to ‘pursue in food faith 
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament (…)’.552 
                                                          
547 Mohammed Shaker, (fn 581) 575. 
548 NPT Review Conference Final Documents, constitute ‘subsequent agreements’ in the sense of Article 32 VCLT 
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549 Article 31 (3) (a) VCLT: ‘Subsequent agreement between the party’ 
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This unprecedented step came as a surprise to the international community, in particular to 
the NWS who are in the midst of undertaking or planning the modernisation of their nuclear 
forces. The de jure NWS had thus far justified the absence of negotiations on the grounds of 
a legal understanding of their Article VI obligation which is favourable to the licit continuation 
of their nuclear programmes.  
The seemingly unlikely adoption of enforcement measures against nuclear powers such as 
the US and Russia also offered the remaining non-NPT NWS a sense of security. In addition, 
they believed that the non-opposability of Article VI to them protected their nuclear 
programmes from external legal measures. In other words, the NWS were unprepared for the 
eventuality of an individual state challenging the legality of their nuclear activities and 
potentially obstructing the established dynamic of inaction within the nuclear disarmament 
context. Indeed, these lawsuits attempted to challenge this status quo while attempting to 
reiterate and clarify existing legal obligations under Article VI. 
This self-imposed responsibility of the RMI to take on the world’s largest military powers in 
an international court, stems from its personal experience with NW. Following US military 
occupation of the Marshall Islands during WWII, the US continued to exercise administrative 
control over the islands, which they soon began to use as a ground to conduct 67 nuclear tests 
between 1947 until 1958. The radioactive fallout from these tests spread across the Islands, 
having serious health implications for the islanders, including birth anomalies and illnesses, 
sometimes forcing people to leave the Islands.553  
The US and the Marshall Islands concluded an agreement in 1986, which made their 
sovereignty in internal and foreign affairs conditional on the acceptance of the continued 
military authority of the US over the islands.554 The desire of the Marshall Islands to gain 
independence was exploited by the US for the purpose of securing the continued operation 
of test sites on the islands. Although the RMI gained full independence in 1990, the agreement 
excluded all responsibility of the US for the future or past effects of its nuclear testing 
programme. 
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554 Compact of Free Association, Agreement between the United States of America and the Marshall Islands, 30 
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For years, the RMI pursued compensation for the damage suffered from the nuclear tests but 
all attempts were rejected in US courts on procedural grounds (statutes of limitation).555 
Eventually, the RMI ran out of judicial avenues and the necessary funds to further pursue 
monetary compensation. The realisation that the US was going to escape any responsibility 
for the wrongdoing the Marshallese population had suffered, the government of the RMI 
decided to address the dangers posed by the continued existence of NW in a larger forum. 
Despite its personal agenda, the RMI asserted that its legal action against the NWS at the ICJ 
was driven by its frustration about the violation by NWS of their international obligations.  
On 24 April 2014, the RMI deposited nine Applications in the ICJ to hold the NWS accountable 
for violations of international law. The legal basis of the RMI’s claim was the obligation under 
Article VI NPT to negotiate in good faith on effective measures and for those who are not 
States Parties to the treaty, to abide by their corresponding obligations under customary 
international law.  
The lawsuits neither sought monetary compensation nor intended to re-open question of 
legality, but rather seek on the one hand, to obtain the legal qualification of the inaction of 
NWS with regard to their Article VI- and corresponding customary obligations, and on the 
other hand, compliance by NWS with this obligation.556 For this purpose, the RMI requested 
declaratory and injunctive relief by asking the ICJ to make a judgment of breach and to order 
the states in question to take all necessary measures to comply with their legal obligations 
within one year. 
Given that only the UK, India and Pakistan consented to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
under Article 36 (2) of the ICJ’s Statute,557 the remaining six cases against China, France, Israel, 
North Korea and the US could not be heard by the ICJ.558  
In 1996, the ICJ addressed nuclear weapons for the first time in its advisory opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The UNGA had first raised this matter in 
1961. Following more than three decades, it requested the ICJ to render an advisory opinion 
                                                          
555 Zohl De Ishtar, (fn 63) 300 – 301. 
556 RMI Application instituting proceedings against the UK, 24 April 2014, 3, para 2. 
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on this question in 1994.  In this opinion, it only offered an incomplete answer, leaving open 
the question of their legality under ‘extreme circumstances of self-defence’.  
Admitting the dangers of such ambiguity ‘with regard to the legal status of weapons as deadly 
as NW’ for the stability of the international legal, it considered ‘long-promised nuclear 
disarmament’ as the most appropriate remedy to this legal uncertainty. In this sense, the 
lawsuits presented the Court with an important opportunity to clarify several key legal issues 
related to the scope of the obligations under Article VI which remained open since its 1996 
advisory opinion. 
The first legal question to be addressed by the Court was whether a customary obligation 
existed corresponding to the obligation contained in Article VI NPT. The RMI contended that 
‘the obligations enshrined in Article VI of the NPT are not merely treaty obligations; they also 
exist separately under customary international law’ which extends their personal scope to 
states which formally remain outside of the NPT regime.559 This was crucial as the existence 
of a legal obligation for India and Pakistan hinged on the bindingness of the obligation 
contained in Article VI on states not parties to the NPT. 
Secondly, in its Applications, the RMI qualified the obligation to negotiate under Article VI as 
a two-fold obligation to adopt a certain conduct and to achieve a precise result, namely 
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Regarding this point, the Court would have had an 
opportunity to clarify the exact scope of the obligation to negotiate under Article VI, as an 
obligation of conduct or result, which continues to remain controversial.560  
The third legal issue concerned the breach of the good faith obligation contained in Article VI 
alleged by the RMI. Had the Court found that the Respondents were, in fact, under no 
obligation to conclude negotiations, it would still have had to assess with ‘utmost rigour’ 
whether their conduct leading up to and during negotiations was coherent with the good faith 
obligation in Article VI.561 In the context of Article VI, the good faith conduct requires NWS 
not to ‘betray the legitimate trust NNWS have invested in hopes that the promised 
                                                          
559 Application RMI against India, 24 April 2014, para 41 and Application RMI against Pakistan, 24 April 2014, 
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negotiations would lead swiftly to an agreement’562 by failing to undertake genuine efforts to 
bring about negotiations or engaging in conduct which risks hindering the achievement of this 
goal.563  
‘The UK's maintenance and qualitative improvement of nuclear forces 
presenting all the threats outlined above, taking place at the same time as 
the UK is failing to live up to its central obligation to pursue in good faith and 
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament.’564 
Thus far, NWS have attempted to demonstrate their good faith performance of Article VI 
obligations and their general commitment to nuclear disarmament by referring to the 
numerical reductions of their arsenals.565 However, the RMI cases intended to challenge this 
narrow focus on the size of stockpiles by arguing that the parallel diversification 
modernisation, upgrade and like-for-like renewal of their nuclear programmes is 
incompatible with their good faith requirement under Article VI.566 
The fourth legal issue, which was raised by India in the context of its preliminary objections, 
was the justification for the continuation of NW programmes on the grounds of self-defence 
in the sense of Article 51 UN Charter. 567 The ICJ would have had to examine whether the 
current regional security environment in South Asia creates such an ‘extreme situation of self-
defence’ which could preclude the unlawfulness of both the continuation and upgrade of its 
NW programme and the continuation of the nuclear arms race.568 In addition, it would have 
had to prove that the maintenance of its NW programme constitutes an act of self-defence 
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vis-à-vis a particular attacking state.569 A re-examination by the Court of the issue of self-
defence would have clarified uncertainties regarding the threat or use of NW in ‘extreme 
situations of self-defence’ more generally. Such a clarification may have reduced 
opportunities for NWS to justify the maintenance of their nuclear forces on these grounds.570 
However, the cases did not reach the merits stage at which these issues would have been 
addressed. Following the submission of the RMI’s memorial on 16 March 2015, the UK raised 
five preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the case, 
which led to the suspension of the proceedings on the merits of the case.571 On 16 September 
2015 and 1 December 2015 respectively, India and Pakistan made similar preliminary 
objections to those raised by the UK.572  
Ob 5 October 2016, the Court upheld the first objection to jurisdiction on the grounds of the 
absence of a dispute between the Parties and found that, lacking jurisdiction, it could not 
proceed on the merits of the case. The court recalled that  
‘in order for a dispute to exist, the two sides must hold clearly opposite views 
concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain 
international obligations. It states that a dispute exists when the evidence 
demonstrates that the respondent was aware, or could not have been unaware, that 
its views were positively opposed by the applicant.’573 
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The Court dismissed the Court’s assertion that the RMI’s statements in multilateral fora were 
evidence of a dispute between it and the UK. It noted that they could not be interpreted as 
allegations that the UK in particular was in breach of its legal obligations and that 
consequently, the UK could not have been aware that the RMI was making such an allegation 
against it.574 
 
2.3. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
Similar to the RMI’s frustration with the status quo in nuclear disarmament, a sentiment of 
discontent has also become noticeable within the wider international community. Until 2017, 
the legal environment regulating the use and possession of NW on a global level remained 
fragmented and was made up of only partial instruments centring on the controversial Article 
VI. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the 
ICJ admitted the dangers for the stability of the international legal order of ambiguity ‘with 
regard to the legal status of weapons as deadly as NW.’575 It considered ‘long-promised 
nuclear disarmament’ as the most appropriate remedy to this legal uncertainty.576 This 
growing understanding that the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons required the 
further development of international law, led NNWS to take more active steps towards 
concrete disarmament measures. 
A first development was highlighted by the Humanitarian Initiative, which consisted in a series 
of three international conferences convened to address the humanitarian impacts of nuclear 
weapons. The initiative, a rhetorical way of reinstating Article VI, had a significant impact by 
reviving the multilateral diplomatic debate surrounding nuclear disarmament. It underscored 
the need to codify a prohibition on the use and possession of NW, claiming that the inherent 
incompatibility of NW with IHL makes their abolition imperative. The Humanitarian Pledge 
promoted a treaty to outlaw nuclear weapons by seeking ‘to identify and pursue effective 
measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.’577 
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This initiative gave fresh impetus to developments in the UNGA. In its resolution 70/33, the 
UNGA convened an open-ended working group on taking forward multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear 
weapons.578 The OEWG concluded that ‘concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions 
and norms will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear 
weapons.’579 The Group recommended the convening of a conference to negotiate a legally 
binding treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons.580 The UNGA followed this recommendation and 
convened a ‘United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit 
Nuclear Weapons, Leading to their Total Elimination’ in resolution 71/258 of 23 December 
2016. 
Official records show that 135 states participated in negotiations.581  On 7 July 2017, the Treaty 
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted in the UNGA by 122 votes in favour of 
the treaty, one vote against (Netherlands) and one abstention (Singapore).582 This vote 
successfully concluded the negotiations and the Treaty was opened for signature on 20 
September 2017 and enter into force 90 days following the 50th ratification. In 2017, ICAN 
received the Nobel Peace Prize ‘(…) for its ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based 
prohibition of [nuclear] weapons’ which ‘have not yet been made the object of a similar 
international legal prohibition’ as biological and chemical weapons.583  
Indeed, it is the first legal instrument aiming to universally outlaw nuclear weapons.584 In 
contrast to the NPT, the TPNW categorically prohibits any possession of nuclear weapons. It 
establishes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear weapon 
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activities including the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, 
use or threat to use nuclear weapons.585  
Furthermore, the treaty prohibits the transfer and deployment to and stationing in the 
territory of any State Party or place under its jurisdiction or control.586 This signifies that NNWS 
are no longer authorised to accommodate nuclear weapons on their territories. This is 
important in particular given the tactical nuclear weapons the US continues to deploy in 
European NNWS.587 TPNW States Parties will no longer be authorised to receive US nuclear 
weapons following the entry into force of the Ban Treaty. 
 
The Effectiveness of the Ban Treaty 
All nine de facto NWS remained absent from all stages in the negotiation and adoption 
process of the Ban Treaty. The NWS put forward different arguments for their non-
participation in negotiations, including concerns regarding hold-out states such as North 
Korea, security considerations and the ineffectiveness of the treaty. US Ambassador to the 
UN, Nikki Haley asserted that 
‘[t]here is nothing I want more for my family than a world with no nuclear weapons. 
But we have to be realistic. Is there anyone that believes that North Korea would agree 
to a ban on nuclear weapons? (…) In this day and time, we can’t honestly say that we 
can protect our people by allowing the bad actors to have [nuclear weapons] and those 
of us that are good, trying to keep peace and safety, not to have them.’588 
The British Ambassador to the UN, Matthew Rycroft justified the United Kingdom’s absence 
from negotiations by questioning the ability of the treaty to lead to nuclear disarmament. He 
explained that ‘the UK is not attending the negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear 
weapons because we do not believe that those negotiations will lead to effective progress on 
global nuclear disarmament.’589 The French Ambassador Alexis Lamek stated that ‘[i]n the 
current perilous context, considering in particular the proliferation of weapons of mass 
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destruction and their means of delivery, our countries continue to rely on nuclear deterrence 
for security and stability.’590 
In 2016, the US published a non-paper which it submitted to its NATO allies. Emphasising 
NATO policy on security and deterrence, as well as the ‘proven step-by-step approach to 
nuclear disarmament', it urged its allies to ‘vote “no” on any vote in the UN First Committee 
on starting negotiations for a nuclear ban treaty.’591 On the day of the conclusion of the TPNW, 
the US, UK and France issued a joined statement which emphasised their continued 
commitment to the NPT and reflected the US stance in its NATO paper. It declared that they  
‘do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it [and that] a purported ban 
on nuclear weapons that does not address the security concerns that continue to 
make nuclear deterrence necessary cannot result in the elimination of a single 
nuclear weapon and will not enhance any country’s security.’592 
This definite non-participation of the NWS and their vigorous rejection of the treaty appears 
to stand in contradiction to their ‘continued to commitment to the NPT.’ Given that nuclear 
disarmament is the ultimate objective of Article VI NPT, the joint declaration to not ‘ever 
become party’ to the TPNW may be interpreted as the absence of a genuine intention to 
pursue nuclear disarmament.  
The four de facto NWS, namely India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, also remained absent 
from negotiations on the TPNW. At the General Debate of the UNGA First Committee, India 
insisted that the TPNW does not create any legal obligations for it, but expressed its 
willingness to work with TPNW signatories in disarmament forums to ‘prohibit their use under 
any circumstance and to eliminate them globally under international verification.’593 Pakistan, 
without explicitly naming the TPNW, insisted that solutions to the ‘impasse of the 
disarmament machinery’ must be pursued in established forums with ‘the participation of all 
                                                          
590 Ibid. 
591 US Mission to NATO, ‘Defence Impacts of Potential United Nations General Assembly Nuclear Weapons Ban 
Treaty’, US Non-Paper submitted to the NATO North Atlantic Council Committee on Proliferation, (Washington 
DC, 17 October 2016), NATO Unclassified, Annex 1 AC/333-N(2016)0029 (INV). 
592 United States, United Kingdom and France, Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to 
the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France following the Adoption of a Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017. 
593 India, Statement by Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill, Permanent Representative of India to the CD at the 
General Debate of the First Committee, 72nd Session, UNGA, 9 October 2017. 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com17/statements/9Oct_  
India.pdf  accessed 12 December 2018). 
156 
 
stakeholders.’594 Israel criticised the treaty’s failure to ‘give due regard to the security and 
stability context’ which may cause it to ‘hinder rather than reinforce disarmament processes 
as well as global and regional security.’595 North Korea was the only out of the four to express 
its support of negotiations on the TPNW.596 
Besides raising new questions regarding the compliance of the de jure NWS with their good 
faith obligation in Article VI, their stance raises questions regarding the TPNW’s future 
adequacy in serving as a legal framework for actual elimination efforts. In other words, can a 
nuclear disarmament treaty can ever be effective without the participation of the states 
possessing the arms which it aims to outlaw? How much can the treaty achieve in practice 
without their participation? 
In his Factual Summary, the Chair of the 2018 PrepCom presented the different views that 
were expressed in the PrepCom in favour and against the TPNW.597 He noted that some 
proponents of the TPNW considered it as ‘an effective measure under Article VI of the NPT 
by creating a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons.’598 It was also described as a 
measure further strengthening the NPT, to which it was complementary.599 Other states 
expressed their opposition to the treaty, asserting that the TPNW ‘would not contribute to 
the reduction or limitation of nuclear weapons’ and  ‘could create an alternative and contrary 
standard to the NPT.’ 600 
Proponents of the treaty may assert that, rather than having been a futile effort, the adoption 
of the Nuclear Ban Treaty was a logical next step for the NNWS. Not simply because forgoing 
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the participation of the NWS made it achievable, but because it generated normative pressure 
by the NNWS against the NWS, which Ritchie and Egeland call “productive power.”601 Indeed, 
the existence of clear and legally binding norms banning nuclear weapons is very likely to 
contribute to the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons as military tools and thereby reduce 
the likelihood of their use, which are important steps on the path to their elimination.602 As 
Rebecca Johnson of ACRONYM argues, 
“[i]nternational law won’t uninvent the weapon but will contribute to accelerating its 
marginalisation as an instrument of policy or defence. [It] will change ... the calculus of 
political and military decision-making about acquiring, replacing, keeping, modernising 
nuclear weapons [and] give the world better tools to prevent the rogues or extremists 
at the margins from ever getting hold of these weapons of mass destruction.”603 
Ramesh Thakur explains that although the TPNW may not develop immediate effects for 
nuclear disarmament, it is intended as a tool to ‘reshape the global normative milieu (…) 
lessen their attractiveness and change the incentive structures for states that possess them 
and others that rely on extended nuclear deterrence.’ 604 
The TPNW also constitutes a significant and necessary contribution to the development of 
the international law governing WMD disarmament in that it puts nuclear weapons on the 
same footing as chemical and biological weapons, which have been outlawed by 
comprehensive disarmament treaties for decades. However, unlike the comprehensive 
disarmament regimes of the CWC and BWC, the Ban Treaty was not intended as a detailed 
legal regime containing all sophisticated technical mechanisms required for elimination 
measures.  
Rather, it is intended to serve as a normative core around which the technical aspects of the 
TPNW regime will be constructed through additional negotiations. For instance, the question 
of verification will be crucial with regards to Article 4 which allows States still possessing 
nuclear weapons to join the treaty under the condition that it adheres to ‘a legally binding, 
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time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-
weapon programme.’605 Hence the capacity and effectiveness of the ‘competent international 
authority to (…) verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons programmes’ will be 
decisive for the further development and strengthening of the TPNW regime.606 
The treaty will also need to gain sufficiently wide adherence in order to develop its effects on 
a large enough scale. Borrie, Caughley, Ritchie and Wan argue that 
‘the legitimacy of the TPNW’s norms and the value of the treaty as an effective 
measure for nuclear disarmament will need cementing through the translation of the 
122 “yes” votes in favour of the treaty into signatories and ratifications up to (…) the 
50 States requires for entry into force. Only then will the TPNW begin to take on 
wider “authority” in global nuclear politics.’607 
Little doubt remains regarding the ability and likelihood of the TPNW influencing the 
discourse surrounding nuclear weapons going forward. The continuous inclusion of the TPNW 
into debates surrounding the NPT, the further exploration of its relationship with Article VI 
and its acknowledgement in NPT Review Conference Final Documents will confer it the 
political and legal authority it requires to gradually develop real influence on the NWS and 
their allies.608 
In conclusion, while the TPNW’s evolution, in particular in terms of adherence, verification 
and institutionalisation, will have to be monitored over the coming years the potential it 
carries for the elimination is significant. For the first time, it makes of nuclear disarmament a 
possible reality of the not too distant future. It has raised debates surrounding nuclear 
disarmament from the usual sphere of legal controversies on Article VI to a level where 
concrete legal obligations will impose concrete measures for the elimination of nuclear 
weapons. 
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1.4. The Trump Presidency and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
Following from the discussion of efforts undertaken by the NNWS to create conditions 
conducive to nuclear disarmament, it is useful to also examine the current geo-political 
atmosphere surrounding nuclear issues, and in particular multilateral measures to enforce 
nuclear norms and US leadership. Although it relates to nuclear non-proliferation rather than 
disarmament obligations, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Deal) concluded in July 
2015 between the Islamic Republic of Iran, the P5 +1 (Germany) and the European Union, is 
a useful for highlighting two important facets of the nuclear disarmament regime.  
First, it demonstrates how a state in breach with its obligations under the NPT may be brought 
back into compliance through both diplomatic means and sanctions. In particular, it is a useful 
opportunity to discuss the role of the UNSC in policing the NPT regime and enforcing nuclear 
related norms. Secondly, it highlights the vulnerability of agreements dealing with nuclear 
weapons to sudden changes in their membership and their strong need for continuous 
leadership. 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Deal) was adopted following over two years of 
negotiations. The landmark agreement was created to reduce the proliferation risks 
associated with Iran’s nuclear programme and to assure the international community of the 
its peaceful nature. In exchange for its commitment to ‘under no circumstances (…) seek, 
develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,’ Iran was to be relieved of international nuclear-
related economic sanctions.609  
The JCPOA’s central objective is to contribute to regional and international peace and security 
by increasing the period it would take Iran to create a nuclear bomb from around three 
months to one year. This is achieved through increased transparency and verification 
activities carried out by the IAEA. On 16 January 2016, following IAEA certification of Iran’s 
compliance with the terms of the JCPOA, the implementation of the deal began and all 
nuclear-related EU, US and UN sanctions on Iran were lifted.  
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On 20 July 2015 the UNSC endorsed the JCPOA in its unanimously adopted resolution 2231 
(2015). In this resolution, the UNSC expressed its support for the political and diplomatic 
efforts in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Called the JCPOA a 
comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.610 Resolution 2231 
(2015) provides for the termination of previous UNSC resolutions imposing economic 
sanctions which may be re-instated in the event of a violation by Iran of its obligations under 
the JCPOA.611 
Resolution 2231 (2015) provides for the Security Council to undertake directly tasks related 
to the implementation of the resolution, particularly with respect to the specific restrictions 
established in its Annex B. For example, paragraph 6.10 of the JCPOA Annex IV provides that 
the Joint Commission reports to the UNSC every six months on implementation issues. The 
UNSC is also to  
‘monitor and take action to improve implementation of the resolution, answer 
inquiries from Member States and International Organisations, respond 
appropriately to information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the 
resolution, undertake outreach to promote proper implementation of the resolution, 
review and decide on proposals by States for nuclear, ballistic missile, or arms-related 
transfers to or activities with Iran, and grant exemptions to the restrictions.’612 
Does this strong inclusion of the UNSC in the JCPOA regime imply that it has adopted a special 
role in enforcing nuclear commitments and policing the nuclear regime? The P5 appear to 
attach a strong role to the UNSC in the area of non-proliferation, as they (the five de jure 
NWS) have consistently turned to the UNSC for assistance with nuclear proliferation 
concerns.613 
‘Under pressure from [nuclear proliferators], the P5 can seem as united as they have 
ever been. The relative rapidity with which China and the US were able to agree on 
strengthening UN sanctions against DPRK – and the fact that Beijing enforced these 
quite firmly, badly hurting Pyongyang economically – also suggests that the P5 
remained committed to cooperation on non-proliferation.’614 
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However, this P5 consensus required for effective UNSC action has faded in the past, in 
particular over measures taken in Iraq in 2003, and can neither be consistently relied on 
today. The fundamental differences among the P5 hampering their effective cooperation in 
dealing with chemical weapons in Syria and over the sanction regime imposed on North 
Korea, as well as growing suspicions over their respective modernisation activities have 
weakened this consensus in recent years.  
The JCPOA itself has served as an example of how flawed cooperation among the P5 can 
endanger multilateral non-proliferation efforts and prevent the UNSC from playing a reliable 
and coherent role in policing nuclear agreements. When US President Trump took office in 
January 2017 he had previously consistently called the JCPOA ‘a terrible deal’.615 In January 
2018, he announced that the US would withdraw from the deal and reinstate sanctions in 
May of the same year unless the US Congress and the other parties to the deal successfully 
addressed its ‘disastrous flaws.’616 
President Trump criticised the limitations of the IAEA inspections regime under the treaty for 
not being able to grant inspectors immediate access to all sites, including non-nuclear military 
sites. Secondly, he considered the non-inclusion of measures on Iran’s ballistic missile 
programme into the JCPOA as a critical weakness. The third shortcoming unacceptable to 
President Trump were the sunset provisions in the deal which provide for the expiration of 
restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme.617  
Richard Nephew, a lead sanctions advisor for the US negotiating team from 2013 to 2014, 
considers Trump’s ultimatum to fix the deal disingenuous, as it was clear that US concerns 
about Iran went beyond the deal and Iran was unlikely to agree to one-sided amendments.618 
When, despite efforts on the part of the UK, France and Germany, no solution acceptable to 
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the US could be reached, Trump formally withdrew from the JCPOA. This not only opened 
new questions for the future of the deal but also for the future of US leadership. 
In a collective assessment of the implications of Trump’s withdrawal, the large majority of 
commentators called the deal effective, underlined its highly intrusive inspection regime and 
its ability to roll back Iran’s nuclear programme by a decade, and asserted that to date the 
JCPOA had achieved Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the deal.619 
Graham Allison called the decision to withdraw a ‘bad choice’ giving Iran a ‘way out’ of the 
deal, while Ernest Moniz (lead negotiator of JCPOA) considered it a ‘major strategic mistake’ 
damaging US influence on Iran’s nuclear activities. Harvard Belfer Center senior fellow 
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall described Trump’s decision as a ‘reckless strategic mistake of 
immense consequence [which] handed a gift to hardliners and undermined US credibility as 
a negotiating partner and set back global non-proliferation efforts.’ One commentator, 
however, considered it a ‘much needed move to correct a historically catastrophic policy by 
Obama’ and argued that the deal only ‘pushed the Iran problem further down the road’ 
(Nawad Obaid, Belfer).620 
Iran’s President Rouhani expressed his continued commitment to the deal. He asserted that 
Iran will remain in the deal despite US withdrawal and re-imposition of sanctions, under the 
condition that Iran’s national interest would be protected.621 Indeed, since the lifting of UN, 
EU and US sanctions in 2016, Iran has concluded important commercial deals with European 
companies (in particular oil companies and car and aircraft manufacturers) which are now 
threatened by US sanctions with extraterritorial effect.622 In fact, the commercial benefits for 
Iran under the original JCPOA membership were a decisive element in its cost-benefit 
calculation. For this reason, the most urgent task for the UK, France and Germany is to identify 
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solutions for maintaining economic and trade relations with Iran, while European companies 
have begun to leave Iran.623 
In conclusion, the example of the JCPOA appears to negate a strong and consistent role for 
the UNSC in policing nuclear non-proliferation, and eventually, nuclear disarmament 
commitments. The new low in relations among the P5, caused by the unilateral US 
withdrawal, is likely to disable effective action of the UNSC in the nuclear and other fields 
until the end of Trump’s presidency. In addition to undermining the effective enforcement of 
NPT commitments, it also undermines the authority of international institutions such as the 
IAEA, which play an indispensable role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It 
remains to be seen whether the deal and its parties possess the necessary resilience to 
overcome such an early challenge. 
President Trump’s attitude towards the JCPOA is a reflection on his general abandonment of 
multilateral approaches to dealing with nuclear weapons. The categorical rejection by the 
Trump administration of the TPNW, Trump’s formal six-month notice on 2 February 2019 of 
US withdrawal from the INF treaty,624 as well as the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)625 
may be interpreted as steps to remove multilateral obstacles hampering the free 
management of its nuclear forces. Although the 2018 NPR reflects the continuation of many 
elements from Obama’s 2010 NPR, it warns of the return of “great power competition” 
among the nuclear powers.626 As it does not suggest any strategies on how to deal with this 
renewed rivalry, is possible that Trump’s abandonment of multilateral mechanisms is aimed 
at gaining greater flexibility in its nuclear responses to developments in other nuclear 
states.627 
                                                          
623 Ellen Wald, ’10 Companies Leaving Iran as Trump’s Sanctions Close In’, Forbes, 6 June 2018 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/06/06/10-companies-leaving-iran-as-trumps-sanctions-close-
in/#dbfc41c90ffa (accessed 17 December 2018); Kelsey Davenport, ‘EU Trade Tool Seeks to Save Iran Nuclear 
Deal’, Arms Control Today , March 2019 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/news/eu-trade-tool-seeks-
save-iran-nuclear-deal (accessed 15 March 2019). 
624 White House, ‘President Donald J. Trump to Withdraw the United States from the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty’ Fact Sheet, 1 February 2019; US Office of the Secretary of Defence, ‘Nuclear 
Posture Review, February 2018 https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-
POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed 2 January 2019). 
625 US Office of the Secretary of Defence, ‘Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018 https://media.defense.gov/ 
2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed 2 January 
2019). 
626 Ibid 6. 
627 Oliver Thränert, ‘Präsident Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review’ Vol 2(2) (Sirius, 2018) 160. 
164 
 
3. The Effectiveness of the Nuclear Disarmament Regime 
3.1. Participation and Cooperation  
The establishment of a regime with a view to regulating the behaviour of states in the area of 
nuclear disarmament can be regarded as a common goal, which is best achieved through the 
political participation of all states and a high-level cooperation between them.628 Moreover, 
given the politically charged nature of NW elimination, voluntary participation and 
cooperation must be reinforced by a degree of formalisation and institutionalisation. 
The NPT is the most widely adhered to arms-related agreement. Today, 96% of all 
democracies are party to the NPT and 40% of countries that became democratic after 1950 
ratified it after they transitioned towards democratic rule.629 A number of explanations for 
this quasi-universality of the NPT have been identified, including the lack of a perceived need 
for national NW stockpiles, existing assurances of protection through alliances with NWS, the 
renunciation of NW as a consequence of political or diplomatic pressure, the technological, 
scientific or financial inability to develop NW or the desire to work towards a ban.630 
However, the ability of the NPT regime to advance nuclear disarmament is limited by two 
factors related to participation and cooperation. First, despite the quasi-universality of the 
NPT, key nuclear powers remain outside the treaty. Hold-out states such India, Israel and 
Pakistan became NWS without violating international law and continue to refuse to join the 
treaty. Israel, which has ratified none of the major arms control treaties, argues against a 
global regime like the NPT and in favour of regional solutions and consequently continues to 
condition its participation in nuclear disarmament efforts on the improvement of security in 
the Middle East.631 
The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT in 2003 constituted a recent step away from 
universality. It remains unclear whether the weakness of the NPT is a cause or effect of such 
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withdrawals.632 However, it must be noted that Article X of the treaty sets the requirements 
for withdrawal relatively low, making it simply procedural, and disregards the destabilising 
effects it can have on the operation of the treaty. While maintaining withdrawal from the 
treaty as an option is crucial for states to adhere to it, stricter conditions must be attached to 
withdrawal.  
As adherence to a new treaty by all states would be necessary for any state to implement it. 
This lack of universality undermines the sense of security the NPT offers NNWS, as their 
commitment not to acquire NW is not matched with a legal commitment to disarm by these 
hold-out states. Consequently, adherence by hold-out states to the NPT would be an 
important step, as this would significantly raise the levels of trust among States Parties and 
provide a platform for negotiations. 
However, the exclusiveness of the NPT nuclear club makes hold-out states reluctant to join 
the NPT regime, given that they would be required to join as NNWS. While a future non-
discriminatory treaty would make their adherence more likely, this solution can be ruled out 
for the time being, given the longstanding rejection of the NPT by India, Israel, North Korea 
and Pakistan.633  Consequently, the urgent goal of universality remains a remote prospect. 634   
Furthermore, this divisive structure of the NPT disregards the interdependent nature of 
disarmament obligations. In other words, the obligation of each state to disarm or not to 
possess NW is ‘necessarily dependent on a corresponding performance (…) in return for a 
similar undertaking by others.’635 This reciprocity of obligations, which is imperative for the 
effectiveness of a disarmament regime, is not given in the NPT. 636  
Although it is important to note that all NPT States Parties are under the obligation to 
negotiate,637 it can be argued that NWS have failed to assume the necessary leadership in 
initiating not only negotiations but also a move from security competition to security 
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cooperation, which is indispensable for progress in nuclear disarmament.638 In other words, 
the necessary transformation of relations, both between NWS and NNWS and within these 
parties, has not yet been achieved.639  
For instance, the P5 Process, which includes all five de jure NWS, has been described as one 
of ‘the earliest successful efforts to enhance the type of multilateral transparency, dialogue, 
confidence-building and mutual understanding needed for future progress toward the 
verifiable elimination of NW’640 Yet, this evaluation of the P5 Process offered by the US does 
not reflect the limited cooperation within this grouping in reality. 
First, although all NPT States Parties have the legal obligation to work towards nuclear 
disarmament, the P5 Process fails to acknowledge the different levels of responsibility among 
the P5 in achieving this goal. In fact, it can be argued that their relative strategic powers 
determine the different degrees of leadership required from them.641 However, the 
willingness of the US to use NW for the achievement of strategic goals makes other P5 
reluctant to give up their own NW. 642 
This undermines the purpose of the P5 process as a whole, namely to collectively achieve 
progress on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations.643 This explains why 
debates are restricted to technical obstacles, such as transparency, confidence building and 
verification and negotiations on legal measures are not taking place.644 Indeed, progress made 
by this grouping has been considered ‘extremely underwhelming’.645 The P5 have been 
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accused of using this process merely to ‘limit the damage’ at the RevCons and to preserve the 
faith of NNWS in the NPT bargain, as the cooperation of the latter is necessary for non-
proliferation.646 
Furthermore, the deterioration of US-Russian relations as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis 
has also made constructive dialogue difficult. The presence of US missiles in Europe as part of 
its extended deterrence strategy and resulting Russian threats to employ NW against the 
US.647 In other words, the improvement of US-Russian relations, including an end to their 
deterrent relationship is a pre-condition for the achievement of consensus not only in the P5 
Process but also on a global level. 648 
On the other hand, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), a grouping of eight NNWS grew out of a 
heightened sense of empowerment of middle powers after Cold War. It aims to unify the 
international community by bridging the North-South divide. It also pursues cohesion and 
common action on disarmament. For instance, the NAC was instrumental in the achievement 
of consensus at the 2000 NPT RevCon. Moreover, the NAC has repeatedly emphasised the 
need for a legally-binding nuclear disarmament instrument. In this respect, it has submitted 
a number of resolutions to the UNGA calling for a world free of NW, and has adopted strong 
language on disarmament, such as the phrase ‘unequivocal undertaking to completely 
eliminate NW and immediately begin work’.649 
 
3.2. Compliance 
While concerns regarding the non-compliance of NPT States Parties have been expressed,650 
it is difficult to measure compliance with Article VI, given the absence of guidelines in this 
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respect. Hence, the compliance of States will be assessed against the standard defined in the 
interpretative outline of Article VI provided above. In other words, this section will assess 
whether negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures have been undertaken and whether 
they meet good faith requirements.  
NWS have repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament. In accordance 
with the restrictive interpretation of Article VI presented above, NWS advance their unilateral 
and bilateral reductions in their arsenals as evidence of their compliance with their obligation 
under Article VI.651 In fact, a template shared by NWS at First Committee-, NPT PrepCom and 
RevCon meetings has been identified, consisting in a reiteration of their commitment to 
Article VI obligations, followed by a reference to quantitative reductions as proof of 
compliance.652 
It appears that these statements constitute mere lip service to Article VI, as they fail to reflect 
both an understanding of the obligation and an intention to pursue multilateral efforts to 
advance the goal of nuclear disarmament.653 Indeed, reductions of NW stockpiles have not 
been undertaken under the constraint of international obligations, but rather on a unilateral 
or bilateral basis.654 
It can be argued that the extension of the NPT in 1995 was the result of the failure of States 
Parties to achieve disarmament objectives within the treaty’s original 25 year life span.655 This 
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lack of progress persisted, given that, aside from US-Russian bilateral negotiations on New 
START in 2009 and the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996, no multilateral negotiations on 
disarmament measures have taken place or been initiated since.656 Other steps ahead have 
been agreed but not materialised.657  
Indeed, despite the elaboration of concrete steps ahead, the disarmament debate has 
become increasingly theoretical. The 13 Steps, the only measures agreed by all States Parties, 
have been outright rejected by the US and France and remain almost entirely 
unimplemented. Consequently, regardless of the construal of the obligation under Article VI, 
a breach can be identified, as negotiations have not taken place and the 13 Steps have been 
disregarded. One can go so far as to argue that this unsatisfactory disarmament record 
demonstrates that in 1968, the NWS ‘made disarmament promises that they had no intention 
of honoring.’658  
Mere numerical reductions of arsenals from very high numbers neither have a profound 
strategic impact nor fulfil requirements of Article VI to negotiate toward a legally binding 
agreement.659 Unilateral and U.S.-Russian reductions that have been neither transparent, 
verifiable nor irreversible, 660 have been perceived by many NNWS as nothing more than 
efforts to streamline existing nuclear arsenals, rather than steps towards complete nuclear 
disarmament. 
Additionally, it can be argued that several aspects related to the behaviour of States Parties 
indicate a breach of the good faith requirement included in Article VI. It does not appear that 
efforts undertaken by NWS are aimed at reaching an agreement with NNWS. Their 
unwillingness to move away from traditional paradigm of State security, arguing that the 
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current security setting is not suitable for nuclear disarmament, does not reflect an openness 
to concessions.661  
Moreover, ambiguous allusions by NWS officials to the possible use of NW, against state as 
well as non-state actors, suggest that the vision of a NWFW does not stand at the centre of 
efforts.662 The restrictive legal understanding of Article VI advanced by NWS, as well as the 
prioritisation of the non-proliferation pillar over the disarmament pillar, suggests an intention 
to gain an ‘unfair or unjust advantage’ over NNWS. This not only contravenes the NPT bargain, 
but also exacerbates the pre-existing imbalance in the treaty, which undermines the purpose 
of the treaty. 663 
The time passed since the adoption of the NPT and the repeated postponing of efforts to 
achieve a multilateral disarmament agreement over a period of several decades, may be 
understood as an ‘abnormal delay’ in the sense of the Lac Lanoux arbitration.664 Given that 
the unjustified attachment of conditions to multilateral disarmament, as well as ‘extensive 
delays and fuzzy timelines’ advanced by NWS turns this goal into an ‘aspiration for the 
indefinite future’, the ICJ may qualify such conduct as a continued violation of the good faith 
obligation in Article VI.665 
A more contentious question concerns the compatibility of the NW modernisation, and the 
resulting extension of their lifespan, with the good faith requirement under Article VI. Indeed, 
it has been argued that the reductions which have taken place were reductions in 
redundancy, as they only concerned outdated warheads. At the same time, remaining 
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warheads are being brought to higher standards in precision and yield.666 This suggests that 
NWS not only continue to plan for their eventual use but also seek permanent possession of 
NW, which is contrary to the object and purpose of the NPT.667 This constitutes a violation of 
the good faith requirement, which obligates States Parties to refrain from any behaviour 
prolonging the achievement of a NWFW.  
A further question to be addressed by the ICJ in the Marshall Islands lawsuit is whether this 
non-compliance constitutes only a treaty breach or keeps Article VI from becoming CIL.668 
 
3.3. Institutional Capacity for Nuclear Disarmament 
Since the first suggestion to institutionalise the elimination of NW in the Baruch Plan, efforts 
have been made to establish fora for states to find a common ground, adopt a collective 
approach to security and work together on tasks, such as verification and enforcement 
measures. Multilateral institutions are needed, given that sustainable nuclear disarmament 
can neither be negotiated nor achieved on an individual basis. While such fora exist within 
the UN disarmament machinery, no standing secretariat exists, tasked with overseeing the 
implementation of Article VI obligations and progress in stockpile reductions. 
The lack of a standing secretariat severely limits the NPT’s ability to compel states to initiate 
negotiations and makes the NPT the weakest among the WMD treaties with regard to 
implementation. The IAEA Board of Governors, the policy-making body of the IAEA, does not 
replace such a Secretariat. Currently, there are two ways of dealing with nuclear 
disarmament, the NPT review process and the (Conference on Disarmament) CD, which both 
deal with it within their competences.669 
The NPT RevCon is the only formalised forum in which the implementation of existing legal 
obligations is discussed periodically. However, the review process is unable to offer an 
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effective substitute for an institutionalised body, as the NPT does not provide for 
consultations or special meetings of States Parties to consider cases on non-compliance or to 
assist them in the implementation in the period between RevCons. Moreover, it operates 
under consensus, which has led to conclusion of a number of review cycles without the 
achievement of consensus or any substantial results, including the 2015 NPT RevCon. In other 
words, little effective progress on disarmament has been achieved within the review process 
thus far.  
The CD in Geneva constitutes the only permanent multilateral forum for the negotiation of 
disarmament treaties. This 65-member negotiating body was established as an essential 
element in the UN disarmament machinery in 1979. Its non-inclusive nature has been 
criticised, as over two thirds of the UN membership are not represented in the CD and it has 
not been enlarged since 1999. This creates problems regarding the necessary participation of 
all states, as discussed above. 
In addition, it has suffered from an ongoing stalemate for over two decades, not only failing 
to conclude negotiations since the CTBT in 1996, but also to establish a programme of work. 
This stagnation in negotiations can be, in part, attributed to the paralysing consensus 
approach of the CD, a practice which is a remainder from the Cold War.670 In other words, 
every member state possesses a veto to block negotiations, which explains why the CD has 
been unable to commence negotiations on an FMCT.671 
As a consequence of this stumbling block, a recent trend of establishing informal discussion 
forums for nuclear disarmament has emerged. For example, the re-establishment of an Open-
Ended Working Group (OEWG) has been debated. An OEWG was previously established by 
the UNGA in 2012 to circumvent the stalemate in the CD. A follow-up was recommended in 
the 2015 NPT RevCon Final Document as a way to advance multilateral negotiations,672 but 
has been met with rejection by key NWS. Some argue that it does not fit into the NPT 
framework, as it would focus on nuclear disarmament only, contrary to the 2010 NPT action 
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plan, which covered all three pillars equally.673 Some NNWS dismissed it as a ‘simulation that 
the [CD] is working’674 and as an extension for the problems in the NPT. 
The UN disarmament machinery remains deeply divided on fundamental questions 
concerning nuclear disarmament, not only as a consequence of the different levels of 
importance governments attach to nuclear disarmament.675 Furthermore, some NWS misuse 
the UN disarmament institutions as arms control rather than disarmament fora.676  
 
3.4. Verification 
Verification is crucial throughout all stages of the disarmament process. First, verification 
mechanisms increase the willingness of NWS to consider the reduction of their NW stockpiles 
and facilitate negotiations, as they offer a certain degree of certainty that NNWS do not 
acquire NW in parallel. On the other hand, a staged elimination process requires intrusive 
inspections.  
Given that the numerical decrease of NW stockpiles is accompanied by the simultaneous 
increase in the significance of individual NW, thus raising suspicions regarding the retention 
of individual warheads by some NWS. Hence, challenges for the verification of disarmament 
at very low warhead numbers must be anticipated. In other words, verification mechanisms 
capable of detecting individual warheads must be in place in order for NWS to be willing to 
reduce their stockpiles to only several hundred warheads.677 
Finally, they are indispensable to provide a sufficient level of certainty to NNWS that fissile 
materials are irreversibly eliminated, but also to allow the adoption of enforcement measures 
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in the case of non-compliance. Verification will remain important even after the full 
elimination of NW, as a NWFW will unlikely be a ‘utopia in which governments will never feel 
tempted to cheat on their global obligations.’678 
Although the NPT has significantly enhanced nuclear transparency, the disarmament pillar of 
the NPT is not verifiable. While Articles III.4, NPT and Article III.5 IAEA Statue provide for the 
verification of non-proliferation obligations, there is no multilateral verification system for 
disarmament. Acting as a framework obligation, it requires states to negotiate disarmament 
measures, which include technical aspects such as the comprehensive verification of a 
multilateral disarmament instrument. 
The sophisticated verification systems of NWFZ and the CTBT demonstrates the feasibility of 
achieving consensus on verification.679 It is important to acknowledge that a nuclear 
disarmament treaty would not be fully verifiable and the technical know-how to build NW 
would not be eliminated along with the warheads. While nuclear reactors and enrichment 
facilities are easy to spot, the detection of fissile materials and their use for non-peaceful 
purposes is challenging.680  
Yet, the verification of NW reductions in the absence of an institutionalised verification 
mechanism is very unreliable. Given the classification of information regarding nuclear 
weapons, it is difficult to verify the non-diversion of fissile materials in both military and 
civilian stockpiles. Hence, alternative means of verification are solicited by states, including 
intelligence services, societal verification and information provided by dissidents and whistle 
blowers. While these sources offer valuable insights into the nuclear activities of states, they 
do not compensate for the absence of institutional verification and provide mere indications 
rather than reliable information.  
The need for a sophisticated rule-based verification system was illustrated by the failure of 
intelligence services in Iraq, who assumed that Iraq was in non-compliance with UN 
resolutions mandating the elimination of its NW. This experience also highlights time-
sensitive character of nuclear disarmament, and in particular verification. Given the profound 
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implications of nuclear disarmament for both NNWS and NWS, verification efforts must both 
be aimed at ensuring compliance and preventing its premature enforcement. 
Concerns have been expressed, that inspections carried out by personnel from NNWS on the 
territory of NWS could result in a breach of Article I, NPT, which prohibits NWS from assisting 
NNWS in the acquisition of NW. Such concerns have not been expressed in the context of the 
CWC and may be dismissed in the nuclear disarmament context, given that an international 
control system for nuclear disarmament would necessarily involve inspectors from both NWS 
and NNWS.681   
Moreover, the Trilateral and UK-Norway Initiatives have demonstrated ways of addressing 
this concern. Similarly, in December 2014, the US and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) 
launched the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, involving 27 
NWS and NNWS. The purpose of this initiative is to explore tools and technologies needed to 
effectively verify future nuclear disarmament agreements without sharing sensitive NW-
related information.682 Hence, granting access to facilities for the purpose of verifying 
disarmament does not constitute a proliferation risk. 
 
 
 
3.5. Enforcement 
Similarly to verification, enforcement must be exceptionally reliable for NWS to be willing to 
give up their NW.683 The purpose of enforcement measures is to both deter states from 
breaching their obligations and deny states the benefits of any violation by raising the costs 
of violating disarmament obligations.684 However, the question of enforcement poses a 
number of challenges both for the achievement of a nuclear disarmament treaty in the near 
future and the effectiveness of such an instrument. 
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First, the obligation to negotiate under Article VI is difficult to enforce, given the absence of 
designated institutions charged with overseeing its implementation. This lack of conventional 
means to compel states to initiate negotiations raises the question whether legal dispute 
settlement offers an alternative way of achieving the implementation of Article VI. While 
some argue that reliable mechanisms for peaceful dispute settlement are crucial to the 
achievement of a NWFW,685 others regard weapons-related disputes are unsuitable for legal 
resolution, due to their politically sensitive nature and the slow nature of proceedings.686 
Given the early termination of proceedings, the ICJ was unable to demonstrate the potential 
of judicial decisions for the enforcement of legal obligations related to nuclear disarmament 
in the RMI Lawsuits against the nine NWS. While a judgment by the could have clarified the 
language of the NPT and offered a legally-binding interpretation of Article VI, this case 
illustrates that dispute settlement cannot be fully relied upon for the enforcement of a 
disarmament agreement. First, attempts by defendant states to side-step the case on 
jurisdictional grounds demonstrate that some cases may be excluded from legal dispute 
resolution.687 Secondly, even if the dispute reaches the merits stage, there is a risk that a party 
to the dispute will reject the decision of the court. Such a situation may raise secondary 
compliance issues. It appears that, at the current stage in nuclear disarmament and in the 
absence of an institutional framework, the diplomatic track offers the highest potential for 
achieving the implementation of Article VI obligations.  
Secondly, enforcement would remain challenging, even in the presence of a verifiable ban. 
Currently, the UNSC currently remains the only body possessing the authority to enforce a 
prohibition of NW, the NPT relying upon it to provide sticks and carrots to ensure compliance 
with non-proliferation obligations. However, a future role of the UNSC as the enforcing body 
                                                          
685 Yevgeny Primakov, Igor Ivanov, Mikhail Moiseyev, Evgeny Velikhov, ‘Start a New Disarmament Plan’ (RBTH, 
2010) http://in.rbth.com/articles/2010/10/22/start_a_new_disarmament_plan04815 
685 2010 RevCon Final Outcome Document. 
686 James Fry, (fn 34) 358; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 1986 
ICP Rep 14., 168; see also Rebecca Bornstein, (fn 750) 149: Bornstein argues that legal resolution must be 
categorically excluded for disputes concerning vital interests of States, such as disputes related to a state’s 
national armaments. 
687 The US rejected the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis that courts have no power to order the government to 
negotiate for disarmament, on the basis that the breach is “speculative”, meaning that compelling the US to 
negotiate would not redress any harm to the Marshall Islands. Finally, the US rejects jurisdiction on the basis 
that the suit raises a “non-justiciable” or non-legal question related to vital interests such as national security, 
which cannot be addressed by judges. 
177 
 
of a disarmament instrument would require a reconsideration of the veto in this context, 
given that five of the nine NWS possess a veto power. In other words, enforcement would be 
shaped by the will of the P5, as each P5 NWS could veto the enforcement of its obligations.688 
This would create a discriminatory disarmament process and perpetuate the exclusivity of the 
NPT nuclear club. It is likely that the de facto NWS, in particular India, will refuse to cooperate 
in such a setting. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the interests and security strategies of the P5 diverge, 
hindering their effective cooperation.689  For instance, the P5 could not agree on how 
rigorously to enforce compliance in Iraq. Generally, the UK, Russia and China are always more 
reluctant to impose sanctions than the US and France. Sanctions are ineffective.690 This can 
be, in part, explained by a wide range of forms of non-compliance and threat perceptions 
leave room for ambiguity and disagreement over the necessity and nature of enforcement 
measures.691   
Given that violations of disarmament obligations may require immediate measures, 
enforcement is a very time-sensitive requirement. Hence, the case-by-case determination of 
appropriate enforcement measures may weaken disarmament obligations. For this reason, 
automatic enforcement mechanisms, non-discriminatory sanctions predetermined by an 
enforcement body and adopted without a vote from the enforcement body, are considered 
for a future disarmament instrument. 692 It is unlikely that major powers will accept the 
automatic adoption of sanctions against them.  
More importantly, effective multilateral disarmament would require independent body for 
the authorisation of enforcement measures, which would enjoy international legitimacy and 
be sufficiently timely and authoritative. Such an enforcement mechanism would have to be 
adapted to the existing security environment as well as the security interests of states. 
Enforcement of non-proliferation obligations are essential to effective disarmament. Dispute 
resolution could contribute to enforcement of a nuclear disarmament agreement. Legal 
disputes over the convention would be referred to the ICJ with mutual consent of SP. A 
                                                          
688 Rebecca Bornstein, (fn 750) 149; Lawrence Freedman, (fn 726) 24. 
689 Rebecca Bornstein, (fn 750) 149. 
690 Hedley Bull, (fn 492) 35. 
691 Rebecca Bornstein, (fn 750) 149. 
692 Henry Sokolski, (fn 617) 29; Rebecca Bornstein, (fn 750) 149. 
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referral of a case of non-compliance to the UNSC would only take place in the most severe 
circumstances. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter assessed the ability of the existing legal framework for nuclear disarmament to 
advance the goal of a NWFW. It was concluded that, although both structural flaws and the 
divisive nature of the NPT have limited its ability to produce meaningful progress in nuclear 
disarmament, Article VI contains a clear obligation for States Parties to undertake multilateral 
negotiations towards disarmament measures, which is reinforced by an additional good faith 
requirement.  
Hence, it was argued that the failure of the international community to collectively establish 
a nuclear disarmament regime, can also be attributed to a compliance gap. Indeed, despite 
the absence of guidelines in Article VI for measuring progress in this respect, the continued 
failure of States Parties to initiate multilateral negotiations in existing fora and to begin the 
implementation of the 13 Practical Steps, was qualified as a violation of Article VI in this 
chapter. Furthermore, given the incompatibility of the modernisation of NW with the purpose 
of the treaty, it was concluded that such practices breach the good faith requirement. 
The formation of this compliance gap was attributed to a number of factors. First, it was 
concluded that while the quasi-universal adherence to the NPT reflects a global consensus on 
the necessity to eliminate NW, key NWS remain outside the NPT, thus limiting its ability to 
create sufficient levels of trust for multilateral negotiations. 
Difficulties in constraining the behaviour of States and compelling them to negotiate have 
also been attributed to the lack of a standing secretariat mandated with overseeing the 
implementation of the disarmament pillar of the NPT. The absence of an institutional 
framework providing States Parties with a negotiating forum has created a dependency on 
the UN disarmament machinery and the NPT review process, which have both proven unable 
to yield consensus. 
Finally, the issues of verification and enforcement constitute obstacles to the willingness of 
NWS to negotiate towards disarmament. Although all states agree that highly sophisticated 
mechanisms to verify and enforce compliance with disarmament obligations are to offer 
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sufficient certainty to NWS that the reduction and eventual elimination of their NW stockpiles 
does not create security threats, agreement on the precise characteristics of such 
mechanisms has proven challenging.  
In conclusion, while necessary legal obligations are in place, architectural flaws and external 
security considerations, not addressed by the current legal framework, have allowed states 
to disregard their obligation to negotiate for several decades. However, a number of factors 
yield hope that this deadlock can be overcome. For instance, the Marshall Islands lawsuit 
constitutes the first translation of a sense of frustration among NNWS into a legal reality. 
Should the case move to the merits stage, the judgment of the ICJ will likely clarify legal 
ambiguities and thereby leave less room for NWS to argue the legal continuation of their NWS 
programmes, regardless of the outcome.  
Furthermore, it was concluded from the analysis of the historic South African nuclear 
disarmament case that nuclear disarmament based is feasible, that profound domestic 
political change in combination with security assurances can facilitate the decision of NWS to 
abandon their NW. Finally, the Humanitarian initiative serves as a reminder of the 
fundamental humanitarian principles underlying nuclear disarmament, contributing to the 
necessary delegitimisation of NW.  
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Chapter 5 - The Effectiveness of Biological Disarmament 
 
Introduction 
The biological disarmament regime constitutes the third pillar for efforts of the international 
community to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction. Adopted as the first multilateral 
disarmament treaty in 1972, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) has been 
in force for more than four decades. During this time, it has successfully strengthened the 
taboo against biological weapons and achieved the renunciation of their use in warfare by the 
vast majority of states.693  
While biological weapons have seldom been used in wartime, their short- and long-term risks 
of the deliberate infliction of disease for human and animal health, the environment and the 
economy of the attacked state, continue to pose a threat to international peace and security. 
Their destabilising properties and potential for misuse by terrorists have been compared with 
those of lethal autonomous weapons, which once deployed, are difficult to contain.694 
Moreover, the destructiveness of biological pathogens, including their rapid spread to across 
continents, has been demonstrated by the outbreaks of the Ebola and Zika viruses in recent 
years. 
For these reasons, the BWC regime, and in particular its central objective to outlaw the 
possession of biological weapons, remains highly relevant. While it is widely perceived as a 
weak disarmament treaty in comparison with the comprehensive CWC, it is unclear by what 
standards it can be evaluated as such. Biological weapons have killed less than 100 persons in 
the 40 years since the BWC’s entry into force.695 In contrast, the use of chemical weapons in 
                                                          
693 Final Document Fourth Review Conference (BWC/Conf.IV/9), 14: reaffirmation that the use of biological 
weapons ‘would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind’; ‘Secretary-General Lauds Move to Strengthen 
Biological Weapons Convention’ (SG/SM/7897-DC/2797), 23 July 2001; ‘Measures under Review to Monitor 
Implementation, Verify Compliance’, (SG/SM/7897-DC/2797), 23 July 2001. 
694 Stuart Russell, ‘Robots in War: The Next Weapons of Mass Destruction?’, World Economic Forum, 17 January 
2016 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/robots-in-war-the-next-weapons-of-mass-destruction/ 
(accessed 19 January 2016). 
695 Robert Johnston, ‘Summary of Historical Attacks Using Chemical or Biological Weapons’, last updated on 30 
November 2016 http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/chembioattacks.html;  Jean-Pascal Zanders, ‘The 
BTWC – Maintaining Relevance’, Presentation at the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference, 2-4 
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warfare and by non-state actors has caused around 2,000 fatalities since the entry into force 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) almost 20 years ago. In other words, the number 
of fatalities caused by such weapons does not, on its own, offer a reliable indicator of strength 
or weakness of disarmament regimes. 
Therefore, this chapter seeks to establish criteria for assessing the legal effectiveness of the 
biological disarmament regime with the aim of evaluating its capacity to ensure the 
irreversible destruction of all biological weapons. For this purpose, it will examine levels of 
participation in the regime, as well as levels of compliance by States Parties with their 
disarmament obligations. Moreover, this chapter will evaluate the extent to which the 
absence of verification and enforcement mechanisms, as well as an institutional body from 
the treaty, affects the irreversibility of biological disarmament. 
  
5.1. The Biological Disarmament Regime 
5.1.1. The Taboo on Biological Weapons 
Biological and toxin warfare has been named ‘public health in reverse’.696 The term 
encompasses the deliberate administration of the disease-causing (pathogenic) effects of 
bacteria, viruses, fungi and toxins for military purposes.697 An attacker deliberately 
administers infectious or toxic substances to enemy troops with the aim of militarily 
weakening them by inducing disease. Biological weapons rely on the reproductive capacity of 
such organisms, as any human or animal infected with a pathogen can become a host and 
further spread the disease. As a result, only a small amount of pathogenic agent may suffice 
to spread a disease across populations and vast geographical areas. 
The military benefits of disease were exploited long before scientists understood its biological 
origins and mechanisms and the means of delivering and spreading such agents evolved over 
time. For instance, an early method of administering infectious or toxic substances to enemy 
troops consisted in polluting wells and drinking water with decaying corpses of humans and 
                                                          
November 2016 https://www.iiss.org/en/events/eu-conference/sections/eu-conference-2016-c74a/special-
sessions-4fbe/special-session-5-2890. 
696 Theodore Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence: Biological Warfare and How to Avoid It, (McGraw-Hill, 1949). 
697 Erhard Geissler (ed), Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, (SIPRI, OUP, 1986) 4-7: toxins are substances which 
are products of the activities of organisms such as bacteria, viruses or fungi. For example, some diseases, such 
as anthrax, are caused by toxins produced within the host (human, animal, plant). 
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animals.698 More advanced forms appearing later consisted in the administration of particular 
diseases, such as smallpox (Black Death), cholera or typhus.699 This approach was able to 
cause  devastating loss of life in enemy troops on the battlefield. 
A sentiment of disgust and moral rejection emerged as a result of early demonstrations of the 
indiscriminate effects of both chemical and biological weapons, and in particular the 
unnecessary suffering they caused.700 Hence, their prohibition was sought in parallel to their 
development, as part of efforts to both restrict means and methods of warfare, and to 
preserve honour and morality on the battlefield.  
The oldest written prohibition of non-conventional weapons was established in the Hindu 
Code of Manu (around 500 BC), which laid down rules against the use of treacherous methods 
of warfare by the king.701 Despite advocating the spread of disease as a method of warfare, 
Kautilya warned that the principal objective was to ‘consolidate peace’ and that restraint 
must be exercised in using disease to terrorise the enemy.702 
This early norm against biological warfare was repeated in modern agreements. The Brussels 
Declaration of 1874 reflected an attempt to codify a European prohibition on the 
‘employment of poison or poisoned weapons’ and ‘the employment of arms (…) calculated to 
cause unnecessary suffering.’703 The text of this Declaration was largely reproduced in Article 
                                                          
698 As early as 300 BC the Greeks polluted the wells and drinking water supplies of their enemies with the corpses 
of animals. Later, the Romans and Persians used the same tactics. In the medieval era, the bodies of human 
victims of disease were catapulted over city walls in order to fight off besieging armies. In 1155 at a battle in 
Tortona, Italy, Barbarossa broadened the scope of biological warfare, using the bodies of dead soldiers, as well 
as animals to pollute wells. In 1863 during the US Civil War, General Johnson used the bodies of sheep and pigs 
to pollute drinking water at Vicksburg. 
699 North American Indian Wars, 1763. Significant turn in the history of biological warfare.  
700 Jean-Pascal Zanders, ‘International Norms Against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy’ 
Vol 8(2), (Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2003) 391. 
701 Sharad Chauhan, Biological Weapons, (APH Publishing, 2004) 443-444; George Bühler (translation), The Laws 
of Manu, (Clarendon Press, 1886) 230, Chapter VI, verse 90: ‘Fighting in a battle, he should not kill his enemies 
with weapons that are concealed, barbed, or smeared with poison or whose points blaze with fire’; verse 93: 
‘(…) let him remember the duty of honourable warriors.’ 
702 Ibid note 6, Chapter II, 596. 
703 ‘Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874‘, 
reproduced in Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1988) 
22-34: Articles 12 – 14 
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23 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 on the laws and customs of war on land, which 
constituted the first legally-binding treaty restricting the use of biological weapons.704 
Following the Great War, both a desire to further develop a prohibition on biological weapons 
and efforts to prepare the ‘the first steps towards the general reduction and limitation of 
armaments’ led to the convening of the Geneva Conference in May 1925.705 This conference 
resulted in the adoption of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) on 
17 June 1925. As an extension of the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, the Protocol 
also prohibited the use of bacteria and other biological agents such as viruses as methods of 
warfare. 
The use of biological weapons was henceforth ‘justly condemned by the general opinion of 
the civilised world’. The text of the Protocol suggests that it was intended to become 
‘universally accepted as a part of international law.’706 However, it did not impose a complete 
ban on biological weapons, as it did not prohibit the study, production or storage of biological 
weapons and could not be verified or enforced. Moreover, states attached important 
reservations to it, in particular to preserve the right to use chemical and biological weapons 
in retaliation.707 Allied powers also engaged in biological warfare research and development 
and Winston Churchill declared the need for acquiring a germ warfare capability as a 
deterrent. 
Today, individuals, terrorist groups and military leaders display a continued interest in 
acquiring biological weapons due to their devastating potential and asymmetric advantages. 
The general appeal of biological weapons lies in the fact that they are much cheaper and 
easier to produce than chemical and nuclear weapons. The production of biological warfare 
                                                          
704 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907, International Peace Conference, The Hague, 
Official Records. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195?OpenDocument  
705 Georges Clemenceau, note to the German Foreign Minister, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, 16 June 1919; 
Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War 
(May-June 1925). 
706 BWC, ‘Universally accepted as a part of international law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of 
nations.’ 
707 Following the adoption of the BWC and the CWC, many reservations were withdrawn. A number of countries 
maintain their reservations, including Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Papua New 
Guinea, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Syria, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. 
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agents does not require large production plants or extensive expertise, as is the case for 
chemical weapons. Given that natural diseases are easily accessible they can be produced in 
any hospital or private establishment. Biological weapons could potentially be carried by 
ICBMs and released from a distance. 
Yet, when biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven relatively 
ineffective, thus offering only limited military value.708 It is impossible to reliably contain 
pandemics in space and time. Difficulties in reversing their effects once released into the 
environment, exposes not only the civilian population of the attacked state, but also the 
attacker to pathogenic agents, thus making the grounds inaccessible.709 For this reason, no 
military resources have been allocated to the training of forces in using biological weapons 
and the creation of decision-making processes for such use. 
While with the BWC the norm prohibiting the use the use of biological weapons is well-
established in international law and is believed to have acquired a customary character, the 
norm prohibiting their possession requires further development and strengthening. 710 
 
5.1.2. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
After the end of the war, concerns surrounding the inability of the global security system to 
contain and stabilise the effects and spread of new powerful weapons, for the first time raised 
the question of disarmament.711 The UNGA called for the elimination of all weapons 
‘adaptable to mass destruction,’ thus initiating first discussions on biological disarmament 
within the wider context of proposals for the general and complete disarmament of all 
weapons of mass destruction.712  
The UNGA assigned the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development 
and production of such weapons to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in 
                                                          
708 Jeffrey Ryan, Jan Glarum, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological Threats, 
(Butterworth-Heineman, 2011) 305 
709 Barry Schneider, Jim Davis, The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004) 
176. 
710 ICRC, ‘Rule 70 of Customary IHL’: this rule affirms that ‘the use of means and methods of warfare which are 
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.’ The commentary of this rule cites 
biological weapons as an example of this type of weapon. 
711 WHO, ‘Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons’ 2nd ed (2004) 10. 
712 UNGA res 1 (1), 24 January 1946 
185 
 
1968.713 Several states including Canada, the UK, France and the US abandoned their 
biological weapons programmes unilaterally while negotiations on the BWC were still 
ongoing.714 In particular, the renunciation by the US of its offensive biological weapons 
programme in 1969, irrespective of the outcome of negotiations, and its offer to open 
biological facilities for public inspection, added impetus to negotiations on the BWC.715 
Eventually, at its 26th session in 1971, the UNGA adopted resolution 2826 (XXVI) with the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), as an annex.  Although the BWC, the first 
multilateral treaty banning an entire class of weapons, was a landmark agreement, it was 
considered to be a first step in the evolution of the biological disarmament regime. This 
explains the lack of key elements in the convention, such as verification mechanisms, which 
were still deemed unachievable at the time of its conclusion. 
As part of efforts to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the UK initially proposed a treaty 
banning the production and research of microbiological agents usable for non-peaceful 
purposes.716 Following the adoption of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, the 
United Kingdom began to advocate biological disarmament more actively and succeeded in 
gathering sponsors for a treaty outlawing biological weapons. In parallel, the US and the 
Soviet Union focused on their ongoing bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). As it 
was clear that, towards the end of the nuclear talks, these two states would not dedicate their 
time and resources to negotiating a stronger BWC, the British delegation to the ENDC 
contented itself with a modest convention based on extensive compromise.717  
In addition to time restrictions, the absence of provisions for verification may also be 
explained by the fact that biological disarmament was regarded as unverifiable at the time. 
As argued by the UK, ‘organisms which would be used [in the production of biological 
                                                          
713 General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI), 5 December 1966. 
714 United States: Disarmament Conference documents (CCD/PV.585), 655; UK: Disarmament Conference 
documents (CCD/PV.659) 
715 ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1969, Washington DC, 1970, 592 – 593; Office of the White House Press 
Secretary, Press Release, Washington DC, 14 February 1970: Later, it also renounced the production, stockpiling 
and use of toxins in warfare. 
716 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Methods 
of Warfare’, submitted by the United Kingdom (ENDC/255, 10 July 1969; ENDC/255/Rev.1, 30 July 1969) 
717 Nicholas Sims, ‘A Simple Treaty, a Complex Fulfilment: A Short History of the Biological Weapons Convention 
Review Conferences’, Vol 63 (3) (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2011) 9. 
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weapons] are required for medical and veterinary uses and could be produced quickly, 
cheaply and without special facilities either in established laboratories or in makeshift 
facilities.’718 Despite this verification challenge, the British delegation to the ENDC urged that 
the rapid adoption of new obligations was not only crucial for containing the risk of the 
eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare, but also for preserving the possibility of 
reversing it.719 
Originally considered jointly with a treaty on chemical disarmament, progress on the BWC 
was made possible by the decision in the ENDC to pursue biological disarmament separately. 
In fact, much stricter verification requirements were attached to a chemical disarmament 
treaty than the BWC. Difficulties in overcoming verification challenges led to the much later 
conclusion of the CWC in 1992. 
The BWC opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. 
Despite its shortcomings, ‘the BWC was a pioneering, multilateral treaty that for the first time 
in history banned an entire category of WMD.’720 This treaty ‘would supplement but not 
supersede the 1925 Geneva Protocol,’ which remains an essential element of the biological 
disarmament regime today.721 Indeed, although the BWC does not explicitly prohibit the use 
of biological weapons, its Article VIII affirms that the prohibition on their use established by 
the Protocol remain valid. Moreover, the BWC has made reservations under the Protocol void 
for BWC States Parties. At the seventh Review Conference in 2011, States Parties have agreed 
that 
‘reservations concerning retaliation, through the use of any of the objects prohibited 
by the Convention, even conditional, are totally incompatible with the absolute and 
universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and 
retention of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, with the aim to exclude 
completely and forever the possibility of their use.’722 
Comprising only fifteen articles, the BWC was intended to be the core of a much wider regime 
of non-proliferation measures, export controls, the criminalisation of the misuse of 
                                                          
718 ‘UK Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare’, submitted to the ENDC, ENDC/231, 6 August 1986, para 3. 
reproduced in Jozef Goldblatt, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume IV, CB Disarmament 
Negotiations, 1920-1970 (Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971) 255-256. 
719 Ibid. 
720 Secretary-General Lauds Move to Strengthen Biological Weapons Convention; Measures under Review to 
Monitor Implementation, Verify Compliance, SG/SM/7897-DC/2797 
721 Ibid, para 4-5, 7 
722 Final Document, Seventh Review Conference of the BWC, BWC/CONF.VII/7, 13 January 2012, para 45 
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pathogenic microbes and toxins, rather than serving as a unique instrument for ensuring the 
elimination of biological weapons.723 Indeed, 
‘(…) the primordial function of the BWC was to assert a norm of abstention from 
biological weapons armament, to reassert the taboo against resorting to the use of 
biological weapons, and to provide a nucleus around which international action against 
transgressors could crystallise.’724 
It was assumed that crucial elements could still be attached to the convention following its 
entry into force. For instance, the verification of state compliance with these measures was 
‘not at that time (…) seen as a cost-effective addition to the array, especially since the 
technical component of such measures was relatively undeveloped.’725  
The BWC’s ‘strength lies in the simplicity of its absolute prohibition,’ which covers the 
development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin 
weapons.726 Article I defines the scope of the ban on biological weapons. It provides that 
States Parties are under the obligation to  
‘never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 
retain:  
(1) microbial other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for 
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.’ 
This article establishes a definition of biological weapons. Rather than listing criteria for their 
identification, it defines biological weapon agents on the basis of the general-purpose 
criterion. The dual-use nature of biological agents imposes such a limitation on the ban on 
biological agents usable for non-peaceful purposes. Only quantities and types of agents 
whose retention, production and acquisition cannot be justified for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful purposes are banned.  
                                                          
723 Secretary-General Lauds Move to Strengthen Biological Weapons Convention; Measures under Review to 
Monitor Implementation, Verify Compliance, SG/SM/7897-DC/2797 
724 George Poste, Julian Perry Robinson, ‘International Control Measures: The Biological Weapons Convention 
and its Projected Protocol’, in Measures for Controlling the Threat from Biological Weapons, (Royal Society, 
2000), 9-14. 
725 ibid 
726 Nicholas Sims, (fn 803) 9. 
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Any microbial agent, biological agent or toxin which cannot be used for peaceful purposes is 
covered by the definition. In particular, the general-purpose criterion allows the prohibition 
in Article I to remain comprehensive in the face of scientific and technological progress as it 
covers yet unknown technologies. It restricts the criteria for the exclusion of substances from 
this definition to those which are used for purely peaceful scientific purposes, but may 
possess dual-use characteristics. It thereby encourages such peaceful use of bacteriological 
agents and toxins.727 The BWC also supports the development of the peaceful uses of 
biological science and technology and contributes to strengthening national public health, 
veterinary, agricultural and emergency-response capacities. 
This approach to defining biological weapons has only been contested by Switzerland, which 
ratified the Convention with the reservation that it would maintain the right to decide which 
items are covered by the definition. This reservation was contested by the US which warned 
that such unilateral decisions would undermine the general-purpose criterion.728  
The BWC is a disarmament- rather than an arms control treaty, as its primary contribution is 
to the general and complete elimination of WMD.729 Article II provides that states which 
acceded to the BWC prior to its entry into force were under the obligation to destroy all 
stockpiles within nine months after its entry into force. At the Fourth Review Conference 
States Parties clarified that new states acceding to the BWC after its entry into force would 
have to complete the destruction or diversion of its stockpiles prior to their accession.730 
Consequently, in the absence of a deadline for destruction, all States Parties have equal rights 
and obligations under the convention as non-possessor states. 
This eliminates the need for biological arms control measures in the Convention. Given the 
absence of de jure possessor states equivalent to those recognised by the NPT, the obligation 
in Article III not to transfer, encourage or induce other states or private persons to acquire or 
retain biological weapons must be understood as measures preventing the acquisition rather 
than the proliferation of biological weapons. 
                                                          
727 See Article X, BWC 
728 Note by US Secretary of State to the Swiss government, 18 August 1976.  
729 Secretary-General Says Biological Weapons Convention has made Important Contribution to Efforts to 
Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction, SG/SM/7341, 26 March 2000 
730 Final Document Fourth Review Conference (BWC/Conf.IV/9), 16, para 1. 
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The requirement imposed on acceding states to destroy and dispose of their biological 
weapons stockpiles or their conversion to peaceful uses, places such activities outside of the 
temporal scope of the Convention. Consequently, the effectiveness of this destruction, as 
required by Article II, cannot be verified. Indeed, in contrast to chemical weapons, very little 
attention has been given to the destruction of biological agents themselves, as the quantities 
of end products to be destroyed are much smaller than in chemical weapons.731  
Further key provisions include Article VI, which obliges States Parties to consult bilaterally and 
multilaterally to solve any problems with the implementation of the BWC, and Article VI, 
which provides that any States Party may request the UNSC to investigate alleged breaches 
of obligations. These two provisions highlight the fact that, despite the treaty’s 
comprehensiveness in terms of the scope of the prohibition, the treaty was strongly criticised 
for its lack of an institutional element, verification mechanisms, as well as conventional 
mechanisms for enforcement. This led some states to only reluctantly join the convention 
much later or to remain outside of it.732 
The incompleteness of the convention and the vagueness of the terms it applies are, in part, 
remedied by periodical review conferences. They have built up ‘a significant body of 
interpretative statements, politically binding commitments, definitions and procedures,’ 
which albeit legally non-binding, may be taken into account in the interpretation of the BWC’s 
provisions.733 In other words, they put ‘flesh on the skeleton (…) of a rather emaciated text.’734  
 As mentioned above, the BWC was regarded as a starting point for the addition of further 
measures to ensure compliance with the prohibition of biological weapons. However, despite 
the gradual clarification of the BWC’s provisions, efforts to complement the treaty with 
additional measures for the verification of compliance, including the adoption of a legally 
binding verification protocol, have been largely fruitless.  
 
                                                          
731 ‘Swedish Working Paper on the Destruction of Chemical and Biological Means of Warfare’, 30 March 1971, 
CCD/324, 180: This working paper only suggests that the destruction of biological agents may be destroyed by 
combustion, in autoclave or by means of disinfectants. In contrast, it offers a much more nuanced description 
of the chemical weapons destruction process. 
732 See France and China who both joined in 1984. 
733 Article 31 VCLT, para 3, a),b): the use of subsequent agreements and practices for the interpretation of 
treaties. 
734 Nicholas Sims, (fn 803) 10, 11. 
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5.3. Effectiveness Evaluation 
5.3.1. Participation and Cooperation 
In the years following its entry into force, the membership of the BWC increased rapidly. By 
the time the CWC entered into force, the BWC had been joined by 140 states, including all of 
the P5 states. Yet, in recent years, the rate of accession has slowed down significantly. As of 
July 2016, only 178 States have acceded to it, making it the least ratified out of the three 
WMD treaties.735 In December 2015, the UNGA adopted a resolution in which it stressed the 
continuing need to achieve the universalisation of the BWC and called upon all signatory 
States to ratify the convention without delay.736 This importance to reinforce the universal 
scope of the Convention had previously been reaffirmed by the UNSC in its Ceasefire 
resolution of 1991.737 
There is a widespread understanding among States Parties that this lack of universality is 
considered to be one of the BWC’s principal weaknesses. Indeed, the rejection by all States 
of the very notion of biological warfare is crucial for making the norm against biological 
weapons effective. Recognising this need for universality, States Parties agreed at the seventh 
Review Conference of the BWC in 2011 ‘that a concerted effort by States Parties is needed to 
persuade States not party to join the Convention.’738 Such efforts include 
• the promotion of universalisation through bilateral contacts with states not party and 
through regional and multilateral fora and activities.  
• reports on the activities of non-States Parties at annual meetings of States Parties, 
• and the sharing of relevant information on activities related to the promotion of 
universalization of the Convention.739 
The Chairs of meetings of States Parties were mandated with the coordination of 
universalisation activities, and the preparation of annual reports on universalisation activities 
                                                          
735 UNODA, ‘Status of the BWC’, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc: 178 States Parties; ‘Status of the 
CWC’: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc 192 States Parties (as of December 2016); ‘Status of the NPT’: 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt 191 States Parties (as of December 2016).  
736 UNGA resolution A/RES/70/74, 7 December 2015, adopted without a vote: second and third introductory 
paragraphs. 
737 UNSC resolution 687 (1991), S/RES/687, 8 April 1991, 2 
738 Final Document, Seventh Review Conference of the BWC, BWC/CONF.VII/7, 13 January 2012, para 27 
739 Ibid, para 28. 
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as well as progress reports.740 The most recent progress report identified ten states whose 
accession or ratification process is under way,741 and fourteen states who are not expected 
to accede to the BWC in the foreseeable future.742 
This process offers insights into the reasons why States hesitate or decide not to join the BWC. 
Reasons for delays in ratifying the BWC given by signatory states included the domestic and 
regional situation of states, such as elections, political transitions and other political 
considerations.743 For example, the unwillingness of key hold-out states include Egypt, Israel 
and Syria can be attributed to the political situation in the Middle East.  
While non-signatory states provided very limited information on their reasons for remaining 
outside of the BWC, four states listed ‘concerns about the obligations under the Convention, 
including [obligations such as] financial contributions and national reporting, [which they do] 
not have the capacity to fulfil.’744 The validity of this justification for non-accession may be 
questioned on the grounds that 21 states parties to the much more demanding CWC have 
chosen to remain outside of the BWC regime. Indeed, the obligation to make contributions 
toward the OPCW and the CWC’s strict verification regime, which imposes declarations and 
inspections, makes CWC membership much more onerous both in financial and practical 
terms.745 
On the other hand, it must be noted, that the majority of non-States Parties display a 
commitment to the principles embodied in the convention. None of them have explicitly 
rejected particular provisions of the treaty, but have instead expressed a willingness to ratify 
the BWC in the near future. However, a fundamental lack of awareness of the BWC, even 
among delegates to meetings of States Parties and Review Conferences, has made the 
promotion of universality especially challenging.746 Public awareness is important for support 
                                                          
740 Ibid, para 29. 
741 Chairperson of the Meeting of States Parties to the BWC, ‘Report on Universalisation Activities’, Item 11, 
BWC/MSP/2015/4, 5 November 2015, para 7: Djibouti, Guinea, Haiti, Namibia, Tanzania (process started); 
Angola, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Nepal (process well advanced). 
742 Ibid: Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Liberia, Kiribati, Micronesia, Samoa, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Tuvalu (waiting for further information, assistance, or have other priorities); Egypt, Israel, Syria (no action 
expected in near future); Niue (no information or feedback yet received). 
743 Ibid, para 8 – 17. 
744 Ibid, para 29, 30, 33, 35. 
745 Graham Pearson, ‘Time for Structural Changes to Make the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention More 
Effective’, Vol 1 (1), (Global Security, 2016) 36. 
746 Jean-Pascal Zanders, (fn 763). 
192 
 
on the part of NGO and for the allocation of funding. Regional BWC workshops have been 
held as a remedy to this lack of awareness. 
In terms of cooperation among States Parties, the BWC is a very active treaty. Article X of the 
Convention provides for such international cooperation among States Parties in activities 
relevant to the object and purpose of the convention.747 Achieving effective cooperation has 
proven challenging on a multilateral level, as States Parties have been unable to converge 
their ideas and approaches in official fora such as the Conference on Disarmament, the First 
Committee of the United Nations and Review Conferences. As a consequence, discussions 
tend to remain abstract and produce few concrete proposals. This has generated a lot of 
frustration among States Parties, which has led to the emergence of more informal forms of 
cooperation on a regional and sub-regional level. 
States Parties to the BWC have organised themselves into three groups for the purposes of 
facilitating discussions, namely the Eastern European Group, the NAM and the Western 
Group.748 The further breakdown of the three Cold War blocks into informal groupings may 
have benefits for cooperation. For instance, the EU, a group of Latin American states and the 
JACKSNNZ group have submitted joint working papers and proposals in preparation of the 
Sixth Review Conference in 2006.749 Such groupings benefit from the like-mindedness of their 
members, flexibility and loose coordination.  
While such regional and cross-regional approaches demonstrate that cooperation in the 
implementation of the BWC is possible, they lack a degree of coordination sufficient for the 
translation of such efforts into the multilateral sphere. In other words, they are undermined 
by the lack of political support for such initiatives by key states, including the US, Russia and 
China. In particular, since the withdrawal by the US of its support for a verification protocol 
                                                          
747 Article X, BWC: (1) provides for the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information between States Parties for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful 
purposes, the collaboration with other states or international organisations in scientific research and the 
prevention of disease. (2) provides that such exchange must avoid hampering economic or technological 
development of States Parties. 
748 UNODA, ‘Regional Groups in the Biological Weapons Convention’: composition of groups 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/bwc/membership/regional-groups-in-the-biological-weapons-
convention/  
749 Latin American Group: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay; JACKSNNZ: Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea, Switzerland, Norway, New 
Zealand; Working Papers are available at BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1-19 
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in 2001, the lack of US leadership has limited the ability of the States Parties to converge their 
national interests around a common approach.750 
 
5.3.2. Compliance 
While the loose terms used in Articles I and II of the BWC enable the prohibition of biological 
weapons to be comprehensive in scope, it also makes it difficult to define compliance. Article 
I excludes only such agents and toxins from the definition of biological weapons, whose 
acquisition or retention may be justified for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes. The term ‘justification’ in the first paragraph does not set a clear threshold beyond 
which certain biological or toxin agents may no longer be needed for ‘peaceful purposes’. In 
particular, it does not establish a clear dividing line between research for entirely peaceful 
purposes and dual-use research.751 
This may be explained by the fact that, in some cases, the quantity or type of biological agent 
alone does not indicate a specific intent regarding its peaceful or non-peaceful use. As a 
consequence, the identification of agents which must be destroyed or converted as part of 
biological disarmament efforts is not a straightforward task. However, given that the BWC 
imposes the elimination of an entire class of weapons, the impact of instances of non-
compliance in the form of the concealment of weapons during disarmament efforts or the 
manufacture of new weapons can be severe. 
For this reason, efforts undertaken by States Parties to increase confidence in compliance, 
have been accompanied by conceptual discussions of compliance; how it can be defined and 
demonstrated.752 Yet, little consensus has been achieved on appropriate methods to identify 
compliance. Indeed,  
                                                          
750 Oliver Meier, ‘Don’t Neglect the Biological Weapons Convention’, Arms Control Now, 12 January 2012 
https://armscontrolnow.org/2012/01/12/dont-neglect-the-biological-weapons-convention/; Daniel Gerstein, 
‘Commentary: The US Needs to Exercise Leadership at the Biological Weapons Convention’, Rand, 23 December 
2015 http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/12/the-us-needs-to-exercise-leadership-at-the-biological.html  
751 Filippa Lentzos, ‘Confidence and Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention’, Workshop Report, 
KCL, London, December 2014 http://www.filippalentzos.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/BWC-workshop-
report-NEW-web.pdf  
752 Nicholas Sims, ‘What Future for Biological Disarmament?’ in Graham Pearson, Nicholas Sims, ‘Report from 
Geneva: The Biological Weapons Convention Fortieth Anniversary of the Entry into Force’, Review No. 42, May 
2015, 35: ‘Such a conceptual discussion of compliance needs to be open ended, without preconditions’. 
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‘many parties have different understandings of compliance. Accordingly, confidence 
can hardly be easily measured, but will be perceived as gradually changing when trust 
in compliant behaviour grows or decreases.’753 
It is unclear ‘whether compliance is a binary state or a continuum.’754 In other words, does 
the term ‘justification’ in Article I intend to set a clear quantitative and qualitative cut-off 
point beyond which biological and toxin agents may no longer be used for peaceful purposes? 
Or must the presence of certain types or quantities of such agents in national facilities be 
evaluated in combination with other factors, such as the intent of the state in question or the 
perception of threat by other States Parties as a result of an alleged violation?755 
In terms of the intent underlying activities relevant to the BWC, it has been argued that 
‘almost any activity conducted with defensive intent will be compliant with the BWC.’756 
Others warn that such an understanding of ‘peaceful purposes’ in Article I may promote 
biological weapons proliferation rather than prevent it.757 
Neither of the two approaches clarifies the question who must be charged with such an 
assessment. Some states claim the right of states to perform this task, while others argue that 
only a formal multilateral body would be able to provide such a politically impartial 
assessment. Given that a multilateral implementation body does not exist under the current 
legal architecture of the BWC, compliance assessments are carried out unilaterally by States 
Parties under no common approach. Confidence-building measures support such unilateral 
evaluations, in that they offer a certain, albeit limited, degree of transparency into the 
activities of States Parties in the biotechnological field. 
Such unilateral compliance assessments have indicated that the vast majority of States Parties 
has successfully implemented their disarmament obligations under Article II. However, strong 
                                                          
753 Gunnar Jeremias, ‘The Future of Confidence Building in Biological Arms Control’, in Graham Pearson, Nicholas 
Sims, ‘Report from Geneva: The Biological Weapons Convention Fortieth Anniversary of the Entry into Force’, 
Review No. 42, May 2015, 38. 
754 Wilton Park Report, ‘Compliance with the BWC: Strategies Towards the 2016 Review Conference’, 23 – 25 
September 2015, para 3. 
755 Ibid, para 24: ‘states can provide data that will add up to an impressionistic picture of its state of compliance, 
not a “yes-no” judgment about its compliance status.’ 
756 ‘Ensuring Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention’, Report on the Meeting on BWC Compliance 
Review Processes, July 2009, 1 http://cissmdev.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/default/files/papers/bwc_ 
compliance_review_report.pdf ; see ‘Material on Compliance by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the 
BWC’, BWC/CONF.III/3/Add.1, 9: the Soviet Union argues that it is in compliance with Article I, despite keeping 
‘at its disposal agents of infectious diseases and toxins only of those kinds and in those quantities which are 
indispensable for research in a programme of defence against bacteriological warfare.’ 
757 Ibid. 
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suspicions on the part of many exist that a number of States, including North Korea, Iraq, Iran, 
Libya, China and Russia, have actively pursued biological warfare programmes. For example, 
at the third Review Conference of the BWC in 1991, Australia, the UK and the US collectively 
accused the Soviet Union of having developed biological weapons in violation of the 
convention. At the fifth Review Conference in 2001, the US made similar allegations against 
four BWC States Parties -  Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya.758 
The biological weapons programme Iraq had operated in violation of the BWC and other 
related obligations imposed by the UNSC constitutes one of the most prominent cases of non-
compliance. Iraq ratified the BWC in 1991 and claimed to have eliminated its biological 
weapons stockpiles as part of the cease-fire agreement ending the Gulf War.759 It was later 
revealed that Iraq had produced anthrax spores, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and possibly 
plague and ricin, and had initiated a programme on several viral agents.760 
Despite ratifying the BWC in 1975, South Africa operated a smaller-scale biological warfare 
programme under the code name ‘Project Coast’ beginning in the early 1980s. The biological 
agents acquired and tested under the programme were anthrax, cholera and plague.761 It was 
dismantled under President De Klerk in 1993 as the result of international pressure, in 
particular from the US. The disarmament process and the comprehensive elimination of all 
biological weapons stockpiles was not verified by an external entity.762 
                                                          
758 John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, ‘Remarks to the Fifth Biological 
Weapons Review Conference Meeting’, Geneva, 19 November 2001 https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm 
/janjuly/6231.htm 
759 UNSC resolution 687 (1991), S/RES/687, 8 April 1991, 5, para 8, a). 
760 ‘Global Chemical and Biological Weapons Survey’, Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003, JIC 
Current Intelligence Group Assessment, 28 October 2002 http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/232640/2002-
10-28-cig-assessment-global-chemical-and-biological-weapons-survey.pdf : ‘We assess that Iraq has continued 
with an offensive BW programme. Research, development and production is assessed to continue under cover 
of a number of outwardly legitimate institutes and covert facilities. Confirmed intelligence reveals that 
transportable BW production facilities have been constructed. Iraq has possibly already made significant 
quantities of BW agents and intelligence indicates it has continued to produce biological agents. We judge that 
Iraq is self-sufficient in its BW programme and currently has available, either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more 
recent production, anthrax spores, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and possibly plague and ricin.’ 
761 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Programme, testimony of Jan Lourens, Daan Goosen, Mike Odendaal, and Schalk van Rensburg; Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999 - April 2002, testimony 
of André Immelman and James Davies. 
762  Stephen Burgess, Helen Purkitt, ‘The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Weapons Program’, INSS Occasional 
Paper 37, February 2001. 
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It has been argued that these instances of non-compliance suggest the BWC’s ineffectiveness 
in dissuading governments and military leaders from pursuing biological weapons 
programmes. 763 
  
5.3.3. Institutional Capacity 
Unlike in the cases of the CWC and the NPT, no international agency or other permanent body 
oversees activities related to the BWC. While this absence of an implementation body from 
the BWC has been interpreted as limiting the legally binding nature of the treaty, it must be 
noted that the provisions of the convention are legally-binding even in the absence of such a 
body.764 Rather, the responsibility to monitor relevant activities and the implementation of 
the treaty lies with the States Parties themselves. 
Article XII of the Convention provides that a Conference of States Parties was to be convened 
five years after its entry into force for the purpose of reviewing the operation and 
implementation of the BWC. The purpose of Review Conferences is to reaffirm the treaty’s 
binding power and to shape its evolution by creating and recording political consensus.765  The 
first Review Conference in 1980 served as a useful forum for clarifying the terms and 
provisions of the BWC and affirming the comprehensive scope of its prohibition.766 In 
particular, the review process has provided States Parties with a forum for the development 
of initiatives for addressing the BWC’s challenges.  
Such initiatives include the adoption of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) at the second 
and third Review Conferences, as well as the establishment of working groups for the 
advancement of verification measures.767 At the fifth Review Conference (2001), it was 
decided that the review process would be complemented with intersessional Meetings of 
                                                          
763 Jonathan Tucker, ‘Putting Teeth in the Biological Weapons Convention’, Issues in Science and Technology, 
Volume XVIII Issue 3, Spring 2002 http://issues.org/18-3/tucker/ (accessed 9 July 2017). 
764 See EU Non-proliferation and Disarmament Conference. BWC session Q&A, 1 October 2013: notes. 
765 Nicholas Sims, (fn 803) 11. 
766 2nd (1986) Rev Con: the convention covers relevant scientific and technological developments, as well as 
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Experts and Meetings of States Parties ‘to discuss and promote common understanding and 
effective action on’ a number of issues with the aim of strengthening the Convention.768  
At the sixth Review Conference in 2006, the BWC’s long-standing institutional deficit was 
addressed. The Implementation Support Unit (ISU), a three-person body was created as part 
of UNODA in Geneva. The ISU was mandated with providing administrative support to 
member states in the implementation of the BWC, facilitating the exchange of confidence-
building measures and the universalisation of the convention.769 The creation of the ISU was 
among the Review Conference’s greatest successes, as it provided States Parties with 
secretarial support for the first time.  
Yet, it has been unable to achieve any tangible results. This can, in part, be explained by its 
modest set-up and the failure of States Parties to expand this body and its resources. While 
CWC and NPT States parties have provided their respective institutions with budgets of 
approximately USD 66 million (OPCW) and 361 million (IAEA) in 2016, proposals for the 
expansion of the ISU from three members of staff to five were rejected.770  
It has been estimated that if the costs of enhancing the ISU were included in the annual 
budget of the BWC, the total costs 4.5% of the OPCW’s annual budget.771 This unwillingness 
of States Parties to invest little resources in the strengthening of the BWC’s institutional 
support, illustrates the relatively low priority of the convention among their security concerns 
and the level of seriousness they attach to its implementation.772 
In other words, none of the initiatives launched in the Review Conference have offered 
permanent solutions to the BWC’s most pressing issues, including rapid advancements in 
biotechnology, the absence of an international organisation overseeing the implementation 
                                                          
768 Final Report, Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, BWC/CONF.V/17, para 18, a). 
769 Final Doc, Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, BWC/CONF.VI/6, Geneva, 2006, 19.  
770 Overview of OPCW budget (1998-2016), ‘Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)‘, NTI, 
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of the convention, a continued lack of transparency and verification, and the resulting lack of 
confidence in compliance. The Final Documents of the most recent Review Conferences have 
revealed a stalemate stemming from the inability of States Parties to reach consensus on 
steps forward.  
The Final Document of the eighth Review Conference in November 2016 reveals a regression 
in efforts to strengthen the BWC. The meetings of experts have been stopped and the 
meetings of States Parties will continue, albeit without a clear mandate beyond preserving 
the ISU. Again, proposals for an increase in the number of ISU staff were not approved.773 To 
some, the Review Conferences have been reduced to a ‘talk shop’ or an ‘empty ritual 
exchange of predictable arguments but no forward movement’.774 
In light of the continued absence of an implementation body from the BWC, the question has 
been raised whether this institutional ‘weakness’, may actually make the BWC better 
equipped to deal with certain issues than the other WMD treaties. For instance, it has been 
argued that this approach may offer more flexibility in addressing future challenges, as it is 
less rigid than institutionalised.775 Indeed, in fixed institutions are based on agreements, the 
terms of which States Parties are very reluctant to modify in light of changing circumstances. 
Moreover, negotiating process are slowed down by bureaucratic obstacles and may be easily 
blocked by vetoes. In other words, such disadvantages may outweigh the benefits of 
institutions.  
Cooperation between States Parties for the purpose of ensuring the implementation of the 
convention, constitutes a new form of governance. However, while the facility to achieve 
agreement on important issues is a pre-condition for success in following this approach, 
recent review conferences have revealed that this is not given. Instead, regional centres of 
decision-making have emerged, allowing regional actors to converge their approaches to 
strengthening the BWC.776 The development of autonomous sets of values and expectations 
on the regional level may be more beneficial to the BWC. On the other hand, such a 
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fragmented form of governance might gradually break up the BWC into regional instruments 
challenge the multilateral norms contained in the BWC. 
 
5.3.4. Verification 
As mentioned above, Article II of the BWC provides that all joining states must eliminate their 
biological weapons materials prior to their accession. However, no mechanisms are in place 
to verify the destruction of stockpiles or of their diversion to peaceful purposes. An acceding 
state is not obliged to declare the completion of the destruction or conversion process. 
Moreover, States Parties have been unable to adopt multilateral mechanisms for providing 
each other with the confidence that the destruction of biological warfare agents has not been 
reversed. Consequently, in the absence of a multilateral monitoring body, the responsibility 
to ensure each other with sufficient confidence in compliance, lies with the States Parties 
themselves. 
The ‘recognition that effective verification could reinforce the Convention’ features in the 
Final Documents of each Review Conference.777 The treaty regime mandates that states-
parties consult with one another and cooperate, bilaterally or multilaterally, to solve 
compliance concerns. A verification regime would facilitate a State party’s compliance with 
the Convention and provide accountability among its parties. It substantially improves the 
prospects for expanded international cooperation involving the peaceful uses of biological 
materials and technology and the exchange of scientific and technological information, which 
is a legal right of all parties to the Convention.   
Challenges for verification, which go beyond those encountered in the verification of the CWC 
and the NPT, have not been overcome since the negotiation of the BWC. In particular, a 
number of difficulties created by the dual-use nature inherent to biological weapons agents 
has made classic approaches to verification unfeasible. Given that organisms producing 
pathogenic agents possess a strong reproductive capacity, comparatively small quantities of 
biological weapons agents can be militarily significant. In contrast, chemical agents must be 
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deployed in multi-ton quantities and spread across large areas in order to be militarily 
significant.  
Furthermore, while most chemical warfare agents have no peaceful application, a number of 
biological weapons agents may also be used in biomedical research, vaccines or for industrial 
purposes. Consequently, the application of such agents must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis and requires the subjective identification of intent. Finally, traces of biological weapons 
agents can be eliminated from biopharmaceutical equipment in a very short time, making 
even short-notice inspections an ineffective means for proving or disproving breaches of the 
BWC.778 
Concerned by the inability of States Parties to achieve an agreement on multilateral means 
of verification, the UNGA mandated the Secretary-General of the UN in its resolution 42/37 
(1987)  
‘to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention 
by any Member State concerning the possible use chemical and bacteriological 
(biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or 
other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of 
the matter and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member 
States.’779 
While this Secretary General Mechanism (SGM) was primarily intended and used for the 
investigation into alleged uses of chemical weapons prior to the adoption of the CWC, it has 
also been used to investigate biological weapons use. It was an important addition to the 
biological weapons regime which continued to lack means for verification, other than national 
technical means, consultations among States Parties and the filing of formal complaints with 
the UNSC, for the investigation of alleged use of biological weapons.   
Yet, the full potential of the SGM remains unexploited. It has fallen into disuse as a 
consequence of the entry into force of the CWC in 1997 and was put on hold to avoid pre-
empting the development of field investigation procedures. While efforts have been 
undertaken to reinvigorate this mechanism, some states are sceptical about the reliance on 
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the SGM for verification.780 Their principal concern is the possibility the Secretary-General 
might refuse to investigate allegations against a P5 States Party.  
At the second Review Conference of the BWC, States Parties adopted confidence-building 
measures (CBM), ‘in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and 
suspicions [regarding the misuse of biological agents or technologies for non-peaceful 
purposes], and to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological 
(biological) activities.781 Information exchanges under the CBMs remain the only means for 
enhancing transparency among BWC States Parties to date. However, they have been 
relatively ineffective in doing so. Infrequent participation and the provision of inadequate 
information often make data gathered difficult to analyse and verify.782 This lack of 
investment in the CBM process can be explained by hopes in the late 1990s that a Verification 
Protocol would be adopted.  
In the late 1980s, the Western Group, a group of 33 BWC member states, pushed for renewed 
efforts to negotiate verification measures. It reminded States Parties that, under the present 
BWC regime, one could not be fully certain that all biological weapons had been destroyed 
and new ones were not being built. As a result, an Ad Hoc Group was established in 1994 to 
address these obstacles to verification. It was mandated with the negotiation of a verification 
protocol for ensuring greater transparency into facilities capable of dual use, rather than 
identifying breaches with a level of confidence comparable to that of the NPT or CWC.783 
The idea was to provide States Parties with a ‘reasonable level of confidence in compliance’ 
while protecting the commercial interests of industrial actors. For this purpose, the Protocol 
provided for mandatory annual declarations of dual-capable facilities, routine visits of such 
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Member States have never submitted a declaration; only eight states provided submissions between 1987 and 
2005; incomplete, inaccurate and misleading data. 
783 Ibid, 56 participating States Parties  
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facilities and short-notice challenge investigations requested by a States Party suspecting a 
violation.784 
After six years of negotiations on a verification protocol under this group, failure to achieve 
consensus on its terms, and in particular the withdrawal by the US of its support for the draft 
protocol, led to its abandonment in 2001.785 Its principal objection to the Protocol consisted 
in the argument that, while being ineffective in deterring proliferators, its verification 
measures would compromise commercial and industrial secrets.786 Following the US 
announcement of its withdrawal, most States Parties were unwilling to continue talks on the 
Protocol, which had constituted the only prospects for a legally-binding, multilateral 
verification instrument. 
Over the years, ambitions to achieve a multilateral verification regime were replaced with a 
unilateral approach consisting in unfounded accusations of non-compliance. This risked 
undermining the BWC’s credibility.787 The continued failure to attach a verification regime to 
the BWC both prior to and following its entry into force solidified the idea that biological 
disarmament is not verifiable.788 
However, the general discussion surrounding verification in the context of the BWC fails to 
address the concrete signification of ‘verification’ in the present context of biological 
disarmament, which has to be reconsidered in light of the present verification practices and 
technologies.789 While early forms of verification relied upon national technical means such 
as satellite surveillance and aerial observation, modern verification measures including OSI 
are applied by multilateral bodies.  
                                                          
784 ‘Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction’, UN Doc, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/CPR.8, 
3 April 2001: Article 4, Article 9 
785 Rebecca Whitehair, Seth Brugger, ‘BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following US Rejection’, Arms 
Control Today, 1 September 2001 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_09/bwcsept01; Ambassador Donald 
Mahley, US Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Arms Control Issues, ‘Statement by the United States 
to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties’, Geneva, 25 July 2001 
786 Ibid 
787 Nicholas Sims, ‘A Simple Treaty, a Complex Fulfilment: A Short History of the Biological Weapons Convention 
Review Conferences’, Vol 63 (3) (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2011) 10 
788 Jean Pascal Zanders, Amy Smithson, ‘Ensuing the Future of the Biological Weapons Convention’ Vol 18 (3) 
(Nonproliferation Review, 2011) 480 
789 Ibid 
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The notion of verification in the 1960s and 1970s differed tremendously from its current 
function. During the 1970s, verification was regarded as an appropriately rapid means of 
detecting a militarily significant breach of treaty obligations. This idea of verification was 
adapted to the reduction of weapons which take a long time to develop, produce and 
deploy.790 In contrast, disarmament treaties such as the BWC require a different type of 
verification, given that even very low numbers of illegally retained weapons may bear great 
military significance. Measures to ensure confidence in compliance must be adapted to the 
nature of the ‘uncertainty’ related to potential breaches.  
It is therefore necessary to depart from an entirely different angle when contemplating 
measures for the verification of biological disarmament on the one hand, and the verification 
of chemical and nuclear disarmament, on the other. A simple copy of the CWC verification 
system into the BWC context would not work. A declaration and inspection-based approach 
based on material accountancy is not considered practicable in biological disarmament due 
to the dual-use nature of pathogenic agents.791 A more process-oriented approach consisting 
the surveillance of industrial activities with the aim of ensuring their peaceful nature may be 
more appropriate than verifying the presence of certain technologies at a certain point in 
time. 
Since the entry into force of the BWC, actors, tools and processes for verification have 
multiplied and diversified and participate in BWC related information exchanges. They include 
the WHO, WTO, Interpol, WCO, the biopharmaceutical industry, research institutes, UN 
agencies, environmental protection.792 This diversity illustrates the shared responsibility to 
prevent the reconstitution of biological weapons programmes. 
For instance, the World Health Organisation (WHO) ‘investigates unusual outbreaks of 
disease.’ Following the anthrax attacks in the US 2001, the World Health Assembly of the 
                                                          
790 Ibid, 481 
791 Jozef Goldblat, ‘The Biological Weapons Convention – An Overview’, International Review of the Red Cross, 
No. 318, 30 August 1997. 
792 Jean Pascal Zanders, Amy Smithson, ‘Ensuing the Future of the Biological Weapons Convention’ Vol 18 (3) 
(Nonproliferation Review, 2011) 481: off-site and on-site inspections to prove compliance and non-compliance; 
a shift from common practice of state secrecy to an international expectation of state transparency in arms 
control and disarmament regimes; expansion of state surveillance capacity, whistleblowers; strengthened 
governmental and professional oversight of industry practices and research (including public health and safety, 
security standards, export control, data collection under the BWC CBM); increase in nongovernmental actors 
(think tanks, scientific organisations, news media). 
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WHO added ‘preparedness for deliberate epidemics’ and improved ‘capacity for infectious 
disease surveillance and response’ to its agenda.793 However, it must be noted that such 
surveillance aims to safeguard international health and does not serve as a reliable tool for 
ensuring the effective destruction of biological weapons. In cases where the WHO identifies 
a deliberate use of biological weapons agents, the allegation would have to be brought to the 
attention of the UNSC. In other words, the fundamental purpose of biological disarmament 
verification, namely to ensure States Parties of compliance with the treaty, is not satisfied by 
WHO surveillance.  
Additional measures related to the protection of intellectual property over organisms, such 
as under the WTO, may offer additional insights into the nature of biotechnological activities 
of states. These measures indirectly contribute to the objectives of the BWC, namely to 
ensure that biological agents and biotechnology are only used for peaceful purposes.  
Finally, it has been suggested that an overlap between the BWC and CWC may partially 
compensate for the absence of verification measures in the BWC. Both treaties prohibit the 
development, production and stockpiling for non-peaceful purposes of so-called ‘mid-
spectrum agents’, such as toxins produced by living plants, animals and microorganisms.794 
Consequently, such agents are verifiable under the CWC verification regime.  
However, such dispersed methods and instruments do not amount to a coherent and 
sufficiently intrusive verification regime. Past instances of non-compliance and continued 
interest by state- and non-state actors in biological warfare agents raises the requirements 
for verification, which can no longer be met by unilateral or regional efforts. In other words, 
an overarching multilateral entity mandated with the continued surveillance of the activities 
of States Parties, remains indispensable.  
Yet, the lack of US leadership and the recent US-Russian differences, have created further 
obstacles to a common approach. In particular, the Obama administration surprisingly 
followed former President Bush in rejecting multilateral approaches to verifying compliance 
                                                          
793 World Health Assembly resolution WHA55.16, ‘Global Public Health Response to Natural Occurrence, 
Accidental Release or Deliberate Use of Biological and Chemical Agents or Radio-nuclear Material that Affect 
Health‘, 18 May 2002 
794 Jonathan Tucker, ‘Re-envisioning the Chemical Weapons Convention’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2 May 
2011 http://thebulletin.org/re-envisioning-chemical-weapons-convention: Article I, BWC; Article II, CWC. Mid-
spectrum agents possess features of both chemical- and biological warfare agents. 
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with the BWC.795 Instead of strengthening the BWC as the principal instrument for outlawing 
biological weapons, it places an increased emphasis on preventing the acquisition and use of 
biological weapons by non-state actors, thus neglecting the disarmament objective of the 
convention.796 
 
5.3.5. Enforcement 
The notion of enforcement of biological disarmament must be considered within the context 
of the BWC’s legal architecture. The absence of both an implementation body and a 
corresponding verification regime raise the question on what grounds and by what entity 
compliance issues might be addressed.  
Article V of the BWC places the responsibility on its States Parties to consult with one another 
and cooperate, bilaterally or multilaterally, to solve ‘any problems that may arise in relation 
to (…) the Convention,’ including compliance concerns.797 The initial identification of such 
problems may be undertaken by any States Party, but a ‘specific, timely response to any 
compliance concern alleging a breach of their obligations under the Convention’ must be 
provided.798 In addition, Article VI provides that such a response may take the form of a formal 
complaint with the UNSC. Article VI constitutes the only provision of the BWC which offers a 
procedure for addressing suspicions or allegations of non-compliance. It provides that 
‘Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in 
breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a 
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should 
include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its 
consideration by the Security Council.’ 
This Article has been considered weak, since the negotiation of the BWC for reasons related 
to the likely use of the veto by the P5 in the case of allegations of non-compliance against 
them. Concerns persist regarding the establishment of a discriminatory practice between the 
                                                          
795 Oliver Meier, ‘Don’t Neglect the Biological Weapons Convention’, Arms Control Now, 12 January 2012 
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P5 and their allies on the one hand, and the remaining BWC States Parties on the other.799 As 
a result, Article VI may only be applied to states other than the P5 and their allies. In other 
words, its credibility continues to hinge upon the responsible use by the P5 of their veto 
power. 
At the third Review Conference of the BWC, States Parties reiterated this concern by inviting 
the UNSC to ‘consider immediately any complaint lodged under Article VI and to initiate any 
measures it considers necessary for the investigation of the complaint’800 More recently, 
States Parties have affirmed that Article VI does not limit the right of states 
‘to consider jointly cases of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the 
Convention and to make appropriate decisions in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and applicable rules of international law.’801 
This clarification of measures to be taken under Article VI stems from a joint US-Canadian 
proposal of 17 September 1991 to include sanctions as a possible response to violations of 
the BWC.802 The intent of this addition was to strengthen the credibility of Article VI as a 
deterrent to violations by providing further options for enforcement in cases where UNSC 
measures would be vetoed.  
It is known that a number of States, including North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, China and Russia, 
have actively pursued biological warfare programmes. Still, Article VI has not been invoked to 
date, neither in the form of a UNSC complaint nor in the form of sanctions.803 This reluctance 
of BWC States Parties to enforce the convention, a responsibility which was placed upon them 
                                                          
799 Nicholas Sims, The Evolution of Biological Disarmament, (OUP, 2001) 53-54: the draft conventions between 
1969 and 1971 provided for the adoption of a UNSC resolution (‘Accompanying Resolution’), in which it declared 
its of its intent to ensure the activation of the complaint procedure under Article VI, (i.e. to use the veto power 
sparingly). The P5 expressed their unwillingness to constrain their veto power in the context of the BWC.  
800 Final Document, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, BWC/CONF.III/23, 9-27 September 1992, 
19; repeated in the Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 
25 November – 6 December 1996, 50.  
801 Final Document, Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, BWC/CONF.VI/6, para 31; 
reiterated in BWC/CONF.VII/7, para 31 and Advance Version of the Final Document, Review Conference of the 
States Parties to the BWC, para 31. 
802 Joint US-Canadian Proposals for the Final Declaration, ‘Article V’, BWC/CONF.III/23, Part III, 16 September 
1991, 75: ‘The Conference notes declarations by States Parties of their intention to consider individually the 
application of sanctions against any State which uses biological or toxin weapons, as well as to consider 
individually measures, including sanctions, in response to any violations of the Convention. Such measures might 
include cessation of scientific and technical collaboration on any biological activity, trade restrictions or denial 
of economic assistance.’ 
803 Final Document, Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, 7-25 November 2016, Advance Version, 
para 27 – 31. 
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as a substitute for institutional enforcement, illustrates how the institutional weakness and 
inability to verify compliance undermine the treaty’s authority as a whole. 
The current measures in place, including CBMs and the ISU, do not enable States Parties to 
make compliance assessments which are sufficiently reliable to allow them to adopt 
appropriate and effective enforcement measures. Given that the terms of Article VI do not 
specify the nature of the ‘breach of obligations’, it is unclear what evidence may confirm the 
validity of such a breach.804 As a result, the assessment of non-compliance is made unilaterally 
and on the basis of evidence available to one or a small number of states only. 
 The serious political implications of such allegations explain why States Parties may be 
reluctant to lodge formal complaints with the UNSC or adopt unilateral sanctions on the basis 
of provisions which offer only vague guidelines. In other words, even four decades after the 
entry into force of the BWC, it is unclear how States Parties must respond to violations. 
Review Conferences have not been able to reconcile the objective to contain the potentially 
severe consequences of non-compliance with difficulties in assessing non-compliance. As a 
consequence, the convention has remained unenforced.  
At the opening of the fifth Review Conference of the BWC, the US delegate openly accused 
six states of violating the Convention, namely Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Sudan. 
However, these allegations were not made with the aim of bringing those states back into 
compliance, but for the purpose of highlighting the BWC’s ‘ineffectiveness in dissuading these 
States from pursuing biological weapons programmes’ and to express the conviction that ‘the 
draft BWC Protocol would have likewise failed to do so.’805 Instead, the US proposed ‘a 
voluntary cooperative mechanism for clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by mutual 
consent,’ including the criminalisation of certain behaviours on a national level.806 
As noted above, measures to address non-compliance must be adapted to the nature of 
uncertainty created by a suspected violation of the BWC. While the BWC does not ban the 
                                                          
804 Article VI, BWC: ‘Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming [the] validity [of the 
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805 John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, ‘Remarks to the Fifth Biological 
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use of biological weapons, any violation which may be directly aimed towards their 
acquisition or the establishment of a biological warfare programme (i.e. militarily significant 
violations) must be addressed in a systematic and legally-binding, rather than voluntary 
manner. As affirmed by the fourth BWC Review Conference in 1996, instances of ‘non-
compliance should be treated with determination in all cases, without selectivity or 
discrimination.’807  
The reluctance of States Parties to address suspected violations without access to sufficiently 
reliable information on the suspected violator’s activities on the one hand, and the need for 
rapid, adequate and coherent measures to address such allegations on the other, limit the 
BWC’s ability to deter future breaches. This explains why  
‘instances and allegations of use have historically been dealt with outside of the BWC 
context and there have been few biological weapons-related crises that might have 
forced States Parties to grapple with the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the BTWC.’808 
In conclusion, unilateral enforcement measures, as envisaged by Articles V and VI do not 
constitute an effective substitute for an institutionalised and legally-binding verification and 
enforcement regime.  
 
Conclusion 
Considering the modest origins of the BWC and in particular the compromises made during 
its negotiation, tremendous progress has been made in further developing and broadening 
its structure. Ambiguities stemming from the limited legal architecture have been clarified 
through a regular dialogue of States Parties in the review process. This dialogue has enabled 
States Parties to adopt subsequent agreements on the legal interpretation of provisions, 
which have provided additional support to the already comprehensive prohibition of 
biological weapons embodied in the BWC. In addition, the activities related to the Convention 
have broadened, inviting more actors to participate in advancing its objectives. 
While the legal architecture of the Convention has become denser, expectations that its 
fundamental flaws would be remedied through the adoption of additional mechanisms have 
                                                          
807 Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the BWC, BWC/Conf.IV/9, 16 para 9 
808 Wilton Park Report, ‘Compliance with the BWC: Strategies Towards the 2016 Review Conference’, 23 – 25 
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been largely disappointed. The BWC’s lack of universality is considered to be one of its 
principal weaknesses. While ongoing efforts to promote universality are likely to further 
increase the treaty’s membership, a persistent group of hold-out states is expected to remain 
outside of the treaty, thereby limiting the confidence of States Parties in the non-use of 
biological weapons. 
Moreover, more than four decades since the entry into force of the treaty, States Parties are 
still unable to cooperate effectively on a multilateral level. Indeed, the absence of a 
multilateral implementation body from the BWC has challenged States Parties to assume the 
responsibility to achieve consensus on important matters without such institutional support. 
As a result, only succeeded in partial and regional initiatives have been launched, which have 
yet to be integrated into the BWC regime.809 However, the failure to adopt a Verification 
Protocol illustrates the lack of political will among States Parties to invest time and resources 
into the strengthening of the treaty and to make necessary concessions. 
The continued lack of institutional support and verification mechanisms has continuously 
weakened the BWC. Indeed, it has not only been unable to dissuade states from pursuing 
biological warfare programmes, but its States Parties also lack appropriate means for 
addressing such instances of non-compliance. This inability to maintain and enforce 
compliance has earned it the name ‘the toothless convention.’810 
In conclusion, the architectural shortcomings of BWC and the inability of its States Parties to 
remedy them limit its legal effectiveness as a disarmament treaty. The effective and 
irreversible destruction of all biological weapons cannot be guaranteed under the current 
regime. However, it must be noted, that despite these weaknesses and the continuing 
questioning of its relevance, the evolution of the BWC regime is ongoing. The BWC the 
remains the cornerstone of the biological disarmament regime to date. Although its role in 
the advancement of ‘general and complete disarmament’ is undisputed, further 
opportunities for placing such activities under ‘strict and effective international control’ must 
be sought.  
                                                          
809 Graham Pearson, Nicholas Sims, ‘Report from Geneva: The Biological Weapons Convention Fortieth 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that legal regimes are crucial instruments for disarmament, but 
that their mere existence sufficient for their effective advancement of disarmament goals. In 
order for disarmament regimes to have a significant impact in the sharply political 
environment in which they operate, they must be provided with a strong legal architecture 
and undergo a continuous effectiveness evaluation.  
The central aim of this research was to remedy the absence of tools enabling disarmament 
practitioners to better understand and enhance the role which legal regimes play in advancing 
disarmament. For this purpose, it first provided a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of 
the law on disarmament before it proceeded to an evaluation of the three WMD disarmament 
regimes on the basis of criteria of effectiveness.  
In this chapter, the principal findings with regard to the research questions are summarised 
and general conclusions drawn from these results. Then, practical application and 
implications for disarmament practitioners, legal advisors and policy-makers will be 
discussed. Furthermore, the limitations of this research will be outlined. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations for further research building on this study and contributing 
to the further development of evaluative tools for testing the effectiveness of disarmament 
regimes. 
  
1. Research Findings and Limitations 
This thesis has recalled that while states have historically sought the elimination of the most 
destructive weapons for as long as they have existed, ‘in an international community that was 
still chaotic, [and without strong legal structures], the first attempts at disarmament were 
timid, few and far between, narrow in scope and generally destined to fail.’811 Chapter 2 
described how, with the emergence of disarmament as a means of preserving international 
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peace and security, states grew more willing to limit their sovereignty and subject themselves 
to legal disarmament instruments. 
An examination of the legal sources of disarmament in Chapter 1 revealed the key conclusion 
that the general principle of voluntarism in international law also governs disarmament 
regimes. In other words, the effectiveness of disarmament regimes rests primarily on the 
consent given by states to disarmament obligations. In the absence of consent, special 
obligations to disarm may arise for third states under customary international law or be 
imposed by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Historically, coerced disarmament, such as the disarmament of Germany in the inter-war 
period, has not led to sustainable and irreversible disarmament. It can be argued that by 
pushing the boundaries of an obligation to disarm on a state, the effectiveness of an existing 
legal regime is undermined as this casts doubt on the consistency and integrity of the law. 
Indeed, if the state that is the object of coercive measures appears to be singled out, this calls 
into question the authority of the treaty regime. As a consequence, the multilateral, consent-
based, legally-binding, verifiable and enforceable elimination of individual classes of weapons 
was reaffirmed as the most effective approach to WMD disarmament. 
Chapter 1 identified key sources of international law and their interaction. It was concluded 
that the law on disarmament does not constitute lex specialis overriding general international 
law and that disarmament regimes cannot be qualified as self-contained regimes given their 
strong reliance on the latter for treaty interpretation, the enforcement of compliance and for 
institutional support from the UN. 
A state’s consent to being bound by a disarmament obligation is not sufficient for it to be 
effective. It is crucial that the scope of the obligation is clear (internal effectiveness). The 
discussion of Article VI, NPT in Chapter 4 revealed that inaccurate and unclear language can 
leave the exact scope of an obligation open to interpretation. The RMI lawsuits further 
illustrated this, as it resorted to a customary rather than conventional obligation to disarm.  
The disarmament debate is part of a broader question of non-use. The elimination aims are 
preventing the use of these weapons. However, these questions must be kept separate. 
Disarmament law is embedded in broader disputes from which it needs to be distinguished. 
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Findings Related to the External Effectiveness of Disarmament Regimes 
The substantive chapters (Chapters 3 – 5) provided an in-depth examination of the chemical, 
nuclear and biological disarmament regimes. They revealed that ‘the rule of law for 
disarmament has evolved very unevenly,’ each regime having gone through its own distinct 
evolution.812 This serves as a reminder that disarmament measures must always account for 
the technical particularities of weapons and their evaluation must take into consideration 
their distinct political challenges.    
The chemical disarmament regime constitutes the most comprehensive and sophisticated out 
if the three WMD regimes. It was concluded that the CWC’s legal structure provides a solid 
foundation for chemical disarmament. The level of participation is satisfactory overall and 
multilateral institutions such as the OPCW and the UN are equipped with the infrastructure 
and instruments necessary to deal with the technical requirements of chemical disarmament. 
Moreover, a sophisticated verification regime is attached to the CWC and mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the CWC are available. 
The effectiveness evaluation in Chapter 3 indicated a high capacity of the CWC regime to 
influence state behaviour. A first conclusion regarding the impact of this regime was drawn 
by means of contrasting the silence of the international community in response to the use of 
chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war (1980 – 1988, prior to the adoption of the CWC), 
to the strong moral outrage of the international community in the Syrian context, which 
facilitated ad hoc disarmament measures in response to the use of CW in Syria (2013).  
However, it was argued in this chapter that the structure of the CW regime is not sufficiently 
flexible. For example, the mandate of the OPCW does not allow for the shared treatment of 
samples with the UN, nor does it provide guidelines for dealing with emerging challenges such 
as non-state actors. Furthermore, this chapter highlighted the grey areas caused by the lack 
of enforcement mechanisms inherent to the CWC regime. In this respect, the reliance on the 
UNSC for enforcement exposes the regime to the bias and veto of the P5, thus allowing close 
relations to a P5 member to protect violators from sanctions. 
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On the other hand, practical obstacles limit the scope of the regime and, consequently, its 
applicability. For example, the Syrian case highlighted the limited scope of the CWC regarding 
non-state parties. To remedy this shortcoming, ad hoc disarmament regimes may serve as a 
complement to the CWC disarmament regime. This has been illustrated by the example of 
the UN-OPCW joint disarmament mission in Syria. However, it was concluded that the narrow 
mandate of the UN-OPCW mission only provided quick, short-term solutions and deprived 
chemical disarmament of the long-term effects the CWC regime offers. 
Moreover, these findings highlight the importance of the time factor in disarmament 
operations, as the crisis situation in Syria has allowed the intensification of efforts in terms of 
participation of states in the operation, the quick implementation of verification measures 
and the cooperation between the UN and OPCW in the mission. Finally, it was argued that 
while the entry into force of the CWC has significantly decreased the risk of chemical warfare, 
the complete and permanent elimination of CW requires universal adherence to the CWC 
regime.  
The nuclear disarmament regime constitutes the most limited WMD regime to date. With the 
adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the legal architecture of the 
regime may finally take shape. This analysis centred on Article VI, NPT which contains the 
disarmament pillar of the NPT. The failure of the Marshall Islands Lawsuits at the ICJ to 
produce authoritative conclusions with regard to the legal scope and nature of Article VI 
highlighted the continued relevance of this question. 
It was argued in this chapter that the application of the interpretative rules of the VCLT (Article 
31, VCLT) does not indicate an obligation to disarm, but rather an obligation of conduct to 
take concrete steps to initiate the negotiation of disarmament. In other words, the standard 
of behaviour contained in Article VI is a standard of due diligence which only requires states 
to take active measures, but not specific outcomes. 
However, a number of types of behaviour indicate a violation of this weak standard of 
behaviour. The legal ambiguity of Article VI has enabled states to justify the continuation and 
even modernisation of their NWS programmes. Although the Marshall Islands lawsuits have 
failed to contribute to the clarification of the legal standard in Article VI.  
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Difficulties in achieving necessary levels of trust for multilateral negotiations on disarmament 
can be explained in part by the fact that key nuclear weapons states remain outside NPT 
regime. Furthermore, difficulties compelling states to negotiate have also been attributed to 
the lack of a standing secretariat mandated with overseeing the implementation of the 
disarmament pillar of the NPT. The absence of an institutional framework providing States 
Parties with a negotiating forum has created a dependency on the UN disarmament 
machinery and the NPT review process, which have both proven unable to yield consensus. 
Finally, the inability of states to agree on the key characteristics of verification and 
enforcement mechanisms has constituted a disincentive for states to initiate formal 
negotiations.  
However, the Marshall Islands Lawsuits and the Humanitarian Initiative constitute the first 
translations of a sense of frustration among non-nuclear weapons states into a legal reality. 
They added to the momentum which enabled the adoption of the new Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Following its entry into force, this treaty will establish much 
clearer and sharper standards of behaviour for states offer alternative approaches to 
overcoming this deadlock. Moreover, the South African case of nuclear disarmament 
illustrated that profound domestic political change in combination with security assurances 
can facilitate the decision of a nuclear weapons state to abandon their nuclear weapons. 
The evaluation of the biological disarmament in Chapter 5 revealed that although no cases of 
biological weapons have been known in recent years, the BWC regime’s fundamental 
shortcoming lies in the lack appropriate means for addressing instances of non-compliance. 
Due to ambiguities in the treaty language resulting from the reduced legal architecture of the 
BWC and reliance on the general-purpose criterion, states parties rely on the subjective 
identification of instances of non-compliance. This inability to maintain and enforce 
compliance has earned it the name ‘the toothless convention.’813 
Furthermore, the BWC’s reduced membership in contrast with the CWC and NPT is another 
key weakness. While ongoing efforts to promote universality are likely to further increase the 
treaty’s membership, a persistent group of hold-out states is expected to remain outside of 
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the treaty, thereby limiting the confidence of States Parties in the non-use of biological 
weapons. 
The BWC’s States Parties are still unable to cooperate effectively on a multilateral level. 
Indeed, the absence of a multilateral implementation body from the BWC, efforts to achieve 
consensus on important matters without such institutional support have only resulted in 
partial and regional initiatives, which have yet to be integrated into the BWC regime.814 The 
failure of its States Parties to adopt a Verification Protocol illustrates the lack of political will 
among States Parties to invest time and resources into the strengthening of the treaty and to 
make necessary concessions. 
A key strength of the BWC is its review process. The review process has enabled States Parties 
to achieve consensus on the legal interpretation of provisions, which has provided additional 
support to the already comprehensive prohibition of biological weapons embodied in the 
BWC. In addition, the activities related to the Convention have broadened, inviting more 
actors to participate in advancing its objectives. It was concluded that despite the absence of 
verification mechanisms, adequate institutional support and enforcement mechanisms, the 
evolution of the BWC regime is ongoing.  
 
2. Limitations of Research 
The subjectivity of Effectiveness Analysis 
Given that there is no commonly agreed definition of effectiveness in IR literature, the 
understanding of effectiveness is inherently subjective and depends on the theoretic 
perspective and expertise of the analyst. Therefore, a systematic quantitative measurement 
of effectiveness is not possible. However, qualitative analysis is better suited for examining 
the trajectory of a regime over time.  
Limited Generalisability of the Findings 
The application of the same criteria to all three WMD regimes has highlighted the different 
levels of completeness of the legal architectures of the nuclear, chemical and biological 
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regimes linked to the different stages in their development. Their evolution not being linear 
and responding differently to external influences, it is difficult to draw generalisable 
conclusions across regimes and to draw useful comparisons regarding their performance. 
Furthermore, as effectiveness analysis is a very subjective field of research, it is difficult to 
find empirical evidence which connects the legal potential of a regime to the positive results 
it achieves in practice. 
Further Testing of the Criteria for Effectiveness 
Given the novelty of this approach to assessing WMD regimes, it must be further challenged 
and adapted in order to be consolidated. As Levi, Young and Zürn noted, criteria for regime 
effectiveness which have not been ‘explored systematically across a range of international 
regimes (…) remain hypotheses in need of testing.’815 In other words, a further application of 
these criteria would enable the long-term testing of the criteria themselves and over time 
lead to their sharpening and strengthening of the criteria as evaluative tools.  
Extension to Conventional Disarmament Regimes 
This research was limited to non-conventional disarmament regimes, not covering 
conventional multilateral disarmament treaties such as the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Mine Ban Treaty and 
others. The applicability of the framework for effectiveness used for WMD regimes to 
conventional disarmament regimes remains to be explored.  
 
3. Practical applications and implication 
Disarmament practitioners with little or no legal expertise would benefit greatly from this 
research, as it provides them with important clarifications of the legal structure underlying 
the regimes they engage with on a routine basis. It allows them to better understand the 
implications of the legal obligations which their governments subscribe to which enhances 
the likelihood of their consistent adherence to them. A clearer understanding allows non-
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International Relations, 1995) 300. 
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legal disarmament practitioners to adopt a more proactive and informed role in the 
negotiation of new legal instruments and measures. 
For disarmament actors with more advanced legal expertise, this research may serve as a 
useful reminder of the ways in which general international law interacts with disarmament 
norms. For instance, legal ambiguities can be better addressed through knowledge of the Law 
of Treaties rules on treaty interpretation. Experts in one WMD regime may draw valuable 
insights from the legal analysis of another. 
The criteria for effectiveness established in this thesis offer practical tools for participants in 
review processes, as they serve as guidelines for areas and issues to navigate in identifying 
the strengths and weaknesses of a regime as well as practical steps to address them. This 
research facilitates a more constructive exchange between policy-makers, legal experts, 
national security advisors and other actors, as it acknowledges a range of interests which must 
be considered yet focuses on the common goal of preserving and strengthening disarmament 
measures. 
Finally, think tanks, NGOs and international disarmament organisations can draw from this 
research as a source of training materials for disarmament practitioners. For example, the 
joint training programme of The Asser Institute for International Law and the OPCW provides 
‘multidisciplinary education on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and threats 
through a historic, legal, technical, diplomatic, and geopolitical framework.’816 This research 
addresses each of these perspectives and joins them into a holistic framework for 
effectiveness. 
 
4. Recommendations for future research 
Given the legal emphasis of the research question, this research has primarily covered the 
legal and political spheres of disarmament, while integrating scientific, technological and 
military factors only as secondary considerations. The multifaceted nature of WMD 
disarmament invites disarmament actors from different background to contribute to a better 
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understanding of the different factors influencing disarmament dynamics. For this reason, the 
integration of further insights from the technological, scientific and military communities 
could further contribute to the refinement of the framework for testing the effectiveness of 
WMD regimes.  
For example, further research is needed to better understand how political will is generated 
and sustained. While this cannot be explained on the grounds of a legal analysis, legal 
effectiveness heavily depends on the presence of sufficient political will. The degree of 
political will manifests itself both at the negotiation and implementation levels. In other 
words, it affects the internal and external effectiveness of a regime. A better understanding 
of the factors influencing political will and its own influence on a regime’s legal structure 
would better inform future effectiveness evaluations.  
Furthermore, there is little long-term value in a singular assessment of the status quo of a 
disarmament regime. As discussed in the introduction, disarmament regimes are dynamic 
entities which are susceptible to rapid change. For this reason, only their continuous re-
evaluation using the same framework for effectiveness can allow for a long-term 
effectiveness analysis.  
For example, the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons constitutes a 
significant addition to the nuclear disarmament regime, occurring following several decades 
of stagnation in its evolution. However, its long-term significance may only become clear 
through a repeated re-assessment of its legal architecture which is limited as of now but 
expected to be expanded through further negotiations. Hence, further research is required. 
While this thesis has affirmed the crucial role which international law plays in the pursuit of 
disarmament. However, it must be noted that given the diversity of competing interests, it is 
difficult to define the precise extent to which states consider legal and non-legal in a given 
situation. On this issue, Daniel Joyner affirms the ‘complexity of the issue area [of 
disarmament], and the difficulty of finding a clear place for international law on issues of such 
high priorities and national security sensitivity.’817 
                                                          
817 Daniel Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (OUP, 2009) 216 – 
217. 
219 
 
Yet, the analysis of the international law on disarmament and in particular on international 
custom, has revealed that new disarmament norms may crystallise slowly over time and 
become relevant in unforeseeable situations, as illustrated by the case of Syrian disarmament. 
The immediate attention which states dedicate to the legal dimension of disarmament is not 
indicative of its long-term impact in practice. Furthermore, this thesis highlighted the fact that 
new factual circumstances create new legal issues. For this reason, it calls for and encourages 
the continued examination and clarification of issues of the international law applicable to 
disarmament addressed in this thesis.  
 
5. The Role of International Law in Disarmament 
Through its in-depth and up-to-date analysis of international disarmament law, this thesis has 
made an important contribution to the thus far limited legal literature on disarmament 
regimes. Yet, the role of international law in disarmament is permanently questioned, given 
that disarmament obligations are not directly enforceable, the factors driving or hampering 
disarmament are of primarily political nature and consequently the authority of legal 
disarmament norms may appear negligible. 
As Daniel Joyner notes, the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons ‘stands 
as a testament to the complexity of the issue area, and the difficulty of finding a clear place 
for international law on issues of such high priorities and national security sensitivity.’818 While 
international law may indeed rarely be the most influential factor in disarmament debates, 
States tend to use disarmament treaties as political instruments to promote their national 
interests. 
Therefore, when legal norms enter the disarmament debate, they have to be as effective as 
possible in establishing clear obligations with as little opportunity for states to take advantage 
to vague and ambiguous provisions, to invoke their lack of confidence due to inexistent or 
flawed verification mechanisms and other regime weaknesses. In other words, by 
strengthening legal disarmament instruments, their impact as political tools will be 
heightened and ultimately the legal and political spheres will interact more constructively. By 
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setting benchmarks for state behaviour surrounding weapons, disarmament treaties shape 
public discourse. 
This research attempts to suggest that the legal format is indispensable for WMD 
disarmament by arguing without it, states would not be able to achieve sufficient levels of 
confidence in each other’s commitments. In other words, that legal commitments establish 
clearer and stronger boundaries for state behaviour than mere political commitments. In a 
similar vein, Sergio Duarte warns: 
‘Just imagine the conditions facing the rule of law that would exist if one day all legal 
constraints on the world’s deadliest weapons were suddenly to disappear. We would 
face a world in which arsenals of WMD were not only growing – both in quantity and 
in quality – but also appearing in more and more states. Risks would increase that 
non-state actors would acquire WMD, as the legal and political barriers to such 
acquisition would fall. This would be a world of might-makes-right – a dark, 
nightmarish vision indeed.’819 
In conclusion, this thesis showed that this is not the end of disarmament regimes. All three 
WMD regimes currently provide such crucial legal barriers to the re-acquisition of WMD. 
Despite the use of chemical weapons in Syria, modernisation efforts on the part of nuclear 
weapons states the lasting absence of means to verify weapons activities, the wheels of WMD 
disarmament are turning, albeit slowly. Building on the understanding that they continue to 
be indispensable for international peace and security and that they have not yet reached their 
full potential, this research has served as a contribution to the continuous investment in these 
regimes. 
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